(m) These expenses are recoverable as damages for breach of the contract: Hanslip v. Padwick, 5 Ex. 615.

(n) Edwards v. McLeay, G-. Coop. 308, 318, 2 Swanst. 287, 289; Berry v. Armistead, 2 Keen, 221, 229; Hart v. Swaine, 7 Ch. D. 42, 47.

If a contract for the sale of land he set aside, on the ground of fraud, after completion, the vendor rescinding is entitled, not only to he restored to the possession of the land, hut also to recover the amount of the rents and profits thereof during the time when the purchaser was in possession; and the purchaser must account for all rents and profits, which he has received, and will he charged with an occupation rent for any part of the land which he has occupied himself (p). The vendor is also entitled to recover his expenses incurred in connexion with the sale (q). On the other hand, the vendor must return the purchase money with interest at the rate of 4l. per cent, per annum (r). And the purchaser will he entitled to an allowance for all necessary outgoings and also, it seems, for substantial repairs and lasting improvements (s). Similarly, the purchaser so rescinding is entitled to be repaid the purchase money with interest at the same rate and his expenses incurred in connexion with the purchase (q), hut must account for the rents and profits received by him and pay an occupation rent for any land in hand; and he is entitled to the like allowance for necessary outgoings, substantial repairs and improvements (r). But it seems that, if an action be brought to set aside the conveyance, any claim to an allowance for substantial repairs and improvements ought to be specially made (t). If the amount chargeable against the purchaser for rents and profits exceed the interest on the purchase money, the accounts may be directed to be taken with annual rests, so that the excess of the profits above the interest may be applied in reduction of the principal (u): but a special case must be made out for taking the accounts in this way (v). The purchaser may in a proper case be directed to account for any rents and profits which he might, but for his wilful default, have received: but it appears that special circumstances must be shown in order to obtain this direction (x). A special case certainly seems necessary to charge the purchaser on the footing of wilful default, where he is the party defrauded (y). But where the fraud was his, he would, it is thought, be more readily charged on that footing (z). The purchaser is not chargeable with interest on the rents and profits for which he is accountable {a). But where the vendor is entitled to rescind (b), the purchaser is chargeable with any depreciation in the value of the land caused by any act of waste or deterioration, which he has committed (c).

On what terms the contract will be rescinded after completion.

(o) Sec Mycock v. Beatson, 13 Ch. D. 386; and the cases cited in the previous note.

(p) Donovan v. Flicker, Jac. 165; Trevelyan v. White, 1 Beav. 588; affirmed, Charter v. Tre~ velyan, 11 Cl. & Fin. 713; Hay-garth v. Wearing, L. R. 12 Eq. 320, 330.

(q) Edwards v. McLeay, G. Coop. 308. 319, 2 Swanst. 287, 289; Berry v. Armistead, 2 Keen, 221, 229; Hart v. Swaine, 7 Ch. D. 42, 47.

(r) See Silkstone, etc. Co. v. Edey, 1900, 1 Ch. 167, 171. £1 per cent, still appears to be the rate of interest chargeable; see also Re Hunt, 1902, 2 Ch. 318, n.

(s) See notes (p), (q), above.

(t) Edwards v. McLeay, G. Coop. 308, 318. 2 Swanst, 287

Whether purchaser chargeable on the footing of wilful default.

289; see also Baugh v. Price, 1 Wils K. B. 320, 322; Haygarth v. Wearing, L. R. 12 Eq. 320, 330.

(u) Donovan v. Fricker, Jac. 16.3.

(v) Neesom v. Clarkson, 4 Hare, 97, 105.

{x) See the cases cited in notes (p), (q), above; Howell v. Howell, 2 My. & Cr. 4 78, 486; Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & Lef. 474, 489, where however the decree made does not accord with the judgment; Gibson v. D'Este, 2 Y. & C.C.C. 542,581; reversed, Wilde v. Gibson, 1 H. L. C. 605, 636; Prees v. Coke, L. R. 6 Ch. 645, 651; above, p. 449.

(y) Such an account was directed as against a purchaser held entitled to rescind in Gibson v.

D'Este, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 542, 581, reversed as mentioned above, n. (x). But it is submitted that this was clearly wrong; see Howell v. Howell, 2 My. & Cr. 478, 486. (z) See Howell v. Howell, 2 My. & Cr. 478, 486; Adams v. Sworder, 2 De G. J. & S. 44, 61; Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 2 Ch. 55; Seton on Decrees, 2320, 6th ed.; Silkstone, etc. Co. v. Edey, 1900, 1 Ch. 167.

(a) See cases cited above, notes (p), (q); Silkstone, etc. Co. v. Edey, 1900, 1 Ch. 167.

(b) See above, p. 746.

(c) See Expte. Bennett, 10 Ves. 381, 400, 401; Robinson v. Ridley, 6 Madd. 2; Gresley v. Mousley, 4 De G. & J. 78.

In connexion with the subject of fraud, it may be mentioned that a forged document, whether it be a deed or a simple writing, is, as a rule, an absolute nullity (d). If it be a conveyance, no interest passes thereby (e); if it be a power of attorney, it confers no authority (f); and if it take the form of a contract, it imposes no liability on any party whose seal or signature thereto is forged (g). And if it assume the shape of a negotiable instrument, it acquires no validity in the hands of a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of the forgery (h). A forgery, being an illegal act, cannot, strictly speaking, be ratified by the person whose seal or signature is counterfeited (i). But the seal or signature, or the forged document, may be adopted by him as his own and may acquire validity as against him under the doctrine of estoppel by conduct (k). Thus if one admit or represent a forged document to have been signed or sealed by him, he will be liable thereunder to any person who has altered his position on the faith of this representation (l). So if one endorse a forged bill of exchange, he will be liable thereon to a holder in due course (m). Money paid on the faith that a forged document is genuine is paid under a mistake of fact and may in general be recovered back (n): but if the amount payable under a forged bill of exchange or promissory note be paid by a person liable thereon to a bond fide holder in the belief that it was genuine, the sum paid cannot be recovered from him, unless notice of the forgery be given to him at once before he has altered his position in consequence of the payment, and at latest on the same day (o). If an agent innocently make use of a forged authority from his principal or supposed principal, he is liable under the doctrine of implied warranty of authority to make good any damage suffered by any person whom he has induced to act on the faith of the authority being genuine (p).