Ch. D. 415; (1887) 36 Ch. D. 716 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 254, 832. In Davis v. Tollemache, (1856) 2 Jur. N. S. 1181, Stuart, V.-C, refused to order the execution of a disentailing deed in pursuance of a mere general covenant for further assurance ; but see comments on this case, Sug. 14th ed. 468.

(z) Mortloch v. Duller, (1804) 10 Ves. 292; White v. Cuddon, (1842) 8 C. & F. 766 ; Shrewsbury JR. Co. v. L. & X. W. B. Co., (1853) 4 D. M. & G. 115; 6 H. L. C. 113; 26 L.J. Ch. 482 ; Maw v. Topham, (1854) 19 Beav. 576.

{a) 3 Geo. IV. c. 126, s. 67.

(b) Barrett v. Ring, (1854) 2 Sm. & G. 43, sed quicre.

(c) See Wilson v. Williams, (1857) 3 Jur. N. S. 810, sup. p. 314.

(d) Thomas v. Dering, (1837) 1 Ke. 729 ; 6 L. J. N. S. Ch. 267.

(0 See sup. p. 1029.

Where one of two executors entered into a contract for the sale of his testator's leaseholds, in the erroneous belief that he had the authority of his co-executor, it was held, on the ground that the sale would injure the beneficiaries, and expose the executor in consequence to risk from them, that the purchaser could not insist on the sale being completed; and the Court of Appeal declined to express any opinion as to whether specific performance of a contract for sale by one executor, apart from his co-executor, can be enforced (ee). So, where two trustees refused to concur in the conveyance of land which the third trustee had agreed to sell, the Court refused specific performance (/).

Contract by-one of several executors to sell leaseholds.

Prior to the Voluntary Conveyances Act, 1893, a voluntary settlor would not be restrained from selling (g) ; but if he contracted to sell, he could not enforce specific performance (A); except against a purchaser who was willing to complete, on a good title being shown (i). On the other hand, the purchaser could enforce the contract against the voluntary settlor (k), or recover his deposit at Law (/). But though the Court would not force the title on the purchaser, and so make him the instrument of avoiding the voluntary settlement (m), yet, when the deed had been avoided under the 27 Eliz. c. 4, by a sale in good faith for value, the title might, but would not necessarily, be forced on a subsequent purchaser. Thus, it has been held (n), that a purchaser is not entitled to repudiate his contract simply because one link in the vendor's title consists of a voluntary conveyance to a person under whom the vendor claims by purchase for value.

Enforcement of his contract to sell by voluntary-settlor.

(ee) Snecsbyx. Thorne, (1855) 7 D. M. & G-. 399; and see Tarratt v. Lloyd, (1856) 2 Jur. N. S. 371. As to the power of one executor alone to convey chattels real, see sup. pp. 601, 616.

(f) Naylor v. Goodall, (1877) 47 L. J. Ch. 53.

(y) Pulcertoft v. P., (1811) 18 Ves. 84.

(h) Smith v. Garland, (1817) 2

Mer. 123 ; Johnson v. Legard, (1822) T. &R. 281.

(i) Peter v. Nicolls, (1871) 11 Eq. 391.

(k) Buckle v. Mitchell, and cases cited, sup. p. 1031, n. (p).

(I) Clarke v. TJlllott, (1872) L. R. 7 Ex. 313 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 197.

(m) S. C.

(n) Noyes v. Paterson, 1894, 3 Ch. 267 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 748.

But now, by the Voluntary Conveyances Act, 1893, a voluntary conveyance of land, whether made before or after the passing of that Act, if made in good faith and without any fraudulent intent, cannot, since the 29th June, 1893, the date of the passing of the Act, be avoided under the above Act of Elizabeth.

Voluntary Conveyances Act, 1893.

The power of married women to contract for the sale or purchase of real estate has already been fully dealt with in Chapter I (Restrictions On The General Capacity To Buy Or Sell Real Estate).; and it need only be added here that, generally speaking, the same principles will regulate the granting or refusal of a decree for specific performance of the contracts which they have the power to enter into, as apply to the contracts of persons under no disability.

Married women.

It is the general rule that, in the absence of misrepresentation or misconduct, where a person is jointly interested in an estate with another person, and purports to deal with the entirety, specific performance will not be decreed against him as to his share; the plaintiff being left to his remedy in damages (p).

Joint tenant purporting to deal with entirety.

As in the case of the vendor, so in that of the purchaser, the contract will be enforced against the purchaser himself, his committee in lunacy (q), or, in case of death, his personal representatives. If he becomes bankrupt, his trustee has the option of abandoning the contract or of completing it, paying, of course, the entire amount due for purchase-money (r). Specific performance, however, cannot be decreed against the trustee in bankruptcy of the purchaser (s) without his consent, though it can be, as we have already seen, against the trustee in bankruptcy of the vendor (t). Where a purchaser, having paid part of the purchase-money, became insolvent, and his assignees, upon a bill being filed against them, disclaimed, the Court declared the representatives of the vendor absolutely entitled to the estate (u).

Purchaser's contract will be enforced against himself and his representatives.

(p) Lumley v. Iiavenscroft, 1895, 1 Q. B. 683, 685; 61 L. J. Q. B. 111.

(q) Lunacy Act, 1890, s. 133 et seq.

(r) Bkcy. Act, 1883, s. 55; Bkcy. Act, 1890, s. 13.

(s) Holloway v. York, (1877) 25 W. R. 627 ; approved in Pearce v. BastablSs Trustee in Bkcy. 1901, 2

Ch. 122, 125 ; 70 L. J. Ch. 446. As to resale by vendor and proof for deficiency, see Bowles v. Rogers, (1800) cited 6 Ves. 95. As to forfeiture of deposit as against the trustee, see Ex p. Barrell, (1875) 10 Ch. 512 ; 44 L. J. Bk. 138; Collins v. Stimson, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 142; 62 L. J. Q. B. 440.