So, also, on an adverse claim to property, the Court will, from general circumstances, draw its own conclusions upon the question of survivorship between parties who are supposed to have perished at about the same time (v).

Presumption as to time of death.

Presumption as to survivorship.

(q) Dunsmure v. Boulderson, 5 Jur. 958.

(r) Doe v. Nepean, 5 B. & Ad. 86.

(s) Webster v. Birchmore, 13 Ves. 362.

(t) Sillick v. Booth, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 117

(u) 14 Sim. 277.

(v) 2 Ph. 199, supra; and see Grissall v. Stelfox, 9 Jur. 890, V. C. K. B.; Wilcock v. Purchase, 9 Jur. 891, V. C. E.

Such presumptions, however, would not necessarily be made as been vendor and purchaser (w); and the above cases must be considered as guides, rather than as authorities, for the conveyancer; in the case of Dowley v. Winfield, in particular, the presumption, not only of the time but even of the fact of death, (admitting its propriety for the purpose of enabling the Court to distribute testamentary assets,) would evidently be of an extreme character if made upon a question of title; the mere fact of a young sailor, who deserted his ship in the Sandwich Islands, not being heard of for twelve years, can scarcely, as a matter of common sense, be considered to raise a stronger presumption of his death, than would the lapse of an equal interval of time in the case of any other person of the same age respecting whose existence no inquiry whatever had been made: in such cases the Court may be supposed to be (perhaps insensibly) influenced not only by a supposition that the party may be dead, but by the feeling that, if alive, he will probably never return to claim the property: it has, moreover, been observed in a recent case, by the same learned Judge who decided Dowley v. Win-field, that the old presumption of death from absence, is, owing to the increased facilities of travelling, becoming daily more untenable (x).

Failure of issue is a negative fact of which no evidence, strictly speaking, is capable of being given; all that can be done is to prove facts which raise a presumption of the want of issue; this proof, according to Mr. Hubback (y), may consist "either of the testimony of living witnesses having the means of knowledge (z), the declarations of deceased relatives, or family reputation otherwise established," and which appears to extend to indirect or circumstantial declarations (a), and, (in conveyancing practice,) to include declarations or affidavits by persons acquainted with although not actually members of the family (b); "or of facts or circumstances irreconcileable with or opposed to the hypothesis that there are any legitimate descendants of the supposed ancestor;" such as facts which tend to show the celibacy of the party (c), the non-mention of issue in wills (d) and other documents in which issue, if existing, would naturally be noticed, and the devolution of dignities or property upon the assumption of the want of issue.

Rules upon, as between adverse claimants, how far applicable as between vendor and purchaser.

Presumption of failure of issue.

(v) Sillick v. Booth, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 121; see Lapsley v. Grierson, 1 H. L. C. 498; see, with reference to the question in the well-known case of General Stanwix, (Fearne's Posthumous Works,) Satterthwaite v. Powell,

1 Curt. 705.

(w) See Sug. 444.

(x) See Watson v. England, 14 Sim. 28; see Hemming v. Spiers, 15 Sim. 550.

(y) P. 203.

Many cases have occurred in which the Court of Chancery has paid out of Court money the title to which depended upon the presumption that females of advanced age were incapable of having issue (e); fifty-five appears to have been the earliest age at which such a presumption has been acted on, the female being unmarried, and the parties receiving the money being required to enter into their recognizances to refund in the event of her marrying and having issue: in a late case (f), where the woman was fifty-eight and unmarried, the V. C. Shadwell ordered payment without requiring any recognizance; we are not aware of any reported case in which a title dependent on such a presumption has been forced upon a purchaser, although, upon general principles, it seems that such a course would, if necessary, be adopted; it being a moral, and not a mathematical certainty, of a good title, which a purchaser can require from a vendor (g): the Courts do not appear to have ever acted upon a similar presumption in the case of a male, and there are obvious reasons why the doctrine should not be so extended.

Presumption against aged female having future issue.

(z) As to which see the late case of Hemming v. Spiers, 15 Sim. 550 (a case between vendor and purchaser); and the cases upon Peerage Claims cited Hub. on Ev. p. 204.

(a) See cases on Peerage Claims, cited Hub. on Ev. p. 205.

(b) Ibid. 230.

(c) See Hemming v. Spiers, 15 Sim. 550.

(d) Hungate v. Gaseoyne, 2 Ph. 25.

(e) See Leng v. Hodges, Jac. 585; Brown v. Pringle, 4 Ha. 124, and earlier cases there cited: see the judgment in Brandon v. Woodthorpe, 10 Beav. 463, where the practice was admitted, although from other circumstances payment was refused.

(f) Miles v. Knight, 12 Jur. 666.

The ordinary evidence of the facts of birth, marriage, and death (h), consists of certified extracts from the Parochial Registers, or from the general Register, established by the 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 86, and amended by the 1 Vict. c. 22: and by declarations as to the identity of the parties; the Parochial Registers are not, as a general rule, evidence of the time or order of birth (i), although they may go far to enable the practitioner to form an opinion upon these points; nor do they seem to be evidence of the time of death, except so far as by showing that it must have occurred before the date of the burial, of which they seem to be evidence (j); and they are evidence of the time as well as of the fact of marriage (k). Under the 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 86, the birth or death, and not the baptism or burial, is the subject of registration; the date forms part of the entry required by the Act, and certified copies of the entries are to be received as evidence of the birth, death, or marriage, to which the same relate (l): it may, however, be doubted whether a purchaser could be compelled to accept a certificate of death as evidence of the fact, unless some sufficient reason were given for the non-production of the certificate of burial (m): extracts from non-parochial registers have long been received by conveyancers as evidence; and by the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 92, the non-parochial registers deposited under the provisions of that Act (n), and certified extracts therefrom (o), are made evidence in the Courts of Law and Equity.