(t) Carpenter v. Butter, 8 M. & W. 209; Taylor, Evidence, Sec. 84, 85, 653 sq., 5th ed.; Stephen, Evidence, Arts. 15 sq.

(u) Fort v. Clarke, 1 Russ. 601.

(v) Tall v. Owen, 4 Y. & C. 192.

(x) Doe d. Pritehard v. Dodd, 2 Nev. & Man. 838, 845; Re Holland, 1902, 2 Ch. 360, 379, 380.

(y) Welcome v. Upton. 6 M. & W. 536, 539; Dor d. Jenkins v. Davies, 10 Q. B. 314.

(z) A recital in a private Act of Parliament is not, as a rule, evidence of the fact recited: Brett v. Beales, M. & M. 421; Beaufort v. Smith, 4 Ex. 450; The Shrewsbury Peerage, 7 H. L. C. 1; Cowell v. Chambers, 21 Beav. 619.

This is held to be admissible, though not conclusive (a) proof of the facts recited, on the ground that it is not to be supposed that a statute, which is made by the sovereign authority of the realm, would contain an untrue statement (b). Statements of fact contained in what are called public documents are admissible as evidence of the facts so stated; and for this purpose public documents are those made by some public officer in pursuance of a judicial or quasi-judicial duty to inquire as to the facts and either for the purpose of the public (c) making use of and having access to the documents, or for the information of the Crown in some matter which affects the property or revenues of the Crown, and is thus a matter of public interest (d).

Statements of fact in public documents.

(a) R. v. Greene, 0 A. & E. 548.

(b) Co. Litt. 19 b; R. v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 67, 69; R. v. Sutton, 4 M. & S. 532, 542.

(c) It appears that the officer need not be an officer of the Crown, and the document need not be made for the information of all the King's subjects, but may be public if made for the use of some class of them; see Blackburn, L. A., Sturla v. Freccia, 5 App. Cas. 623, 643, 644; Taylor, Evidence, 65 1429-1433, 5th ed.

(d) Roue v. Brenton, 8 B. & C. 732. 743, 744 'caption of seisin to the use of the Duke of Cornwall by persons assigned by him to do so admitted on the ground of the interest of the Crown and therefore of the public in the Duchy and its revenues;: Evans v. Taylor, 7 A. & E. 617 (statements contained in a survey, which was made under statutory authority, but relating to matters outside the scope of the duty of inquiry, rejected); Irish Society v. Bishop of Derry, 12 d. & Fin. 641, 668, 669 (entry in one of the books of the First Fruits Office received); Shrewsbury Peerage Case, 7 H. L. C. 1, 20, 21, 24, 25 (books from the Heralds' College admissible, if containing information obtained on the Heralds' visitations, bat otherwise not; see 5 App. Cas. 644, 645); Queen's Proctory. Fry, 4 P. D. 230 records of marriages and baptisms kept by order of the Government of India receivable); Manchester Corporation v. Lyons, 22 Ch. D. 287, 299 (inquisitiou as to manorial rights directed to justices of the Duke of Lancaster at a time when be had sovereign rights in the Duchy, admitted); Sturla v. Freccia, 5 A pp. Cas. 623, 643, 644 (statements as to the place of birth and the age of one Mangini contained in the report of a committee of a public department of a foreign state, directed to inquire as to his fitness for a diplomatic post, rejected, and a general rule laid down by Lord Blackburn; Neill v. Devonshire, 8 A.pp. Cas. 135, 183-186 (inquisitions on attainder and mortem admitted, also the decree in a possessory suit in the Irish Court of Chancery);Evans v. Merthyr Tydfil, etc. Council, 1899,1 Ch. 241, 250, 252 (survey of Crown lands made in pursuance of a statutory duty, admitted); Lyell v. Kennedy, 11 App. Cas. 117 (extract from parish registers kept under public authority in Scotland, received);

Statutory declarations of a member of the family as to matters of pedigree are admissible in evidence after the deponent's death, if they were made before any controversy had arisen as to the facts deposed to (e). But with this exception, statutory declarations as to matters of title are not admissible as evidence in litigation (f), unless against the deponent, or his privies in estate, blood or law as an admission by him (g), or after the deponent's death as a statement (if so made) either against his pecuniary or proprietary interest, or in the course of his business or professional duty, or as to public or general rights (h). A recital of a document in a deed operates as an admission of the existence and due execution of the recited document by a party to the deed containing the recital, who has executed and taken some benefit under the deed (i): but such a recital is not, generally speaking, any evidence of the existence or execution of the recited document, or of its contents, as against other persons (k). And even against parties to the deed, the recital is not evidence of any part of the contents of the recited documents, beyond what is recited (l). But if it has been proved that a document recited in a deed has been lost, the recital may be good secondary evidence of the lost document, when there has been long uninterrupted possession in accordance therewith (m).

Statutory-declarations.

Recitals in deeds of other documents Re Goodrich, 1904, P. 138 (entry in a register of births made under Stat, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 86, admitted as evidence of the actual date of birth); Mercer v. Denne, 1904, 2 Oh. 534, 541, 544-546; 1905, 2 Ch. 538, 555-558, 561, 564, 568 (reports made in 1610 by a surveyor by order of the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports as to repairs made necessary to Walmer Castle by encroachments of the sea, and an estimate made by King's engineer for reparation of Walmer Castle, all produced from the Record Office, and maps and plans prepared by direction of the Board of Ordnance in 1641, lo44 and 1647 and produced from the War Office, rejected as having been made for private information and temporary purposes; chart made by a private person, but in possession of the Admiralty, rejected; charts made by direction of the Admiralty for the use of the navy and merchants, admitted; and Lord Blackburn's rule in Sturla v. Freccia discussed); and see Taylor, Evidence, Sec. 1429-1433, 5th ed ; Stephen, Evidence, Art. 34.