The doctrine of consolidation does not apply unless the mortgages sought to be consolidated were all or both made by the same mortgagor (t) in the same right (u), and it is not sufficient that the equities of redemption are subsequently united in the same person (v). On the other hand it is not necessary that the mortgages should originally have been made to the same mortgagee; it is sufficient in certain circumstances that they should be held by the same person when the doctrine is invoked.

(r) See chapter 23, Action on the Covenant, Sec. 226.

(s) Even after action brought the mortgagor, subject to rules of court, might pay the arrears and costs and be relieved from the consequences of his default. In that event, as the mortgagor's legal rights would be restored by virtue of the statute, there would be no right to consolidation on the mortgagee's part. Cf. Todd v. Linklater, 1901, 1 O.L.R. 103. A special acceleration clause, not operating under the statute, and not containing any provision relieving the mortgagor from the consequences of default, would have the effect of compelling the mortgagor to pay off the whole mortgage in order to avoid consolidation.

(t) A mortgage made by A cannot be consolidated with a mortgage made by B to the same mortgagee even though B is merely a trustee for A. Sharp v. Rickards, [1909] 1 Ch. 109.

(u) A mortgage made by a partner for his own private debt cannot be consolidated with a mortgage made by two or more partners for a partnership debt. Cummins v. Fletcher, 1880. 14 Ch.D. 699, at p. 710.

(v) Sharp v. Rickards, supra.

The cases are divisable into classes which will be discussed separately (w).