(t) See and consider Re Spark's Lease, L905, 1 Ch. 456: Jenkins v. price, 1907. 2 Ch. 229, reversed, 1908, 1 Ch. 10; Willmolt v. London Road Car Co., 1910, 1 Ch. 754.

(u) Re Marshall and Salt's Contract, 1900. 2 Ch. 202.

(x) Curtis v. Spitty, 1 Bing. N. C. 756, 760; Hyde v. Warden 3 Ex. D. 72. 76: Bee Wms. Real Prop. 07, 336, 21st ed.

(y) Hare v. Cator, Cowp. 766. 8tevenson v. Lombard, 2 East, 575; Salts v. Battersby. 1910,2 K.B. 155.

(z) Johnson v. Wild, 44 Ch. D. 146.

(a) See above, p. 361, n. (x).

(b) This view of the question seems to have escaped the notice of the learned counsel for the plaintiff and of the Court in Johnson v. Wild, ubi sup.

(c) Hyde v. Warden, 3 Ex. D. 72, 76; Dewar v. Goodman, 1909, A. C. 72; above, p. 357, and n. (a).

(d) Hyde v. Warden, 3 Ex. D. 72, 76, 81; see also Fildes v. Hooker, 3 Madd. 193.

Sale of leaseholds in lots.

Where leaseholds for years perpetually renewable under a covenant in that behalf (g) are sold as such, it appears that, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary, the purchaser is entitled to be satisfied that he will obtain, not only the existing term, but also the effective right to renew it for ever. He is in fact buying, not merely the term, but an equitable interest in the fee simple as well (h). It is thought therefore that, where the first lease was granted less than forty years before the contract, the purchaser is not precluded by the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874 (i), from calling for the title to confer the right of renewal, and may require the production, not only of the first lease containing the covenant of renewal and the subsequent title thereunder, but also of the title to the freehold from the granting of the first lease back to the beginning of forty years before the contract (i). Where the first lease was granted more than forty years before the contract, it is thought that not more than forty years' title under the leases and the covenant to renew them could be required to be shown, and that such enjoyment would have to be accepted as prima facie evidence that the right of renewal was effectually conferred (j). But it is conceived that the purchaser would be entitled to require proof of some covenant for perpetual renewal entered into forty years at least before the sale; and that if the right of perpetual renewal should depend solely on the original covenant to renew, and not on new covenants to that effect contained in the renewed leases, he would have the right to call for an abstract and production of the instrument containing the original covenant (k). In cases of this kind, the renewed lease is usually granted partly in consideration of the surrender of the then existing lease, and where this has occurred within the time, for which title can be required to be shown, the purchaser has the right to require proof that the surrenderor was entitled to the entire interest, legal as well as equitable, in the lease surrendered. For if there were anything in that lease to give notice that the surrenderor was a trustee of his interest therein, and consequently of his interest in the renewed lease, the purchaser would take with notice of such trust (l). It appears from this that any lease granted in express consideration of the surrender of a prior lease is not in itself a good root of title (m). The vendor of leaseholds, which are renewable, whether perpetually or for some definite period, should protect himself by special stipulation against these liabilities (n). And it seems that in any case where a lease is sold, which has on the face of it been granted in consideration of the surrender of a former lease, the vendor should make special provision to preclude his being required to prove that the surrenderor was entitled to the whole interest in the lease surrendered (o).

Sale of renewable leaseholds.

See above, p. 81.

(f) Above, p. 82; 1 Dart, V. & P. 132, 5th ed.; 148, 6th ed.; see 1 Davidson, Prec. Con v. 545, 632, n., 699 - 701, 4th ed.; ibid. 453, 529. n., 563 - 566, 5th ed.; 1 Key & Elph. Prec. Conv. 293, and n. (d), 8th ed.; Davidson's Concise Precedents, 116, and n. (b), 17th ed.

(g) Covenants to renew least's for years or lives continually on their expiration for ever are hold to be valid and either not to be obnoxious to or to be excepted out of the rule against perpetuities, and may be specifically enforced; see Ross v. Worsop, 1 Bro. P. C. 281;

Pendred v. Grjffith, ib. 314; .su v. Anderson, 2 Bro. P. C. 256; Igguldcn v. May, 9 Ves. 325, 334; S. O., 7 East, 237, 242 - 245; Hare v. Barges, 4 K. & J. 45, 57: Pollock v. Booth, Ir. R. 9 Eq. 229; Jessel, M. R., London & South Western Ry. Co. v. Gomm. 20 Ch. D. 562, 579: Swinburnt v. Milium, 9 App. Cas. 844, 850, 853, 855; 42 Sol. J. 629, 630 (by the author); Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, Sec. 230, 230a, 2nd ed.

(h) See Jessel, M. R., Moore v. Clench, 1 Ch. D. 447, 452.

(i) Stat. 37 & 38 Vict. c. 78, s. 2, r. 1; above, p. 99.

(j) See above, pp. 94-97, 100;

1 Davidson, Prec. Conv. 534, 4th ed.; 443, 5th ed.; Sug. V. & P. 309. 370.

(k) See above, pp. 94 - 98, 100. (/) See Coppin v. Fernyhough, 2 Bro. C. C. 291; Hodgkinson v.

Cooper, 9 Beav. 304; Sug. V. & P. 369; 1 Dart, V. & P. 291, 5th ed.; 332, 6th ed.; 327, 7th ed.; 1 Davidson, Prec. Conv. 696, n. (l), 4th ed.; above, pp. 237 sq.

(m) See above, pp. 106 - 108.

Sale of lease granted on surrender of a prior lease.

The reader will remember that under the present law, when the purposes of long terms of years created for securing the payment of money charged on land have been satisfied, they either cease, where originally limited subject to a proviso for cesser, by virtue of such proviso, or they are made to merge by being assigned or surrendered to the person or persons seised of the freehold in the land subject to the term, or they become attendant upon the inheritance by express declaration or construction of law and thereupon cease and determine under the Satisfied Terms Act of 1845 (p). Whenever any land sold has been subject to such a term, it is of course material for the purchaser's counsel to ascertain that it became utterly extinct; and if the date of the term's alleged cesser fall within the period for which title has to be shown, the title to the term down to that date must be abstracted and produced (q). It should be borne in mind that cesser under an express proviso does not usually take place unless and until the trustees of the term have been duly reimbursed all their costs and expenses (r); and that, in order to effect the merger of a term, it must be surrendered to the person entitled at law in reversion immediately expectant on the term to the freehold or some leasehold (s) estate in the land demised (t). No merger will take place if the surrenderee were entitled in equity only and not at law, or if another term of years be outstanding between the estates of the surrenderor and the surrenderee (u). Whenever a term vested in trustees is intended to be merged, they should themselves surrender it; as the persons equitably interested in the term cannot make any effective assurance of the legal estate therein, and the trustees may have a lien on the term for their costs, which would prevent it from becoming extinct as a satisfied term (x). With respect to the cesser under the Satisfied Terms Act of 1845 of terms becoming satisfied after that year (y), it is to be noted that such terms only are extinguished as have become satisfied and attendant on the inheritance. A term does not become so satisfied and attendant unless the beneficial interest in the whole charge secured by the term and the beneficial interest in the entire freehold estate affected by the term are united in one person, or so long as there remains any useful purpose beneficial to the owner of the term and consistent with the trusts thereof (z). And a term is not satisfied, so as to cease under the Act, so long as any of the moneys originally secured thereby, including the trustees' costs (a), remain unpaid, or if any incumbrance, against which the term would be an effectual protection, be outstanding (b).