Evidence that certain events, which would certainly have affected the title, did not happen.

(u) See Stephen, Evidence, Arts. 25, 31.

{x) Sug. V. & P. 418; 1 Dart, V. & P. 347, 5th ed.; 393, 6th ed.; 388, 7th ed.

(y) Sec Doe d. Banning v. Griffin, 15 East, 293, 294, n.; Greaves v.

Greenwood, 2 Ex. D. 289; Re Jackson, 1907, 2 ch. 354

(z) Re Marsh and Earl Gran-ville, 24 ch. D. 11, 19.

(a) Re Marsh and Earl Granville, 24 Ch. D. 11, 19; Bee below, p. 136.

Here we may state the general rule with respect to presumptions of matters of fact on sales; which is, that the purchaser is bound to presume whatever a judge would at law direct the jury to presume, but not matters which the judge would leave to the jury to pronounce on the effect of the evidence (c). For example, a purchaser may be required to presume, after long possession of lands in accordance with the beneficial title, that some bare legal estate, which was previously outstanding and ought to have been assured to the beneficiaries, was duly conveyed to them, although no such conveyance can be found (d). But the Court will not oblige a purchaser, who has notice of some equitable incumbrance affecting the property sold, to take a title depending on the fact that the vendor bought without notice of such incumbrance (e).

Rule as to presumptions of fact.

Besides events, which would certainly affect the title, if they occurred, there are other events, the happening of which might or might not affect the title.

Events of which the happening may or may not have affected the title.

(b) 1 Dart, V. & P. 328, 329, 5th ed.; 372, 373, 6th ed.; 366, 367, 7th ed.

(c) Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 239, 254, 270; Emery v. Grocock, 6 Madd. 54, 57; Sug. V. & P. 399; 1 Dart, V. & P. 327, 333, 5th ed.; 371, 377, 6th ed.; 365, 371, 7th ed.; Fry, Sp. Perf. Sec. 890, 891.

(d) See England d. Syburn v. Slade, 4 T. R. 682; Doe d. Bowerman v. Sybourn, 7 T. R. 2; Wilson v. Allen, 1 J. & W. 611, 620; Cooke v. Soltan, 2 S. & S. 154; Clippens Oil Co. v. Edinburgh, etc. Trustees, 1904, A. C. 64; and cases cited in previous note; Taylor on Evidence, Sec. 113-121, 5th ed.

(e) Freer v. Hesse, 4 De G. M. & G. 495; Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co. v. Butler, 16 Q. B. D. 778, 787, 789, 790.

An instance of this is the marriage of a vendor since the conveyance of the property to him or her, when a marriage settlement may or may not have been made, and, if made, may or may not have affected the property sold. It is conceived that the vendor is, as a rule, bound to answer all questions relevant to the abstracted title, that is, the title he is offering for the purchaser's acceptance (f); and he must therefore answer the question whether a particular event, which might or might not have affected the title, has happened. If the answer be that the event has not happened, it does not appear that the purchaser can in general require any further evidence: though it seems he may call upon the vendor to make (at the purchaser's expense, according to the present rule (g) ) a statutory declaration of the fact. If the vendor reply that the event happened but did not affect the property sold, the purchaser may require this statement to be confirmed by the production of any evidence in the vendor's possession or power, as well as to be embodied in a statutory declaration: but he cannot, it seems, insist on the production of other evidence (h). If the purchaser be informed of the existence of a document, such as a vendor's marriage settlement, which may or may not affect the property sold, and is also told that it did not affect the property sold, he is not fixed with notice of any equitable interest created by the document in the property sold (i). But as this is no protection to the purchaser against any legal estate or interest limited by such document in the property purchased, he should of course require the document, if in the vendor's possession or power, to be produced for his solicitor's examination (k).

(f) Sug. V. & P. 415, 416; 1 Dart. V. & P. 328, 329, 5th ed.; 372, 373, 6-th ed.; 366, 367, 7th ed. It is submitted that the case of Be Ford and Hill, 10 Ch. D. 365, contains nothing contrary to this proposition. It was there held that a vendor is not bound to answer the requisition: Is there to the knowledge of the-vendor or his solicitor any settlement, deed, fact, omission or any incumbrance affecting the property not disclosed by the ab-stract? The Court considered that such a requisition is in fact an interrogatory searching into matters beyond the vendor's duty of furnishing and verifying an abstract of title. Considering the established practice of not ab-stracting purely equitable charges (above, pp. 110-112), it seems obvious that this is a correct view. The vendor in delivering an abstract offers the abstracted title as a good title; and if it appears so to the purchaser's advisers, it seems not unreasonable to preclude them from requiring the vendor to set forth generally whatever else he may know about the title. But to require him to answer all questions relevant to the abstracted title is an entirely different thing; that does not go beyond requiring him to prove the title which he offers.

(g) Above, p. 116.

(h) 1 Dart, V. & P. 328, 329, 5th ed.; 372, 373, 6th ed.; 366, 367, 7th ed.

At common law the vendor was bound to procure at his own expense the evidence necessary to prove all the facts stated in the abstract (/): but under the Conveyancing Act, 1881 (m), the purchaser, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary, has to bear the expenses of searching for and procuring all such evidence, which is not in the vendor's possession. As has been previously remarked (n), this enactment does not discharge the vendor from his obligation of procuring proper evidence of the facts, if he have not any evidence in his possession; it merely exonerates him from the expense of so doing.