Rectification may be obtained where a written instrument does not express the parties' real agreement.

(s) Altham's case, 8 Rep. 150b, 155; Croome v. Lediard, 2 My. & K. 251; Saunderson v. Piper, 5 Bing. N. C. 425; Elphinstone, Norton & Clark, Interpretation of Deeds, Rule 26, p. 112; see also Higginson v. Clowes, 15 Ves. 516; Clowes v. Higginson, 1 V. & B. 524; Sug. V. & P. 161; Marshall v. Berridge, 19 Ch. D. 233. This is hardly the place to state in full the rules, with their exceptions, as to the admission of extrinsic evidence in interpretation of written instruments. The reader is referred to Stephen on Evidence, Arts. 90 - 92; Elphinstone, Norton & Clark, Interpretation of Deeds, Rules 1, 10 - 12, 16, and Ch. VIII. pp. 1, 47, 57, 76, 102 sq.; Wigram on Wills, L. Q. R. xx. 245. But it may be pointed out that, whilst extrinsic evidence of external facts, other than the fact of what the parties actually intended, is admissible to elucidate descriptions, apparently capable of being reduced to certainty by such evidence, of persons or things mentioned in the writing, evidence of the actual intention of the parties is only admissible where it turns out, after attempting to elucidate a description of the above character by proof of such external facts, that the description is equally applicable to several objects. See above, p. 677; Cheyney's case, 5 Rep. 68; Alt-ham's case, 8 Rep. 155; Jones v. Newman, 1 W. Bl. 60; Miller v. Travers, 8 Bing. 244, 248; Doe d. Morgan v. Morgan, 1 C. & M. 235; Doe d. Gord v. Needs, 2 M. & W. 129, 139, 140; Doe d. Hiscocks v. Hiscocks, 5 M. & W. 363, 368, 369; Elphinstone, Norton & Clark, Interpretation of Deeds, Rule 25, p. 108. We may also mention here that the rule in question does not prohibit the proof by oral evidence of some stipulation collateral and additional to a written contract and not inconsistent with the terms expressed in the writing; Lindley v. Lacey, 17 C. B. N. S. 578; Malpas v. London & South Western Eg. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 336; Morgan v. Griffith, L. R. 6 Ex. 70; Erskine v. Adeane, L. R. 8 Ch. 756; Lamare v. Dixon, L. R. 6 H. L. 414; Angell v. Duke, L. R. 10 Q. B. 174; De Lassalle v. Guildford, 1901, 2 K. B. 215.

3(2)

(t) Uvedale v. Halfpenny, 2 P. W. 151; Motteux v. London Assurance Co., 1 Atk. 545; Henkle v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., 1 Ves. sen. 317; Baker v. Paine, ib. 456; Ball v. Storie, 1 Sim. & Stu. 210; Cowen v. Truefitt, Id., 1899, 2 Ch. 309; above, p. 568, n. (h).

(u) Mackenzie v. Coulson, L. R. 8 Eq. 368.

(x) See Fowler v. Fowler, 4 De G. & J. 250, 265.

(y) Pitcairn v. Oybourne, 2 Ves. sen. 375; Irnham v. Child, 1 Bro. C. C. 92; Portmore v. Morris, 2 Bro. C. C. 219; Townshend v.

Stangroom, 6 Ves. 328, 332, 333; Vouillon v. States, 25 L. J. Ch. 875.

(z) Stat. 29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 4; above, p. 3.

(a) Mortimer v. Shortall, 2 Dru. & War. 363, in which case a lease of land for life executed in pursuance of a parol agreement was rectified; Cowen v. Truefitt, Id 1899, 2 Ch. 309.

(b) Stat. 29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 4; above, p. 3.

(c) Thomas v. Davis, 1 Dick. 301, 303; Johnson v. Bragge, 1901, 1 Ch. 28, 36, 37.

(d) Above, p. 9.

(e) See Pitcairn v. Or/bourne, 2 Ves. sen. 375; Pember v. Mathers, 1 Bro. C. C. 52, 54; Clarke v. Grant, 14 Ves. 519, 524; Fry, Sp. Perf. Sec. 567, 814; above, p. 10. It is submitted that the dictum to the contrary of Alderson, B., in A. - G.

V. Sitwell, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 559, 583, takes no account of the earlier authorities cited in this and the preceding notes and is not good law.

(/) Above, pp. 4, 6, 7.

(g) Above, p. 698.

(h) Henkle v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., l Ves. sen. 317, 319; Towmshend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 328, 333; Fowler v. Fouler, 4 De G. & J. 250, 264; Tucker v. Bennett, 38 Ch. D. 1, 9.

(i) Piteairn v. Ogbourne, 2 Ves. sen. 375, 379; Townshend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 328, 324; Bloomer v. Spittle, L. R. 13 Eq. 422, stated below, p. 712. It is submitted that there is no rule, as suggested by the dicta of Lord St. Leonards in Mortimer v. Shortall, 2 Dr. & War. 363, 374, and Alderson, B., in A.-G. v. Sitwell, 1 Y. & C. 559, 583 (accepted in Pollock on Contract, 513, 7th ed.), that if the alleged mistake be denied by one of the parties to the written instrument, parol evidence alone is inadmissible to prove it. Such a rule would obviously be an inducement to fraud; and the weight of authority is against Lord St. Leonards' dictum. Parol evidence was admitted and prevailed in face of the defendant's denial in Pitcairn v. Ogboume,2Ves. sen. 375, 379; Garrard v. Frankel, 30 Beav. 445; and Paget v. Marshall, 28 Ch. D. 255. And Baron Alder-son's true meaning appears to have been that the Statute of Frauds prohibits the admission of parol evidence to prove a case for rectification in the face of the defendant's denial. But as we have seen, this proposition cannot be upheld; above, p. 700, nn. (a) (c).

Now it has been clearly established from the earliest times of modern equitable jurisdiction that a man may well claim, as plaintiff, the rectification of a written instrument on the ground of a mistake common to all parties thereto in the terms of the writing, and may prove by extrinsic evidence that they entered into some antecedent contract at variance with the terms of the instrument and had a common intention of embodying or carrying out that contract in or by the writing (l). And it is, as we have seen (m), equally clear that the Statute of Frauds is no bar to obtaining such relief, notwithstanding that the antecedent contract were one of those required by that Act to be put into writing, but were made by word of mouth. It is also perfectly well settled that rectification will be granted in equity not only of written instruments in the nature of executed contracts, those which are meant to give effect to some antecedent agreement, but also of writings which are merely intended to embody an agreement of an executory nature (n). For example, a written contract to sell land may certainly be rectified just as well as a conveyance of land upon sale (o). Furthermore, it appears that under the old Chancery practice a claim for the rectification of a written instrument, which embodied an agreement of an executory nature, might well be joined with a claim for equitable relief in respect of the enforcement of the agreement (p). And under the rules of practice introduced by the Judicature Act of 1873 (q), the Supreme Court is required, in every cause pending before it, to grant all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of any and every legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them respectively in such cause; so that, as far as possible, all matters in controversy between the said parties respectively may be completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of such matters avoided. Now it would appear to be a necessary consequence of these rules that a man may first apply as plaintiff for the rectification of a written contract for the sale of land, and may afterwards sue for the specific performance of that contract, as rectified; and further, that he may well combine these claims in one action (r). On this point, however, the law is at present uncertain. The reason of this is as follows: It has ever been held that one may claim rectification as plaintiff.