This section is from the book "A Compendium Of The Law And Practice Of Vendors And Purchasers Of Real Estate", by J. Henry Dart. Also available from Amazon: A compendium of the law and practice of vendors and purchasers of real estate.
Where the sale was expressed to be made in consideration of the purchaser's subsequent covenant to pay an annuity and a gross sum of 3000l. in the event of his own marriage, there was held to be no lien upon the estate for the 3000l. (a): upon this decision it may be remarked, that the nature of the consideration, and the fact of a covenant being taken, furnished strong arguments in favour of an intention to abandon the lien as respects the 3000l.; for the existence of a lien for a gross sum, the payment of which might remain contingent during the life of the purchaser, and which depended upon an event the probabilities of which were not matters of calculation and which could not have been guarded against by any scheme of insurance, would have left the estate in his hand inalienable except at a most serious sacrifice.
So, where a daughter, on the eve of marriage, sold to her father her reversion of an estate, and the conveyance was expressed to be in consideration of the sum of 3000l. secured to her upon the terms mentioned in a bond of even date, and the indorsed receipt was for "a bond for the sum of 3000l., being the full consideration within expressed to be given;" the bond being in fact for securing to her an annuity of 100l. during the joint lives of herself, her husband and father, and for payment of a sum of 3000l. in certain contingencies depending upon lives and the existence of issue, and subject to a proviso avoiding the bond (as regarded the 3000l.) in the event of the father by deed or will making a certain specified provision for his daughter or her husband, it was held that no lien upon the estate was intended to or did exist (b). although payment agreed to be deferred, or third parties join in note or bill.
Whether affected by surety joining in bond.
Whether lost if conveyance be expressly in consideration of covenant, the sum being payable upon an incalculable contingency.
Or if conveyance be expressly in consideration of a bond.
(w) Winter v. Lord Anson, 3 Russ. 488, 490.
(v) S. C.
(w) 15 Ves. 349; see Teed v. Carruthers, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 31.
(x) Hughes v. Kearney, 1 Sch. &
Lef. 132,136; Grant v. Mills, 2 Ves. & B. 306.
(y) 2 Ves. & B. 309.
(z) Cood v. Cood, 10 Price, 109; Sug. 860.
(a) Clarke v. Royle, 3 Sim. 499.
The last two decisions, it is submitted, hardly establish that the lien would be discharged by the mere fact of the conveyance being expressed to be made in consideration of a bond or covenant for payment of a gross sum in all events; the sum being in fact so made payable; indeed, Parrott v. Sweetland appears to have been considered rather as a case of family arrangement than an ordinary transaction between vendor and purchaser (c); and Clarke v. Royle partook of the same character; they may, however, it is conceived, induce a doubt whether Winter v. Lord Anson (d) would be an authority for the existence of the lien where a vendor takes a bond for a future consideration payable upon incalculable contingencies.
If, however, the consideration be payable upon a calculable contingency, it appears that taking a bond or covenant for its payment would not affect the lien; this conclusion seems to be warranted by those cases upon sales in consideration of an annuity next adverted to.
The authorities seem to show, that, in the absence of special circumstances, a vendor who sells in consideration of even a life annuity, retains a lien upon the estate, although he take a bond or covenant for payment; this was decided in Tardiffe v. Scrughan (e); a case which, although doubts have been entertained respecting it (f), is considered by Sir E. Sugden to be an authority (g); and his opinion has been recently followed by Sir James Wigram, V. C. (h), who, however, in some degree grounded his decision upon the circumstance of the purchaser having covenanted with the vendor to uphold the property.
Whether affected by mere fact of conveyance being in consideration of a covenant or bond; or if bond be for securing purchase-money upon an incalculable contingency.
Bond for securing payment on calculable contingency, lien not affected: semble.
Lien for annuity consideration, is not affected by bond; except under special circumstances, e.g., annuity granted by distinct deed.
(b) Parrott v. Sweetland, 3 Myl. & K. 655.
(c) See 3 Myl. & K. 664. (d) 3 Russ. 488.
Where, however, an equity of redemption was sold in consideration of two annuities, which were granted and covenanted to be paid by a deed of even date with the conveyance, and the conveyance was expressed to be made by the mortgagor and mortgagee in consideration of the annuities having been so granted, and of the mortgage debt having been paid by the purchaser, it was held, that the circumstance of the separate deed being taken as a security for the annuities, and the statement of the con-sideration in the conveyance, evidenced an intention that there should be no lien upon the estate (i).
So, where a reversion was sold in consideration of immediate life annuities, which were secured by bond, it was considered by Lord Eldon, that the nature of the estate, and the fact of a bond being taken, showed that the parties did not intend the lien to subsist; the annuities might all determine before the reversion fell into possession; and this, coupled with the fact of the purchaser taking the bond, showed that he did not intend the lien on the reversion to subsist (k); but the decision is disapproved of by Sir E. Sugden (I).
Whether affected by bond in case of sale of reversion.
(e) Cited 1 Bro. C. C. 423.
(f) See 15 Ves. 352; 3 Sim. 502; but see 13 Sim. 412.
(g) Sug. 870.
(h) Matthew v. Bowler, 6 Ha. 110.
(i) Buckland v. Pocknell, 13 Sim. 406.
(k) See Mackreth v. Symmons, 15
Ves. 351.
(I) Sug. 869, and note, that the same objection to the existence of the lien existed in Parrott v. Sweetland, ubi supra, which was a case of a sale of a reversion in consideration of an annuity and a gross sum.
And it was decided, in the same case, by Lord Eldon, that the nature of the transaction may show that the lien is to subsist as to part of the unpaid purchase-money, but not as to the residue.
And as taking a substantive and independent security destroys the lien, not by virtue of any technical rule but merely by indicating the intention of the vendor, the lien may, notwithstanding the security, be preserved, either by express agreement, or by any expressions negativing the presumable intention to abandon it; e. g., a stipulation that the estate shall not be sold until the money is paid, or with the consent of the vendor and the surety (m): and, on the other hand, the intention to abandon the lien in cases where only a note or bond is taken, may be evidenced by a parol express agreement (n) or by any expressions inconsistent with its continuance; e. g., expressions referring to a resale of the property before the time fixed for payment of the amount due to the vendor (o).
Where a vendor joined in a deed by which the purchaser mortgaged the estate to a third party who advanced part of the purchase-money, he, of course, was held to have, as against such mortgagee, no lien for the unpaid balance (p): so, where, upon a purchase by trustees, the vendor, knowing the money to be trust money, signed the usual indorsed receipt, but allowed part of it to remain in the hands of one of the trustees without the knowledge of his co-trustees, or cestuis que trust, he was held to have no lien on the estate (q).
And no lien will be assumed in favour of parties who are, by law, disqualified from holding such an interest in real estate (r).
Lien may subsist as to only part of unpaid money.
Presumable intention either way may be rebutted.
Lien, how lost as against third parties.
None implied in favour of disqualified parties.
(m) Elliot v. Edwards, 3 Bos. & P. 181.
(n) 1 Sim. & St. 445.
(o) See Ex parte Parkes, 1 G. & J. 228.
(p) Cood. Pollard, 9 Pri. 544. (q) White v. Wakefield, 7 Sim. 401. (r) Harrison v. Southcote, 2 Ves. 389, 393; and see 15 Ves. 337.
A vendor's lien can only be enforced by suit in Equity; and he cannot, at the same time, sue in Equity, and bring an action at Law upon any bond or other security which he may have taken for payment of the money; but if he fail in one remedy he may resort to the other (s),
Where the vendor conveys the estate to the purchaser, and takes a reconveyance, by way of mortgage, for securing payment of part of the purchase-money, his lien appears to render the existence of judgments against the purchaser immaterial.
A vendor, having given the usual release in the body of the conveyance for the purchase-money, cannot bring an action for interest which has been omitted to be paid through an error of calculation (t).
 
Continue to: