(p) See above, pp. 217, 218, 228, n. (x).

(q) Re Pawley and London and Provincial Bank, 1900, 1 Ch. 58. Renunciation of probate by one appointed executor is eqiuvalent to a disclaimer of any interest conferred on him by the appointment in the testator's estate, real or personal; see Long v. Symes, 3 Hagg. 771, 774, 778; Re Birchall, 40 Ch. D. 436, 439; Re Fisher and Haslett, 13 L. R. Ir. 546. As a rule, a trust estate may be disclaimed by deed or conduct, as well as by matter of record; Re Birchall, ubi sup. But it should be noted that an executor cannot renounce probate by matter in pais; 1 Wms. Exors. 281, 7th ed. Since, therefore, an executor, who has not proved, cannot disclaim the office by deed or conduct, it appears that he cannot so disclaim the estate in the testator's realty vested in him as incident to that office.

(r) Me Cohen's Executors and London County Council, 1902, 1 Ch. 187.

(s) The law regards every devise of lands as being in effect specific, though in terms it may be residuary; Hensman v. Fryer, L. R. 3 Ch. 420; Laneefield v. Iggulden, L. R. 10 Ch. 136; 2 Jarm. Wills, 1431, n., 5th ed.

(t) Re Pix, 1901, W. N. 165; Kemp v. Inland Revenue Commrs., 1905, 1 K. B. 591, deciding that no stamp is necessary where the assent is given in writing not under seal; above, p. 218.

(u) See sect. 3 (1), above, p. 230. (v) Above, p. 229.

(w) Above, p. 232, n. (q).

(x) In the case of a chattel, real or personal, assent may be either express or implied, and the assent of one of several executors is sufficient, even though he be himself the legatee; Townson v. Tickell, 3 B. & A. 31, 40; Cole v. Miles, 10 Hare, 179; 2 Wms. Exors. 948, 1374-1378, 7th ed. In the absence of any decision, it cannot safely be assumed that this is now the law with regard to realty.

(y) See above, p. 230.

(z) Re Cary and Lott's Contract, 1901, 2 Ch. 463. See Wms. Pers. Prop. 458, 16th ed.

The devolution of the beneficial interest in lands is not altered by the Act. Such interest may therefore be devised to the same extent as before, remains subject to the law of dower and curtesy, and upon intestacy descends to the heir or escheats according to the law previously in force (a). It is obvious that the term real estate (b) as used in the Act must receive a restricted interpretation. Life estates are real estate: but as they cease on death, of course they do not pass to the personal representatives, nor are they made liable to the deceased owners' debts. It is submitted that the key to the construction of the Act is in the provision that real estate shall vest in the personal representatives, notwithstanding any testamentary disposition (c). This seems to show that the Act is intended to apply to such real estate as may be effectually devised by will. If this be so, the descent of estates tail, whether legal or equitable, remains unaffected by the Act. But pending the decision of the Court on this point, a real difficulty is raised by the unskilled wording of the Act in the case of estates tail. They are not only real estate, but real estate of inheritance in the hands of the donee; as such, they are subject to the law of dower and curtesy (d); and they are charged by statute, in the hands of the heir in tail after his ancestor's death, with debts due from the ancestor to the Crown by judgment, recognizance, obligation or other specialty, although the heir shall not have been comprised therein (e), and also with all arrears and debts, if any, due to the Crown from the ancestor as an accountant to the Crown whose yearly or total receipts exceeded three hundred pounds (f). Why then, it may be urged, shall not estates tail vest in the deceased owner's personal representatives and he charged with the payment of all his debts, according to the letter of the Land Transfer Act? It is probable, however, that the Court will consider that no suffcient intention is expressed in the Act to subject estates tail to all their deceased owner's debts, and that the Act only applies to devisable real estate. 13ut the point is one on which it would be scarcely safe to act upon a text-writer's opinion. The Act seems to apply to all real estate, to which the deceased person was entitled for his own benefit in equity, and which he might devise by his will (g). As regards copy holds, it is clear that legal estates of inheritance in copyholds vested in one, who has been duly admitted tenant on the rolls for his own benefit, are left to pass to the devisee or heir according to the previous law (h). But it has been decided that an equitable estate in fee in copyholds passes to the legal personal representatives under the Act (i); and the opinion has been judicially expressed that the provisions of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, excepting copyholds and customary freeholds from being included in "real estate" in cases where an admission or any act by the lord is necessary to perfect the title of a purchaser from the customary tenant (/.), are to be construed as referring to a purchaser from the copyholder or other customary tenant, who is the actual tenant on the rolls or at law of the lord. Upon this construction of the Act, it appears that the equitable estate in fee of an unadmitted surrenderee of copyholds (/) passes on his death to his personal representatives.

Estates tail.

(a) Above, pp. 213 - 216.

(b) As to the origin and meaning of the term "real estate," see Wms. Real Prop. 8, 25-29, 184, 548, 21st ed.

(c) Sect. 1 (1); above, p. 228.

(d) Above, pp. 214, 215.

(e) Stat. 33 Hen. VIII. c. 39, s. 52 (s. 75 in Ruffhead); Chitty on the Prerogative of the Crown, 299.

(f) Stat. 13 Eliz. c. 4; see 25 Geo. III. c. 35; Chitty, Prerogative, 294, 295.

Equitable estates.

Copyholds.

Equitable estate in copyholds.

Equitable estate of uuadmitted surrenderee.

(g) Kekewich, J., Re Somer-ville and Tarner's Contract, 1903, 2 Ch. 583, 587, 588.

(h) Above, pp. 216, 217.

(i) Re Somerville and Tarner's Contract, 1903, 2 Ch. 583.

(k) Above, p. 229.

(l) See 1 Seriv. Cop. 172, 173, 361, 3rd ed.; 1 Wat. Cop. 118 and n. (1), 1th ed.; Elton on Copyholds, 70.

It has been held that the Crown is not bound by the Land Transfer Act, 1897, and therefore the legal estate in lands escheating to the Crown does not vest in the solicitor to the Treasury, who takes out administration as nominee of the Crown, where chattels fall to the Crown upon intestacy (m). But it does not appear that this decision governs the case of an escheat to a common person. Lands liable to escheat are devisable (n), and are also assets for payment of the deceased tenant's debts (o). These are reasons for holding that lands liable to escheat to a mesne lord will vest under the above-mentioned Act in the executors of any will the tenant may have made, though relating to personal estate only, or in his administrator, if he die wholly intestate. It seems that a purchaser of real estate from an executor or administrator professing to sell under this Act should require to be satisfied that the property sold does not escheat to the Crown, i.e., that there is an heir or a devisee.

Real estate escheating to the Crown.

(m) In the Goods of Hartley, 1899, P. 40.

(n) See Wms. Real Prop. 56, 21st ed.

(o) Evans v. Brown, 5 Beav.

114; Hughes v. Wells, 9 Hare, 749; Beale v. Symonds, 16 Beav. 406.