Inadequacy of consideration on sale of a reversion.

153. Earlier cases had proceeded on the ground that inadequacy of consideration alone was a sufficient ground for refusing to enforce specific performance; Young v. Clerk, Prec. Ch. 538; Savile v. Savile, 1 P. W. 745; Bay v. Newman, 2 Cox, 77; and the earlier rule was re-asserted by Kindersley, V.-C, in Falcke v. Gray, 4 Drew. 651: but this case is said by Sir Edward Fry, Sp. Perf. Sec. 445, to break the current of the later authority.

(a) Above, pp. 685, 692.

(b) Fry, Sp. Perf. Sec. 446.

(c) See notes (y) (z), above.

(d) Not of course including remainders on reversions expectant only on a lease at a profitable rent.

(e) Peacock v. Evans, 16 Ves. 512; Gowland v. Be Faria, 17 Ves. 20; Hincksman v. Smith, 3 Russ. 433; Kendall v. Beckett, 2 Russ. & My. 88, 90. This doctrine was not applied where the reversion was sold by public auction; Shelly v. Nash, 3 Madd. 232; nor where the reversion was sold together with the estate in possession whereon it was expectant; Wood v. Abrey, ib. 417; and see Wardle v. Carter, 7 Sim. 490.

Contracts to sell or buy land, which have been induced by duress or undue influence, are voidable at the option of the party coerced or unduly influenced in the same manner and within the same limits as contracts induced by fraud (k). Thus they may be set aside either before or after completion, at suit of the avoiding party's trustee in bankruptcy (I), or his representatives after his death (m), as well as himself; and against the representatives after death of the other party, and all persons claiming under the transaction so voidable either as volunteers affected by (n) or purchasers with notice of the disabling fact (o). And they are equally unimpeachable against purchasers taking any interest in the land sold for value in good faith and without notice of that fact (p). Such contracts and conveyances may be affirmed either expressly or impliedly in the same manner as those induced by fraud (q); and long acquiescence therein may be evidence of an election to affirm them (r). But of course any such express confirmation must be quite free from all taint of the duress, undue influence or breach of duty which it is intended to condone (s); and it must not be made in ignorance of the party's right to set aside the original transaction; otherwise it will be equally voidable (t). Sales of land induced by duress election for duress or influence, the option to set the transaction aside forms part of his real estate, as in the case of a similar contract voidable for fraud; above, p. 747; Tomson v. Judge, 3 Drew. 306.

Contracts induced by duress or undue influence voidable within the same limits as those induced by fraud.

(/) Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. 125; 1 White & Tudor L. C. Eq.

(g) Above, p. 382.

(h) Stat. 31 Vict. c. 4.

(i) Aylesford v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. 484, 490, 491; O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, 2 App. Cas. 814, 822, 823, 833, 834; Fry v. Lane, 40 Ch. D. 312; Brenchley v. Higgins, 83 L. T. 751

(k) Above, pp. 744 sq.

(I) Ford v. Olden, L. R. 3 Eq. 461.

(m) Holman v. Loynes, 4 De G. M. & G. 270 ; Gresley v. Mousley, 4 De G. & J. 78; Plowright v. Lambert, 52 L. T. 646. Where land has been sold under a contract voidable at the vendor's

(n) A voluntary settlement made in favour of several persons and induced, as regards one of them and the interest taken by himself alone, by undue influence is not voidable against the others; Wright v. Carter, 1903, 1 Ch. 27. But the case is different where a settlement is procured by the undue influence of one party in favour of himself and others, for whose benefit, as well as his own, the undue influence was exercised; see next note.

(o) Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273, 289; Kempson v. Ashbee, L. R. 10 Ch. 15; Bainbrigge v. Browne, 18 Ch. D. 188, 197; Morley v. Loughnan, 1893, 1 Ch. 736, 757.

(p) Blackie v. Clark, 15 Beav. 595; Bainbrigge v. Browne, 18

Ch. D. 188, 197.

(q) Stump v. Gaby, 2 De G. M. & G. 623; Jarratt v. Aldam, L. R.

9 Eq. 463.

(r) Edwards v. Meyrick, 2 Hare, 60, 75; Wright v. Vanderplank, 8 De G. M. & G. 133; Allcard v. Skinner, 36 Ch. D. 145, 187, 192, 193.

(s) Baugh v. Price, 1 Wils. 320; Savery v. King, 5 H. L. C. 627, 664; Moxon v. Payne, L. R. 8 Ch. 881, 885.

(t) Baugh v. Price, 1 Wils. 320, 322 ; Kempson v. Ashbee, L. R.

10 Ch. 15. It is conceived that there can be no doubt that, as a rule, knowledge of the party's rights is necessary to make an effectual confirmation. But in Mitchell v. Homfray, 8 Q. B. D. 587, it was in special circumstances held that a gift of money to a medical man by a patient was confirmed by the patient's deliberate assent thereto persisted in during several years after the relation between them had been severed, although it was not or undue influence will be set aside, in general, on the like terms as those induced by fraud, the vendor returning the purchase money paid with interest and the purchaser giving up the land and the profits thereof received or derived by him (u), including an occupation rent for any land which has been in his own possession, having the like allowances made to him for necessary outgoings and substantial improvements and repairs, and being charged, where the relief is claimed against him, with the loss caused by any acts of waste or deterioration, which he has committed {x). And the purchaser will not be required to account for the rents and profits on the footing of wilful default (y), unless a special case be made out against him (z), or unless he were guilty of a special breach of trust; as where he purchased when he was standing in a fiduciary relation to the vendor and concealed from the vendor some information which ought to have been communicated to him (a), or where the fiduciary relation was such as to incapacitate him altogether from purchasing the estate(b). It is thought that, where a sale is set aside for any undue influence not amounting to an actionable wrong, the party in fault is not liable to reimburse the other for any loss sustained in the nature of collateral damages and not attributable to any outlay incurred or act done in pursuance of the contract (c). But in the case of a sale induced by duress, such as false imprisonment, battery or menaces of loss of life or limb (d), which amounts to an actual tort (e), it is conceived that the party so coerced can recover all damages attributable to the wrong, as in the case of fraud (f).

Terms of setting aside sales induced by duress or undue influence.

Whether purchaser accountable on the footing of wilful default.

Proved that the patient knew that the original gift was voidable. The ground on which this judgment really rests appears to be that such assent was equivalent to a new gift made at a time when there was no confidential relation between the parties to invalidate it. It may be noted that, as the chattels given were already in the donee's possession, nothing was required to make a new gift to him but the expression of the donor's intention to give: Wms. Pers. Prop. 68, 15th ed.

(u) Above, pp. 750-753.

(x) Expte. Hughes, 6 Ves. 617, 624, 625; Expte. James, 8 Ves. 337, 351; Expte. Bennett, 10 Ves. 381, 400, 401; Robinson v. Ridley, 6 Madd. 2; Longmate v. Ledger, 2 Giff. 157; Gresley v. Mousley, 4 De G. & J. 78, 100 - 102.

(y) See previous note, (z) Above, pp. 449, 753.

(a) Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 2 Ch. 55; Seton on Judgments, 2320, 6th ed.; Plowright v. Lambert, 52 L. T. 646.

(b) Adams v. Sworder, 2 De G. J. & S. 44; Silkstone, etc. Co. v. Edey, 1900, 1 Ch. 167.

(c) See above, pp. 750, 751; and cases cited in note (x), above. (d) Above, p. 7)6.

(e) 3 Black. Comm. 120, 127. (f) Above, p. 751.