(h) Jones v. Rimmer, 14 Ch. D. 588.

(i) See Chap. XII. 5 2, below. (k) Stat. 16 & -47 Vict. c. 61, ss. 29-32 repealed and replaced by 8 Edw. VII. c. !8, ss. 15-19,

(l) Stat. 38 & 39 Vict, c. 55, see ss. 150, 257. (m) Stat. 55 & 56 Vict. c. 57. (n) Midgley v.. Coppock, 4 Ex. D. Re Bettesworth and Richer, 37 ch. D. 535; stock v. Meakin, 1900, 1 ch.683; Re Allen and Driscolls Contract, 1904, 2 ch.

226; Camberwell Corpn. v. Dixon 1910, 1 K. B. 424

(o) Carlish v. Salt, 1906, 1 Ch.

335, as to which see the writer's criticism in 50 Sol. J. 611.

(p) Re Highett and Bird's con-tract, 1902, 2 Ch. 214: C. A., 1903, 1 Ch. 287; explained in Re Allen and Driscoll's Contract, 1904, 2 Ch. 231.

(q) Barsht v. Tagg, 1900, 1 Ch. 231.

(r) Stat. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 65, 94-104, L60, incorporating 10 & 11 Vict. o. 34, ss. 75-78.

The general rule applicable to inquiries of the above nature is that the vendor is bound to answer all relevant questions with respect to the property sold (x): but the limits of inquiry are shown in the case of Re Ford and Hill (y) already mentioned. It was there held that a vendor need not answer the inquiry, Is there, to the knowledge of the vendor or his solicitor, any settlement, deed, fact, omission, or any incumbrance affecting the property not disclosed by the abstract? This question the Court of Appeal held to be not so much a requisition as a searching interrogatory. As we have already pointed out (z), there is a clear distinction between putting questions to ascertain that the title shown on the abstract is fully proved and at all points complete, and interrogating the vendor whether he knows of any matter of title besides those stated on the abstract.

Vendor bound to answer all relevant questions.

Re Ford and Hill.

(s) See Re Leyland and Taylor's Contract, 1900, 2 Ch. G25; below, Ch. XII. Sect. 2.

(t) See cases cited in notes (I), p. 50, (n), p; 177, above; below, Ch. XL Sect. 1.

(u) Above, pp. 41, 94.

(x) Above, p. 135.

(y) 10 Ch. D. 365.

(z) Above, p. 135, n. (f).

Having regard to the practice already stated (a) of not disclosing purely equitable charges or interests on the abstract, where the purchaser may acquire a good title without notice of them, it seems obvious that such an interrogatory is objectionable. But it is thought that the decision in Re Ford and Hill does not go further than this, and does not exonerate the vendor from the obligation of answering questions relevant to the issue between the parties, which is, has the vendor proved the title, which he has shown on the abstract?{b).

When the abstract is laid before counsel to advise thereon, he settles the necessary requisitions, and writes his opinion on the title according to the circumstances of the case; as that, if the requisitions be satisfactorily answered, a good title according to the contract will have been shown, or that some irremovable objection to the title appears. At the same time he usually advises what searches ought to be made. The subject of searches is reserved for subsequent consideration (c).

Counsel advising on title.

Searches.

As we have seen (d), it is usually stipulated that the purchaser's requisitions on or objections to the title shall be sent in within a specified time after the delivery of the abstract, that in this respect time shall be of the essence of the contract, and that in default of any requisitions or objections so made, the purchaser shall be taken to have accepted the title. The time so limited only begins to run from the delivery of a perfect abstract (e). But if the abstract delivered be in accordance with the contract, the purchaser must be careful to send in his requisitions or objections within the time appointed, or he will lose his right to insist upon them(f). If, however, the abstract delivered show no title at all on the face of it, the purchaser may take this objection at any time, notwithstanding any such stipulation as the above, and although the day fixed for sending in requisitions be past. Thus in Want v. Stallibrass (g), two persons entered into a contract to sell land, stipulating that all objections and requisitions not sent in within fourteen days after the delivery of the abstract should be considered as waived. They then delivered an abstract from which it appeared that they were trustees of the property sold for a third person for life and after his death for sale; and they offered the concurrence of the tenant for life, apparently supposing that this would enable them to make a good title. The purchaser, after the fourteen days had expired, took the objection that, as the trust for sale did not arise until the death of the tenant for life, it was not presently exercisable, even with the tenant-for-life's concurrence (h). And it was held by the Court of Exchequer that the purchaser was entitled to recover his deposit, as the above-mentioned stipulation did not exonerate the vendors from their obligation of showing a good title, and it was apparent on the face of the abstract delivered by them that they had failed to perform this obligation. So in Re Tanqueray-Willaume and Landau (i), two persons sold land under the usual condition limiting the time for sending in requisitions or objections, and offered to make title as executors and trustees of a will selling under the power of sale implied by the testator's debts being charged on his real estate (k). After the time so limited had expired the purchaser took the objection that the words of the will did not create such a charge of debts. And it was held both by Kay, J., and the Court of Appeal that it it was not too late to raise this objection, because (as they said) it "went to the root of the title." In other words, it was an objection that the vendors had failed on the face of their own abstract to show any title at all. It also appears that objection to anything, which is a matter of conveyance rather than of title (l), may well be made after the time limited for sending in requisitions on title has expired. Thus where the abstract shows a title in the vendor, subject to mortgages, the purchaser can of course require the mortgagees to concur in the conveyance, although he may not have sent in any requisition to that effect within the appointed time. For, as we have soon (m), a vendor is considered to have shown an acceptable title, if it appear from the abstract that on doing certain acts, which he can perform immediately and independently of others' consent, he will have the right to direct the conveyance of the whole estate contracted for. But by his own showing he has no good title except he do such acts. It is therefore a matter of course that he shall perform them; and it is unnecessary for the purchaser to address any requisition to this point (n). But it is of course the better plan to take any objection to the title in the manner and within the time prescribed by the contract, even though the objection be an absolute failure to show title on the face of the abstract (o). And it is also desirable to include in the requisitions to be sent in within the time limited a demand for the concurrence in the conveyance of any mortgagees or other incumbrancers whose charges are redeemable (p).