Where purchaser, having notice of claim, abstains from inquiry.

Sm. & G. 188. See and distinguish Earl of Gainsborough v. Watcombe Co., (1885) 54 L. J. Ch. 991.

(r) Taylor v. Baker, (181S) 5 Pr. 306.

(s) See Gibson v. Ingo, (1847) 6 Ha. 124.

(t) Penny v. Watte, (1849) 1 M. & G. 150, 158.

(u) Jones v. Williams, (1857) 24 Beav. 47, 59.

(x) Re Alms Corn Charity, 1901, 2 Ch. 750; 71 L. J. Ch. 76.

(y) Frail v. Ellis, (1852) 16 Bear. 350 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 467.

A mortgagee not inquiring for the deeds has been postponed to a prior equitable incumbrancer (a) upon the ground (b) of his having purposely abstained from making inquiry, the mortgage being for securing a pre-existing debt; that, in short, there was wilful blindness : and it has been held, in some cases, that the mere omission to ask for the deeds may be sufficient to postpone a mortgagee or purchaser to the equitable lien of the actual holder (c) ; though the case is different if an inquiry is made in good faith, and a reasonable excuse given for their non-production (d).

Where he omits to inquire for the title deeds.

The rule being that a purchaser has notice of all deeds relating to and forming part of the full title allowed by law, and of their contents (e), he cannot relieve himself from the notice, which an examination of the full title would have given him, by contracting to buy under a shorter title ; and he will be fixed with notice of everything appearing on the full title, though prior to its stipulated commencement (/). On the same principle, it being well settled that a lessee (g), or a sub-lessee (h), has notice of the title of the immediate and (in the case of a sub-lessee) of the original lessor, no contract abbreviating the title can alter the rule ; and a lessee or purchaser of a lease will be affected with notice of everything of which he would have had notice, had he examined the lessor's full title (i). And the statutory enactments (k), restricting the right of a lessee or purchaser of a leasehold interest to require the title to the reversion, have not altered the rule, but have merely placed the lessee or purchaser in the same position as he formerly occupied where he had stipulated not to require such title (/).

Purchase under a short title does not relieve from notice of anything on the full title.

(z) Dawson v. Prince, (1857) 2 D. & J. 41 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 169.

(a) Whitbread v. Jordan, (1835) 1 Y. & C. 303.

(b) See Jones v. Smith, (1842) 1 Ph. 244, 255.

(c) Worthington v. Morgan, (1849) 1G Si. 517; 18 L. J. Ch. 233 ; Veto v. Hammond, (18G1) 30 Beav. 495; 31 L. J. Ch. 354 ; Clarke v. Palmer, (1882) 21 Ch. D. 124 ; 51 L. J. Ch. G34 ; sup. p. 8G0.

(d) Hewitt v. Looscmore, (1851) 9 Ha. 449 ; and sec sup. pp. 859, 860.

(c) Sup. p. 877 d seq.

(/) Robson v. Flight, (1865) 4 D. J. & S. 608; Peto v. Hammond, (1861) 30 Beav. 495; 31 L. J. Ch. 354; Morland v. Cook, (1868) 6 Eq. 252, 266 ; 37 L. J. Ch. 825 ; Chxnnery v. Evans, (1864) 11 H. L. C. 115.

(g) A.-G. v. Backhouse, (1810) 17 Vcs. 293 ; Butler v. Lord Porlar-lington, (1841) 1 D. & War. 20 ; A.-G. v. Hall, (1853) 16 Beav. 388.

(h) Steed man v. Poole, (1847) 6 Ha. 193 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 348 ; Cosser v. Collinge, (1832) 3 M. & K. 283 ; 1 L. J. N. S. Ch. 130 ; Bank of Ireland v. Brookfield Linen Co., (1884) 15 L. R. Ir. 37.

But, on the other hand, a private Act of Parliament, or a private Act made public (m), is not, in itself, notice to a purchaser : nor is registration of a deed, etc, in a county register notice (n), nor the entry of a document on the court rolls of a manor (o), unless the purchaser make a search extending over a period comprising the entry in the register or court rolls (p), as the case may be. The issuing of a fiat or of a commission of bankruptcy was not of itself notice (q), though gazetted (r); nor is a decree in a Court of Equity (s), nor a lis pendens, unless registered (t) ; though in all these eases the purchaser has the means of acquiring notice.

Cases in which a purchaser is not affected with notice.

(i) Parker v. Whyle, (1863) 1 H. & M. 167 ; Clements v. Welles, (1865) 1 Eq. 200 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 265 ; Wilson v. Hart, (1866) 1 Ch. 163; 35 L. J. Ch. 569; Feilden v. Slater, (1869) 7 Eq. 523 ; 38 L. J. Ch. 379. See and distinguish Carter v. Williams, (1870) 9 Eq. 678 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 560, where a full examination of the title would not have disclosed the covenants, of which notice was sought to be imputed, as they were contained in a separate deed, without which an apparently perfect title was made out.

(k) V. & P. Act, s. 2 ; Conv. Act, 1881, s. 3 (1).

(I) Patman v. Harland, (1881) 17 Ch. D. 353; 50 L. J. Ch. 612 ; Thornewell v. Johnson, (1881) 50 L. J. Ch. 641 ; Re Cox and Neve, 1891, 2 Ch. 109, 117, 118; MogridgeY. Clapp, 1892, 3 Ch. 382, 394, 397 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 534 ; Re Pursell and Deal-in, (1893) W. N. 152 ; see sup. p. 776.

{m) Hesse v. Stevenson, (1803) 3 B. & P. 565, 578; Sug. 14th ed. 758; see Dawson v. Paver, (1847) 5 Ha. 415; 16 L. J. Ch. 274.

(n) Morccock v. Dickins, (1768) Amb. 678 ; Bushell v. B., (1803) 1 Sch. & L. 90 ; Wiseman v. West land, (1826) 1 Y. & J. 117 ; and see York. Reg. Act, 1885, s. 5, repealing s. 15 of the Act of 1884 ; sup. pp. 865, 870 et seq.

(o) Bugden v. Bignold, (1843) 2 Y. & C. C. C. 377; and see Lane y. Jackson, (1855) 20 Beav. 535.

(p) Hodgson v. Dean, (1825) 2 S. & S. 221 ; and see Procter v. Cooper, (1853) 2 Dr. 1, the case of a search for judgments.

(q) See Hitchcox v. Sedgwick, on appeal, Sug. 14th ed. 762 ; Re Atkinson, (1852) 2 D. M. & G. 140 ; Cannan v. S. E. R. Co., (1852) 7 Ex. 813 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 257 ; and see, as to notice, Pike v. Stephens, (1848) 12 Q. B. 465; 17 L. J. Q. B. 282 ; Pennell v. Stephens, (1849) 7 C. B. 987; 18 L. J. P. C. 291 ; Green v. Laurie, (1847) 1 Ex. 335 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 61 ; Re Burr's Trusts, (1858) 4 K. & J. 219 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 548, and cases cited: notice to a solicitor's clerk held insufficient.