In the fourth line, after the words "upon the terms proposed" add footnote 11a as follows:
Hughes v. Chung Sun Tung Co., 28 Cal. App. 371; 154 Pac. 299 (1915); Maxon v. Jones, 128 Cal. 77; 60 Pac. 516.
If one is employed by another to find a third party who will make a certain loan to him, and such employee finds a third party able, willing, and ready to make the loan, he may recover the compensation agreed upon for the service.13
Where a person makesi an agreement with a broker to procure a loan for the former, for which he is to pay the broker, and the broker, acting in behalf of such person, applies to a title company for the loan, and obtains its acceptance by the company, such person for whom the broker acted becomes responsible to the company for its charges.14
An agreement by a husband to give a mortgage is not binding on his wife, and does not affect her dower right, if she does not join in the agreement.15
The arrangement most advantageous to the broker or attorney representing the lender, is the one now insisted upon by the various title and guarantee companies; namely, the borrower must sign a written memorandum that he agrees to pay a fixed amount for procuring the loan, for examining and guaranteeing or securing the guarantee of the title to the property, to the lender, drawing and recording papers, etc., and that this amount should be paid whether the loan is actually made or not.16
12 It does not appear whether the title company was the proposed lender. Therefore it is difficult to say whether the court meant to hold that as the title company was the proposed lender it was wrong in refusing to loan because of the alleged defect, or whether it was intended to hold, a third party being the lender, that notwithstanding the exception stated by the title company, the borrower had really furnished a policy showing that the title was marketable.
13 Bartlett v. Garrett, 188 Mo. App. 144; 175 S. W. 79 (1915).
14Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Carroll, 145 App. Div. 926; 129 N. Y. Suppl. 919 (1911). See also Sec. 203.
15 Meixel v. Meixel, 161 App. Div. 518; 146 N. Y. Suppl. 587 (1914). See also Sec. 116.
Statutes of some states restrict the exactions of sums in connection with the loan of money, for commissions, examinations, renewals, etc., when the security offered is a chattel mortgage. A discussion of that subject is, however, outside of the scope of a work relating to real estate brokers.
A statute which forbids any person to charge more than a specified percentage of brokerage for procuring a loan, but does not prescribe any penalty for its violation, does not render void a contract for a greater brokerage, but the broker can recover only the statutory amount.17
Such statutes are not always limited to brokers engaged in the occupation of soliciting and procuring loans, but apply to the character of the services rendered. In other words, the statutes do not apply to persons but to anyone performing brokerage services of the kind mentioned.18
16 See Form 40a post.
17Buchanan v. Tilden, 18 App. Div. 123; 45 N. Y. Suppl. 417 (1897).
18 Id. Cf. Sec. 11.