Recitals, when evidence.

(x) Harvey v. Philips, (1743) 2 Atk. 541.

(y) Fitzwalter Peerage, (1844) 10 C. & F. 952.

(z) 1 Jarm. Conv. 4th ed. 161; and see Yorkshire Registries Acts, 1884, s. 22. Cf. R. S. C, Ord. XXXVII. r. 4, and Ord. LXI. r. 7.

(a) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 65, a. 34; amended by s. 6 of 11 & 12 Vict, c. 83, and, by s. 14, extended to all instruments enrolled in the Duchy of Lancaster since 31 Aug. 1848; Taylor, 11th ed. 1117.

(b) 10 Anne, c. 28 (Ruff. c. 18), s. 3. (bb) Jud. Act, 1925, s. 219.

(c) Burt. Comp. pl. 478 et seq.; see Gillett v. Abbott, (1838) 7 A. & E. 783; 3 N. & P. 24; 7 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 61; Bringloe v. Goodson, (1839) 5 Bing. N. C. 738; 8 L. J. N. S. C. P. 364; Moulton v. Edmonds, (1859) 1 D. F. & J. 246; 29 L. J. Ch. 181.

(d) Bristoto v. Cormioan, (1878) 3 A. C. 641.

By the Ecclesiastical Leases Act, 1836, in any renewed ecclesiastical lease granted since the 21st June, 1836 (unless in pursuance of a covenant or agreement entered into before the 1st March, 1836), the recital of the old lease and of the death, etc. of the cestui que vie, is conclusive evidence thereof.

Renewed ecclesiastical lease.

An examined copy of the memorial of a deed registered in a register county is secondary evidence of the contents of the deed against the parties thereto, and all persons claiming under them (g); but probably not as against strangers (h); and does not prove the execution of it by all the persons named as parties (i).

Copy of memorial of registered deed.

Where the title prior to the 1st January, 1926, depends upon a deed acknowledged by a married woman, under the Fines and Recoveries Act, 1883, evidence should be given of the taking of the acknowledgment (k).

Acknowledged deed.

(e) Alexander v. Crosby, (1844) 1 J. & L. 666; 2 Ir. Eq. R. 141; Prosser v. Watts, (1821) 6 Mad. 59.

(f) See above, p. 146.

(g) Wollaston v. Hakewill, (1841) 3 Man. & G. 297; 10 L. J. C. P. 303; Doe v. Clifford, (1847) 2 C. & K. 448; see Hobhouse v. Hamilton, (1803) 1 Sch. & L. 207; Cathrow v. Eade, (1851) 4 De G. & S. 527; 21 L. T. (0. S.) 179.

(h) Doe v. Clifford, sup.; Allen v. A., (1842) 1 Con. & L. 427, 457; 4 Ir. Eq. R. 472; but see Collins v. Maule, (1838) 8 C. & P. 502. As to memorials of assignments of Irish judgments, see Fitzgerald v. F., (1849) 8 C. B. 592; 19 L. J. C. P. 126.

(i) Halifax Commercial Bank and Wood, (1898) 79 L. T. 536.

(k) Jolly v. Handcock, (1852) 7 Ex. 820; 22 L. J. Ex. 38.

A sealed certificate of enrolment by the proper officer of the Central Office endorsed on any document is sufficient prima facie evidence that the same was duly enrolled at the time mentioned in the certificate; and copies of all enrolments, if stamped with the seal of the office (now the Filing Department of the Central Office (I)), are evidence to the same extent and in the same manner as the original enrolments (m).

Proof under statutes of enrolments.

So, certified copies of, or extracts from, deeds, documents, maps, etc, deposited in the Office of Land Revenue, Records, and Enrolments, are admissible in every case in which the original would have been admitted as evidence (n).

Certified copies.

Statements made for public purposes in public documents are admissible as evidence. Public documents are such as are made for the purpose of the public making use of them and being able to refer to them, by a public officer whose judicial or quasi-judicial office it is to make them (a). On this ground are admissible entries of births and marriages, taken from the registers which are kept in India by order of the Indian Office (p), foreign registers (q), and an inquisition, directed by the Duke of Lancaster to three of his justices in 1360 a.d., a time when he had sovereign rights in the Duchy (r); so, a record showing that a Court of competent jurisdiction inquired into, and pronounced upon, a state of facts, or question of usage, at a time before living memory; for, though not properly evidence of reputation, such evidence is as strong as, if not stronger than, reputation: and the authorities are agreed that it is admissible, at least in cases where reputation would be admissible (s). So, too, the Heralds' Books recording the Heralds' visitations (t), a survey made in pursuance of an Act of Parliament (u), and entries from parish poor rate books (x).

Public documents.

(l) Sup. Ct. of Jud. (Con.) Act, 1925, ss. 218 - 220; Sup. Ct. Documents (Production) Rules, 1926; R. S. C. 1883, O. 61, rr. 7 - 13.

(m) The Petty Bag Act, 1849, ss. 18, 19; and last n.

(n) The Crown Lands Act, 1852, s. 8; Taylor, 11th ed. p. 1116.

(o) Sturla v. Freccia, (1880) 5 A. C. 623, 643; 50 L. J. Ch. 86; and see Re Woodward, 1913, 1 Ch. 392.

(p) Queen's Proctor v. Fry, (1879) 4 P. D. 230; 48 L. J. P. 68.

(q) Lyell v. Kennedy, (1889) 14 A. C. 437, 448; 59 L. J. Q. B. 268; and see inf. p. 347.

(r) Mayor of Manchester v. Lyons, (1882) 22 Ch. D. 287, 299.

In Re Woodward (y) it was held that the register of births, marriages, deaths and burials, kept by the Society of Friends prior to 1st July, 1837, when 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 86, came into force, were not evidence at Common Law. On being deposited at Somerset House under the Non-parochial Registers Act, 1840, these registers became statutory evidence, but entries therein are only provable by production of the original registers or by a certificate under seal of the General Register Office.

It seems that the award map under an inclosure award is not necessarily conclusive as to boundaries (z). In A. G. v. Horner (a) old maps from the British Museum and the Guildhall were tendered in evidence but rejected. "Whatever may be the rule," said Hamilton, L.j.(b), "as to the admission of ordnance survey maps to prove the existence of a visible track at the time of the survey, there is none which would admit maps, as such, as physical delineations of the surface of the ground, without some more proof than their mere production. As to the suggestion that these maps might be relied upon as having become public documents because they come out of the custody of the Guildhall librarian and the British Museum librarian, these facts in themselves do not make them public documents, as documents belonging to one of the departments of state would be."