(b) Page v. Midland By. Co., 1894, 1 Ch. 11; Great Western By. Co. v. Fisher, 1905, 1 Ch. 316, 322.

(c) See above, pp. 567, 568, 581, n. (m).

(d) See above, pp. 568 & n. (h), 588, 699 sq., 703 - 707, 720.

(e) 1893, 1 Ch. 523; above, p. 1034.

It appears that, under the present Bankruptcy law, the liability of a person, who has entered into covenants for title, in so far as it consists in any obligation or possibility of an obligation to pay money on breach of the covenants, is capable of proof in his bankruptcy, and will be discharged by an order of discharge made or by a composition or scheme of arrangement approved therein (l). But the covenantor's liability under a covenant for further assurance, in so far as it is capable of being enforced specifically (m), is not capable of proof in nor discharged by his bankruptcy (n), but may be asserted against the trustee in the bankruptcy, or against the covenantor himself after his discharge, or his representatives in law or gratuitous or equitable assignees (o).

Bankruptcy of covenantor for title.

(f) Correct the statement to the contrary made, above, p. 584; in writing which, the decision on this point in David v. Sabin was overlooked.

(g) Above, p. 974.

(h) This was the case in David v. Sabin, where the fraud of the covenantee caused an incumbrance to remain outstanding without the knowledge of the covenantor, and so occasioned the breach of covenant; see above, p. 1034.

(i) See Stevenson v. Lombard, 2 East, 575, 580; Sug. V. & P. 576.

(k) Above, pp. 674, 675, 748.

We have seen that if, without making any fraudulent misrepresentation, a man sell lands, to which he has no good title, and convey the same to the purchaser, but give him no covenants for title, or covenants not availing against the defect (p), the purchaser has no right or equity to recover the purchase money in case of his ejectment after the conveyance, and has in general no remedy (q). There is however one contingency in which he may obtain satisfaction. If the vendor should chance to acquire by any means after the conveyance some valid estate or interest in the land sold, he will be bound in equity to assure the same in such manner as will make good his contract of sale (r). For in such case the rule of equity is that, as the conveyance has proved to be defective, the vendor shall not plead that the contract has been already discharged by performance (s). And this rule is applicable to any contract to convey land for valuable consideration, and to agreements of mortgage, settlement or exchange as well as of sale (t). It was suggested in one case (u) that this equity is personal to the contractor and is not available against his successors in estate. This opinion however was judicially dissented from by Lord St. Leonards (x), and appears to be unsound in principle (y). The true rule seems to be that, if the vendor himself had once become entitled to a valid estate in the land, the purchaser's equity would attach upon it in the hands of all persons claiming under the vendor, otherwise than for a legal interest by purchase for value without notice (z). But of course if the vendor's eldest son and heir or other successor should acquire a valid interest in the land sold by an independent title, not derived from the vendor, he would not be bound to give effect to the sale (a). And if the vendor had sold and conveyed some particular estate or interest only in the land or such interest as he had therein, so that the conveyance actually gave effect to the contract, but the interest conveyed afterwards came to an end, the vendor would not be bound to assure to the purchaser any new estate or interest which he might acquire after the conveyance (b).

If one sell land and execute a defective conveyance, he will be bound in equity to make good the contract out of any estate in the land that he may afterwards acquire.

(l) See above, p. 921; Hardy v. Fothergill, 13 App. Cas. 351. '

(m) See above, p. 1043.

(n) See Re Reis, 1904, 2 K. B. 769, 777, 781, 787.

(o) Above, pp. 1043, 1044 & n. (t).

(p) Above, pp. 571, 1031.

(q) Above, pp. 540, 577, 578, 042, 1026, 1031.

(r) Seabourne v. Towel, 2 Vern. 11; Noel v. Bewley, 3 Sim. 103, 116; Jones v. Kearney, 1 Dru. & War. 134, 158 - 160; Smith v. Baker; 1 Y. & C. C. C. 223; Smith v. Osborne, 6 H. L. C. 375, 390, 398; Sug. V. & P. 745; 2 Dart, V. & P. 909.

(s) Above, p. 922.

As previously explained (c), if the conveyance to the purchaser contained a precise averment of the vendor's seisin in fee or other right, sufficient to work an estoppel at law, then if the vendor had not the estate specified at the time of conveyance but afterwards acquired it, the same would immediately pass to the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, without any further conveyance, by the effect of the estoppel. An estoppel of this kind would be available in favour of the purchaser, his heirs and assigns, as against all persons claiming the whole or any part of the vendor's after-acquired estate by any title derived from him, whether gratuitously or for value and whether for a legal or an equitable interest.

Vendor's after-acquired estate passing to the purchaser by-estoppel.

(t) See cases cited in note {r), above.

(u) Morse v. Faulkner, 1 Anst. 11, 14.

(x) Jones v. Kearney, 1 Dru. & War. 134, 159.

(y) 2 Dart, V. & P. 910, 911. (z) See Martin v. Seamore, 1

Ch. Ca. 170; Taylor v. Wheeler, 2 Vern. 564; Jennings v. Moore, ib. 609; and cf. above, pp. 1042, 1043.

(a) Cf. above, p. 1043.

(b) See Smith v. Osborne, 6 H. L. C. 375, 390, 398; above, p. 1044.

(c) Above, pp. 550, 551.