(x) Worthing Corpn.v. Heather, 1906, 2 Ch. 532. An appeal was entered against this decision, but the case was compromised. The decision in this case is criticised by the writer in 51 Sol. J. 648 069, where it is respectfully submitted that agreements of this kind are in general or unlimited restraint of alienation, and ought to be treated as void on that account; see also another article by the writer on this subject in 54 Sol. J. 471, 501.

(y) South Eastern Ry. Co. v. Associated Portland etc,t Ltd., 1910, 1 Ch. 12, 28 - 34. This decision is criticised by the writer in 54 Sol. J. 471, 501.

(z) See Wms. Real Prop. 40.". - 407, 21st ed.: and the writer's article on the Rule against Perpetuities in the Encyclopaedia of the Laws of England, 2nd ed.

24 (2)

It would be specifically enforceable against the lessor himself, or (as it appears) by the lessee himself against the lessor's heirs or assigns: but not by the lessee's assigns against the lessor's assigns (a).

Where the landlord of a tenant for a term of years has granted to him a new lease to commence in reversion upon the expiration of the existing term, it must not be forgotten that during this term the tenant has only an interesse termini, and no term, under the new lease; he is not tenant for one term compiled by adding the years to be enjoyed under the new lease to the existing term. If, therefore, the tenant should have underlet for a period exceeding the existing term, he will in effect have assigned his interest in the term, and will have no reversion enabling him to distrain for the rent reserved by the underlease (b). Terms of years may of course be limited to commence at a future time (c); and no period was defined by the ancient common law within which such terms should be required to take effect (d). But of late years the question has been raised whether terms to commence in futuro are well limited if they may take effect at some time exceeding the period allowed by the rule against perpetuities (e). And having regard to the recent trend of judicial opinion on this subject (f), it cannot safely be assumed that terms limited to commence at a future time beyond that period are validly created.

Reversionary leases.

Terms to commence in futuro.

(a) See Woodall v. Clifton, 1905, 2 Ch. 257; Worthing Corpn. v. Heather, 1906, 2 Ch. 532; and the writer's articles in 42 Sol. J. 630, 650; 51 Sol. J. 648, 669, 670.

(b) Lewis v. Baker, 1905, 1 Ch. 46; Llangattock v. Watney, etc, ltd., 1910, 1 K. B. 236; affirmed, 1910, A. C. 394; see Wms. Real Prop. 507, 523, 21st ed.

(c) Wms. Real Prop. 395, 13th ed.; 505, 21st ed.

(d) See Smith v. Day, 2 M. & W. 684; 3rd Rep. of Real Property Commrs., 29, 31; Encyclopaedia of the Laws of England, xi. 72, 73, 2nd ed. (by the author).

(e) See 1 Sand. Uses, 197, 199, 4th ed.; Lewis on Perpetuities, 600, 609, 614; Gray on Perpetuities, Sec. 299 - 303, 314, 316, 319, 2nded.

(f) See North, J., Dunn v. Flood, 25 Ch. D. 629; Baggallay, L. J., S.C., 28 Ch. D. 592; Re Hollis' Hospital and Hague, 1899, 2 Ch. 540 (these opinions are criticised below, Chap. XII. Sec. 3); Farwell, L. J., South Eastern Ry. Co. v. Associated Portland etc.,