Implied grant and reservation of necessary-easements.

(i) D'eyncourt v. Gregory, (1866) 3 Eq. 382; 36 L. J. Ch. 107; Monti v. Barnes, 1901, 1 K. B. 205; 70 L. J. K. B. 225; and see Bulkeley v. Stephens, (1895) 11 T. L. R. 564; Viscount Hill v. Bullock, 1897, 2 Ch. 55, 482; 66 L. J. Ch. 705.

(k) Laybourn v. Gridley, 1892, 2 Ch. 53; 61 L. J. Ch. 352.

(l) Thynne v. Shove, (1890) 45 Ch. D. 577; 59 L. J. Ch. 509.

(m) Born v. Turner, 1900, 2 Ch. 211; 69 L. J. Ch. 593.

(n) See sup. p. 372.

(o) Pyer v. Carter, (1857) 1 H. & N. 916; 28 L. J. Ex. 258; Ewart v. Cochrane, (1861) 4 Macq. 117. See Suffield v. Brown, (1863) 4 D. J. & S. 185; 33 L. J. Ch. 249; Watts v. Kelson, (1871) 6 Ch. 166; 40 L. J. Ch. 126; Wheeldon v. Burrows, (1879) 12 Ch. D. 31, 49; 48 L. J. Ch. 853; Russell v. Watts, (1885) 10 A. C. 590. The right of drainage must be of the same kind as that formerly enjoyed; so that a right to drain surface water implies no right to use the drain for sewerage; Watson v. Troughton, (1863) 48 L. T. 508.

(p) See sup. p. 364 et seq. And consider Curriers' Company v. Corbett, (1865) 2 Dr. & S. 355; Ellis v. Manchester Carriage Co., (1876) 2 C. P. D. 13; cf. Booth v. Alcock, (1873) 8 Oh. 663: 42 L. J. Ch. 557.

In order to pass rights which are not properly easements, e.g., a, right of way over another tenement of the grantor (y), or a right to support for a house from an adjoining plot of land, where both had been in the possession of one common owner (z), the word "appurtenances" was formerly insufficient; words amounting to an express grant were necessary (a); but it has since been held (b), that a grant of land "together with all ways now used or enjoyed therewith," will pass the right to use a definite way, used for the convenience of the land granted, even though the rroad was constructed during unity of possession, and did not exist previously; also, that the words " with all rights, members or appurtenances to the hereditaments belonging, or occupied, or enjoyed as part, parcel, or member thereof," will pass a right to use a private road made, during unity of possession, by the vendor for his own convenience (c). In Bayley v. G. W. R. Co., Fry, L. J., expressed the opinion (d), that "' if one person owns both Whiteacre and Blackacre, and if there be a made and visible road over Whiteacre, and that has been used for the purpose of Blackacre in such a way that if two tenements belonged to several owners there would have been an easement in favour of Blackacre, and the owner aliened Blackacre to a purchaser, retaining Whiteacre, then the grant of Blackacre either 'with all rights usually enjoyed with it,' or 'with all rights appertaining to,blackacre,' or probably the mere grant of Blackacre itself without general words, carries a right of way over Whiteacre."

(q) Aldin x. Latimer & Co., 1894, 2 Ch. 437; 63 L. J. Ch. 601; Cable v. Bryant, 1908, 1 Ch. 259.

(r) Watts v. Kelson, (1871) 6 Ch. 166; 40 L. J. Ch. 126, case of artificial underground watercourse.

(s) Kay v. Oxley, (1875) L. R. 10 Q. B. 369; 44 L. J. Q. B. 210; Barkshire v. Grubb, (1881) 18 Ch. D. 616; 50 L. J. Ch. 731; Bayley v. G. W. B. Co., (1884) 26 Ch. D. 434.

(t) See Smart v. Morton, (1855) 5 E. & B. 30; 24 L. J. Q. B. 260; Dugdale v. Bobertson, (1857) 3 K. & J. 695; Cal. B. Co. v. Sprot, (1856) 2 Macq. 449; Haines v. Roberts, (1857) 7 E. & B. 625; 27 L. J. Ex. 49; and see Schwann v. Cotton, 1916, 2 Ch. 459.

(u) See Pinnington v. Galland, (1853) 9 Ex. 1; 22 L. J. Ex. 349; Pearson v. Spencer, (1863) 3 B. & S. 761; Worthington v. Gimson, (1860) 2 E. & E. 618; 29 L. J. Q. B. 116; and see Richards v. Rose, (1853) 9 Ex. 218; 23 L. J. Ex. 3; Murchie v. Black, (1865) 11 Jur. N. S. 608; Davies v. Sear, (1869) 7 Eq. 427; 38 L. J. Ch. 545; Howarth v. Armstrong, (1897) 77 L. T. 62; Kensington Co-op. Stores v. Lyons, (1895) 11 T. L. R. 319; sup. p. 372.

(x) Wheeldon v. Burrows, (1879) 12 Ch. D. 31; Taws v. Knowles, 1891, 2 Q. B. 564; F. Betts, Ltd. v. Pickfords, Ltd., 1906, 2 Ch. 87.

(y) Bolton v. B., (1879) 11 Oh. D. 968; 48 L. J. Ch. 467.

(z) Sherbrook v. Tufnell, (1882) 46 L. T. 886; and see Watson v. Troughton, (1883) 48 L. T. 508.

(a) Barlow v. Rhodes, (1833) 1 Or. & M. 439; Baird v. Fortune, (1861) 4 Macq. 127; Grymes v. Peacock, (1609) Bulst. 17.

(b) Berkshire v. Grubb, (1861) 18 Ch. D. 616; Kay v. Oxley, (1875) L. R. 10 Q. B. 360; 44 L. J. Q. B. 210; Hansford v. Jago, 1921, 1 Ch. 322.

(c) Bayley v. G. W. R. Co., (1864) 26 Ch. D. 434; Re Peck and Sch. Bd. for London, 1893, 2 Ch. 315, 321; 62 L. J. Ch. 598; and see Brown v. Alabaster, (1867) 37 Ch. D. 490; 57 L.. J. Ch. 255; Thomas v. Owen (1867) 20 Q. B. D. 225; 57 L. J. Q. B. 198; Roe v. Siddons, (1888) 22 Q. B. D. 224; 60 L. T. 345; Gordon v. Ogilvie, (1809) 15 T. L. R. 239; and see Long v. Gowlett, 1923, 2 Ch. 177, 203.

(d) At p. 457.

(e) I.e., 8. 62 of the L. P. Act, 1925, or s. 6 of the Conv. Act. 1881, which it replaces.

But the main point to be considered iswhether there has been actual user; if there has, and the right claimed is one known to the law, the right will pass though its use has been precarious; but in each case the special circumstances must be taken into consideration (g). For the right to pass, however, in such a case, it seems that the user must have been by the occupier of that part of the land for the benefit of which the claim is made altogether apart from the ownership or occupation of the other part of the land (h).

(f) Birmingham, Dudley and Dist. Bkg. Co. v. Ross, (1888) 38 Ch. D. 295, 307; 57 L. J. Ch. 601; Godwin v. Schweppes, 1902, 1 Oh. 926: 71

As regards the use of the words "enjoyed with," implied by the statutory provision (e), a right to come within those words must be such a one as has been used under circumstances leading to an expectation that the enjoyment would be continued and that it would not be simply precarious (f):