(c) Worthing ton v. Morgan, (1819) 1G Si. 517 ; 18 L. J. Ch. 233; Peto v. Hammond, (1861) 30 Beav. 495; 31 L. J. Ch. 354 ; Clarice v. Palmer, (1882) 21 Ch. D. 121 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 634 ; and see sup. p. 890.

(d) Cothay v. Sydenham, (1788) 2 Br. C. C. 391 ; Williams v. W., (1881) 17 Ch. D. 437.

(e) Harryman v. Collins, (1854) 18 Beav. at p. 19.

(/) Hunter v. Walters, (1871) 7 Ch. 75; 41 L. J. Ch. 175; Re Arnold, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 270, 281.

(g) Beckett v. Cordley, (1784) 1 Br. C. C. 353, 357 ; Welford v. Beezclcy, (1747) 1 Ves. sen. 7; Sug. 14th ed. 781 ; Small v. Carrie, (1853) 2 Dr. at p. 115 ; 5 D. M. & G. 141 ; and see Hunter v. Walters, (1871) 7 Ch. 75; 41 L. J. Ch. 175.

(h) See Borell v. Dann, (1S43) 2 Ha. 440, 450. So, as regards a purchase by trustees ; Ware v. Lord Egmont, (1854) 4 D. M. & G. 460; 24 L. J. Ch. 361.

Where a purchaser is informed of the existence of an instrument which may, but does not necessarily, affect the property, and he is assured that the instrument does not affect that property, but relates to other property, and he, acting fairly and honestly, believes such statement, and it turns out that he is misled, and that the instrument does relate to the property, he will not be fixed with a notice of its contents (7) : and it has even been held that where he is aware that the instrument affects the property, and he has not availed himself of the opportunity of examining it, that he is not affected with notice, if he, in good faith, relies on the vendor's statement of its contents (m) : but it is the clear duty of the purchaser in such a case to satisfy himself, by having the deed examined on his behalf; and this decision would not, it is submitted, be followed (n).

Notice of a deed forming no necessary part of the title is not notice.

Nor will a purchaser be affected by an ambiguous recital (o) : though, as we have seen, an erroneous recital of an instrument may fix him with knowledge of its true contents (p) ; nor is he bound by circumstances inducing merely a suspicion of fraud (q) ; or by the usual trusts of a term assigned to attend the inheritance (r), where no reference is made to any particular instrument or course of limitations :

Amhiguous recitals and statements.

(i) See A.-G. v. Pargeter, (1843) 6 Beav. 150; 13 L. J. N. S. Ch. 81; Ker v. Lord Dungannon, (1841) 1 D. & War. 509, 542.

(k) Boursot v. Savage, (1866) 2 Eq. 134.

{I) See Jones v. Smith, (1843) 1 Ph. 244, 253; West v. Reid, (1843) 2 Ha. 249, 260 ; 12 L. J. N. S. Ch. 245 ; Agra Bank v. Barry, (1874) L. R. 7 H. L. 135; Williams v. W., (1881) 17 Ch. D. 437 ; Be Valletort Sanitary Co., 1903, 2 Ch. 654; 72 L. J. Ch. 674 ; see sup. p. 877.

(m) Cox v. Coventon, (1862) 31 Beav. 378.

(«) See Jones v. Smith, (1843) 1 Ph. 244, 253 ; English and Scottish Merc. Co. v. Brunton, 1892, 2 Q. B. 700 ; 67 L. T. 406 ; and see sup. p. 889.

(o) Kcnney v. Browne, (1796) 3 Ridg. 462, 512 ; and see Keesom v. Clarkson, (1842) 2 Ha. at p. 175.

(p) See Hope v. Liddell, (1855) 21 Beav. 183 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 90 ; and see sup. p. 883.

(q) Sug. 14th ed. 779; M'Qucenv. Farquhar, (1805) 11 Ves. 467; and see Cockroft v. Sutcliffc, (1856) 2 Jur. N. S. 323; 25 L. J. Ch. 313.

(r) Sug. 14th ed. 779.

So, notice of there being a change in the solicitors who are professionally to represent a particular interest, is not, in itself, notice of a change in the ownership of such interest (.s). Where the legatee of a legacy charged on land, assigned it for value, and then, without the concurrence of the assignee, joined in mortgaging the estates first to A. and then to B., the latter mortgage being expressed to be "subject to prior incumbrances," but B. had no notice of the assignment of the legacy, and the mortgagors did not appear to have intended to include it among "prior incumbrances," B. was held to have priority of the assignee (/).

And it appears that, as a general rule, the mere omission to pursue inquiries to the extent to which a prudent, cautious, and wary person would ordinarily extend them, is not, in itself, sufficient to fix a purchaser in good faith with notice of what he might have ascertained by pursuing such inquiries (u) : the fact of the conveyance being in consideration of a preexisting debt, would, of course, induce a doubt whether the purchaser were acting in good faith ; and the omission to inquire after the title deeds of a property, unless otherwise satisfactorily explained (x), would probably be attributed to a suspicion that the inquiry if made would lead to disclosures affecting the title (y).

Purchaser, whether bound to use excessive caution.

Formerly a purchaser (though an infant purchasing under the sanction of a Court of Equity (z)) was bound by notice to his counsel (a), solicitor, or agent (b), or, perhaps, trustee (c), if acquired either in the same transaction (d), or in a prior transaction under circumstances which satisfied the Court that the notice must have been recollected (c). The presumption against such recollection would, no doubt, have been stronger in the case of counsel than of a solicitor (/') ; and, even as respects a solicitor, there seemed to be a difficulty in holding that a purchaser, employing one who had not acted for the vendor, could be affected by notice acquired by him previous to retainer (g). In one case, where an annuity deed was prepared by the grantee's solicitor, containing a covenant by the grantor that the property was free from other incumbrances, the grantee was held not to have constructive notice of an undisclosed mortgage which his solicitor, in conjunction with other persons, had upon the property (h).

Notice to counsel, solicitor or agent is notice to purchaser.

(s) West v. Reid, (1843) 2 Ha. 249.

(t) Greenwood v. Churchill, (1843) 6 Beav. 314 ; 12 L. J. N. S. Ch. 400.

(u) Sco Jones v. Smith, (1843) 1 Ph. 244, 257 ; 1 J. & L. 441 ; Sag. 14th cil. 772,775] Agra Bank v. Barry, (1874) L. It. 7 II. L. 135 ; Williams v.W., (1881) 17 Ch.D. 437; English and Scottish Merc. Co. v. Brunton, 1892, 2 Q. B. 700 ; G7 L. T. 406.