Remedies conferred by-registered charges on registered land.

(k) Stat. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 87, s. 27; see above, p. 1123, n. (x).

(l) Above, pp. 1074 - 1081.

(m) Stat. 60 & 61 Vict. c. 65, s. 8 (4); above, p. 1065, n. (o).

(n) Above, pp. 578, 1123.

(o) Above, p. 1062.

(p) See above, p. 1095. (q) See above, p. 1092. (r) Above, p. 552.

(s) Stats. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 87, ss. 22 - 28; 60 & 61 Vict. c. 65, s. 9.

{t) Stat. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 87, s. 23. As an office copy of the instrument of charge is now contained in the certificate of charge, and when so contained is made primd facie evidence of the instrument (above, p. 1095, a. (s) ), the chargee has in his own possesion sufficient evidence for enforcing the covenant to pay implied in the charge.

(u) Above, p. 1124 & n. (g).

(x) Stat. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 87, s. 26, enabling the chargee to enforce a foreclosure or sale of the land charged in the same manner in which be might enforce the same if the land had been trans-ferred to him by way of mortgage, By the Land Tranfer Rules (1903), L64, the chargee, on obtaining an order for foreclosure absolute, is entitled to be registered as proprietor of the land, subject to prior charges, if any. And it appears that be will thus obtain the Like estate as if the Land had been transferred to him for value by the person registered as proprietor thereof at the time of registration of the charge.

(y) Stat. 38 &:ii) Vict. o. 87, s. 22. It. is immaterial that no such into rest was previously known to the English Law of land; the authority of Parliament is supreme; and all Courts, of Law as well as of equity, are bound to give effect to the charge; see Lord Advocate v. Moray, L906, A. C. 531, 539.

(z) Stat. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 87, S. 25.

(a) Above, pp. 1058, n. (c), L061, nn. (p, q, r), 1073.

(b) The opinion has been ex-pressed that a registered charge "does not convey any Legal estate so as to enable the mortgagee to maintain an action for the re-covery of the land"; Wolsten-holme's Forms and Precedents, 249, n. (a), 6th ed., citing Allen v. Woods, 68 L. T. 143. That case however merely decides that, on ejectment by one claiming under an equitable title, the person entitled to the legal estate must he a party to the action. But, as above maintained (n. (y), the chargee has a legal right of entry; so this case has no application. And with great respect to the opinion of the learned author cited, it is not necessary to have the legal estate in land in order to maintain successfully an action to recover possession thereof. We have seen that by the common law a man wrongfully disseised of land was divested of all estate therein, and left with a mere right of entry or even of action; above, p. 773. But he could nevertheless well maintain an action to recover possession he is not in the position of a mortgagee in fee of unregistered land, who simply takes possession of his own fee simple, subject only to the mortgagor's equity of redemption, which will he altogether extinguished when the mortgagor has held possession for twelve years without acknowledgment of the mortgagor's title or right to redemption (l). The registered chargee, who has entered into possession, has still no definite estate in the land; though he seems to have an interest analogous to that of a tenant by elegit. He has no right, on entry into possession, to he registered as proprietor of the land; the mortgagor therefore remains the registered proprietor and can still exercise all the registered proprietor's powers of transfer or charge. And when the chargee has been in possession for twelve years without acknowledgment of the mortgagor's title, he does not obtain ipso facto the full ownership of the land: but he must first apply to the Court for an order for rectification of the register by entry of his name as proprietor of the land. And it does not appear that he can claim such an order as his undoubted right; the granting thereof appears to be in the judicial discretion of the Court, which is to be exercised "subject to any estates or rights acquired by registration for valuable consideration in pursuance of the Land Transfer Acts" (m). It seems, therefore, that persons claiming under registered transfers for value or charges made by the mortgagor against all persons whomsoever for the time being in occupation of the land; see Wms. Real Prop. 17 & n. (n), 64, 19th ed., and authorities there cited.

(c) See previous note. If the chargee were to sue the mortgagor to get possession of the land charged, it is thought that the latter would be precluded from asserting that the legal estate was outstanding in some third person; Doe d. Ogle v. Vickers, 4 A. & E. 782; Doe d. Hurst v. Clifton, ib. 809, 813; Doe d. Levy v. Horne, 3 Q. B. 757, 760, 766.

(d) Above, p. 1072.

(e) Stat. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 87, e. 49; above, p. 1072 & n. (g).

(f) Capital and Counties Bank, Ld. v. Modes, 1903, 1 Ch. 631, 656.

(g) Above, p. 1081, n. (r).

(h) Above, p. 1126.

(i) Above, p. 1126.

(k) It is thought that the chargee, having a mere lien on the reversion, could not be held to be an assignee of part of the reversion and so entitled to enforce the covenants and right of re-entry; see Co. Litt. 215 a; Wright v. Burroughes, 3 C. B. 685. But he might possibly be considered to be "a person entitled, subject to the term, to the income of the land leased," and to be enabled, as such, to enforce the lessee's covenants and the conditions of re-entry by virtue of sect. 10 of the Conveyancing Act of 1881 (stat. 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41), as regards leases made after that year. It has not been decided, however, that that enactment confers the right to enforce the covenants and conditions in a lease on a person, who takes no part of the estate in reversion; and the terms of the whole section seem to be opposed to such a construction. "With respect to the chargee's right, on entry into possession, to enforce the lessee's covenants and the conditions in a lease granted by the mortgagor, after the charge, under sect. 18 of the Conveyancing Act of 1881 (stat. 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41), the opinion has been expressed that he can do so; 2 Key & Elph. Prec. Conv. 919, 8th ed., citing Municipal, etc. Building Socy. v. Smith, 22 Q. B. D. 70. That case certainly decided that, when a lease is so granted by the mortgagor after an ordinary mortgage in fee of unregistered land, the mortgagee entering into possession can enforce the lessee's covenants and the conditions in the lease. But the ground of the decision was that, in such circumstances, the lease took effect under the statutory power out of the mortgagee's legal estate in the land, and the mortgagee had therefore the legal reversion. With great respect to the editors of the treatise above cited, it is submitted that it is far from clear that a registered chargee of registered land, having no estate at all in the land and no part of the reversionary estate expectant on such a lease, could successfully maintain an action to enforce the lessee's covenants or the conditions therein contained.