This section is from the book "A Treatise On The Law Of Vendor And Purchaser Of Real Estate And Chattels Real", by T. Cyprian Williams. Also available from Amazon: A treatise on the law of vendor and purchaser of real estate and chattels real.
Letter of acceptance sent without the writer's authority.
Unilateral mistake.
(o) See above, p. 13.
(p) See Henkel v. Tape, L. R. 6 Ex. 7; Baxendale v. Bennett, 3 Q. B. D. .525; Clutton v. Atten-borough, 1897, A. C. 90, 96. The offer appears to be ostensibly-accepted through the agency of a third person acting without the authority of the party purported to be bound; and the writer of the letter is, it is submitted, no more bound than he would be if the third person had, without his authority, written a letter of acceptance in his name; see Hollins v. Fowler, L. R. 7 H. L. 7.57. So where a deed or a similar legal instrument is executed as an escrow, and entrusted to a solicitor to keep until performance of the required condition, and he fraudulently delivers the same without exacting performance of the condition, the person who executed the deed is not estopped from showing that it was not his act; Lloyd's Bank, Ltd. v. Bullock, 1896, 2 Ch. 192, 194. It may be noted that where one has signed, but not issuer!, a negotiable instrument complete and valid on the face of it, and the same is taken out of his possession against his will, and put into circulation, it appears that, as against a holder in due course, he cannot avoid his liability on the ground that, owing to the want of any consent between himself and the other party to the instrument, there was no contract at all between them; see Glutton v. Attenborough, 1897, A. C. 90, 93, 96.
(q) See previous note.
Estoppel arising from a man's own carelessness.
Executing, without inquiry, a document presented by one's solicitor.
Misunderstanding as to effect of a legal document.
(r) Above, p. 14.
(s) See H. T. Chitty, arguendo, Henkel v. Pape, L. R. 6 Ex. 7, 8 ; Anson on Contract, 159, 160, 8th ed. It is submitted that the remark of Collins, M. R., in Van Praagh v. Everidge, 1903, 1 Ch. 434, 436, that it was not clear to him, whether the parties were ad idem, must not be taken in a sense adverse to the above conclusion. In that case the parties' minds were most certainly not in truth at one: but the question whether the defendant was not estopped at law from proving the truth was not argued or decided in the Court of Appeal.
(t) See Mellish, L. J., Hunter v. Walters, L. R. 7 Ch. 75, 88; King v. Smith, 1900, 2 Ch. 425, 430; above, p. 655.
Difference between transactions void and voidable.
Conveyance induced by misrepresentation, fraud, etc. not voidable as against a purchaser for value without notice.
(u) Powell v. Smith, L. E. 14 Eq. 85; Tamplin v. James, 15 Ch. D. 215; Stewart v. Kennedy, 15 App. Cas. 108.
(x) Above, p. 66C.
(y) Above, pp. 667 - 671.
(z) Above, p. 666; Hunter v. Walters, L. R. 7 Ch. 75, 82; Onward Building Society v. Smith-son, 1893, 1 Ch. 1, 15; Lloyd's Bank, Ltd. v. Bullock, 1896, 2 Ch. 192, 196, 197.
(a) In this respect the rules of law and equity are the same; so that the conveyance procured by fraud of an equitable estate or interest in lands or goods is not voidable as against a bond fide purchaser for value without notice of the fraud; and the conveyance so procured of a legal estate or interest cannot be avoided as against such a purchaser taking an equitable interest only; Sturge
This doctrine, however, relates only to conveyances procured by fraud. Contracts induced by fraud may, as a rule, be avoided, notwithstanding that the benefits thereof have been assigned to one taking in good faith and for value without notice of the fraud; for the assignee of the benefit of a contract takes subject to all equities existing between his assignor and the other contractor (b). To this rule, negotiable instruments are an exception (c). But it should be noted, especially in connexion with contracts for the sale of land, that the rule is only applicable so long as the tiling assigned is the benefit of an obligation arising from contract, that is to say, a thing in action. We have seen that where a contract for the sale of land is executed by payment of the purchase money, the purchaser becomes absolutely raid entirely entitled in equity to the land, the vendor being thenceforward a bare trustee for him, and having no longer any lien on the land (d). In this state of things the vendor is regarded in equity as having made a complete conveyance of the land, and not as remaining under contract to convey it; the parties' agreement has in equity passed out of the stage of executory into that of executed contract. It appears therefore that if a contract so executed were induced by the purchaser's fraud, and he resold or mortgaged the land to a purchaser taking for valuable consideration paid or executed (e), in good faith and without notice of the fraud, the vendor could not set aside the sale as against such subsequent purchaser (f). But it seems that, until this stage of the contract has been reached, it remains, for the purposes of the rule in question, an executory contract, the parties' relations being those of mutual obligation only (g).
Contracts induced by fraud remain voidable, as against the other contractor's assigns.
Where a sale of land is executed by payment of the purchase money.
V. Starr, 2 My. & K. 195; Phillips v. Phillios, 4 De G. F. & J. 208, 218; Hunter v. Walters, L. R 7 Oh. 75; Lindley, L. J., National Provincial Bank of England v. Jackson, 33 Ch. D. 1, 13; Lloyd's Bank, Ltd. v. Bullock, 1896, 2 Ch. 192, 197; cf. Cave v. Cave, 15 Ch. D. 639, 647. As to the common law rule, see White v. Garden, 10 C. B. 919; Kingsford v. Merry, 25 L. J. N. S. Ex. 166, reversed on another ground, 26 L. J. N. S. Ex. 83; Pease v. Gloahec, L. R. 1 P. C. 219, 229, 230; Cundy v.
Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459, 464; Vilmont v. Bentley, 18 Q. B. D. 322, 330; 12 App. Cas. 471, 473, 483 (this decision gave rise to the amending stat. 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 24 (2)); stat. 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 23; Wms. Pers. Prop. 520, 15th ed.
 
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