In supplemental findings made at the request of the defendants and inserted in the case on settlement, the court found, as further facts, that each of the machines, except two, was a machine complete in itself, which received no support from the walls, ceilings or roof of the building, and would operate, with the proper power applied to it, wherever it was placed, and that all the machines could be taken apart without injury to themselves or to the building in which they were placed, except such injury as would result from the loosening of the fastenings, and could, without injury, be put together again and operated in any place where there was sufficient room for them to stand and where the necessary power could be applied. That none of the machines, except the two iron softeners, were attached to the building except as follows: Some of them were fastened to the floor at the end where the belt went on, by angle bolts made for the purpose, which held the feet of the machines to the floor; these bolts went down through the floor, and were held by nuts screwed on below the floor. Others were held by nails of similar construction; others by common nails, and one or two by cleats of wood, nailed down on each side of the machine; they were also attached to the gearing. That the bolts, nails and cleats were so placed for the purpose of steadying the machines and preventing them from being moved or lifted up by the action of the belt. But to this finding the court added that that was not the only purpose. On these findings, assuming them to be sustained by evidence, I think it clear on all the authorities cited, that the conclusion that, as between the present parties, the machines were fixtures and part of the freehold was correct. The rule declared by statute (2 R. S. 83, secs. 6 and 7), as between the personal representatives and the heirs of a deceased party, is not controlling in cases between vendor and vendee. Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287; Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 Id. 278; House v. House, 10 Paige, 158. That enactment makes the mode of annexation the test whether the property retains its character of personalty, and gives to the executor or administrator things annexed to the freehold, or to any building, for the purpose of trade or manufacture, and not fixed into the wall of a house, so as to be essential to its support. But, as between vendor and vendee, the mode of annexation is not the controlling test. The purpose of the annexation, and the intent with which it was made, is in such cases the most important consideration. The permanency of the attachment does not depend so much upon the degree of physical force with which the thing is attached as upon the motive and intention of the party in attaching it. If the article is attached for temporary use with the intention of removing it, a mortgagee cannot interfere with its removal by the mortgagor. If it is placed there for the permanent improvement of the freehold, he may. Crane v. Bingham, 3 Stockton, N. J. 29; Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 296, 297. The mode of annexation may, it is true, in the absence of other proof of intent, be controlling. It may be in itself so inseparable and permanent as to render the article necessarily a part of the realty, and in case of less thorough annexation, the mode of attachment may afford convincing evidence that the intention was that the attachment should be permanent; as, for instance, where the building is constructed expressly to receive the machine or other articles, and it could not be removed without material injury to the building, or where the article would be of no value except for use in that particular building, or could not be removed therefrom without being destroyed or greatly damaged. These are tests which have been frequently applied in determining whether the annexation was intended to be temporary or permanent, but they are not the only ones, nor is it indispensable that any of these conditions should exist. In the case of Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287, before referred to, this court, after a full examination of the numerous authorities, gave its approval to the criterion of a fixture as stated in Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 McCook, 511, viz., the union of three requisites. First. Actual annexation to the realty or something appurtenant thereto. Second. Application to the use or purpose to which this part of the realty with which it is connected is appropriated. Third. The intention of the party making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the freehold. By the application of that criterion this court, with only one dissenting voice, decided that a portable grist-mill for grinding flour, placed in a building which had been used as a tannery, and was provided with steam power previously placed in the building to grind bark for the tannery, became part of the freehold, as between a judgment-creditor and a purchaser of the realty. It was found by the referee that the grist-mill was placed there by the owner of the realty for the purpose of being used as a permanent structure for a custom grist-mill for the neighborhood, and on that ground it was held by this court to have become part of the realty, notwithstanding the fact that it was not attached to the walls of the building, but annexed, as in the present case, only to the floor. It had been built elsewhere, and was constructed in such a manner as to be readily taken apart without injury to itself or to the building, and moved from place to place. There was a very slight difference in the mode of annexation from that in the present case, to wit: That to support the floor, upright posts were placed under it resting on the cellar floor, while in the present case the building was constructed expressly for the purpose of receiving machinery of the description which was placed there, and of sufficient strength to render additional support unnecessary, although, in the present case, some of the machines weighed three or four times as much as the portable grist-mill. The case of Murdock v. Gifford, 18 N. Y. 28, which is mainly relied upon by the appellant here, was distinguished by showing that, in that case, not only was there an entire absence of any finding that the looms were placed in the building and attached thereto for the purpose of becoming a permanent part of it, but that that fact was expressly negatived by the finding that the attachment was for the sole purpose of keeping them steady in their places - a fact which the court, in the present case, although requested expressly, refused to find. Numerous other cases are referred to, where, notwithstanding similar attachments, the property was held to be personalty; but it appears that in all these cases the object of the attachment excluded the intention of rendering them permanent fixtures. The object, and not the method of the attachment, appears to be considered the controlling feature. " The principles applicable as between vendor and purchaser must vary with the varying circumstances of each case. The question of intention enters into and makes an element of each case. The circumstances are to be taken into account to show whether the erections were made for the permanent improvement of the freehold or for the temporary purpose of trade." Farrar v. Chauffetete, 5 Denio, 527. These principles are recognized in the case of Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 N. Y. 278. The annexation in that case, it is true, was of a much more complete character than in the present case, or in that of Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287, but the intention of the parties in making the annexation is recognized as one of the tests, and it is conceded that the circumstances that the machinery may or may not be removed without injury to the building or to itself is not now deemed to be controlling, and Washburn on Real Property, vol. 1, p. 8, is cited, in which the author says: ' It may be stated that whether a thing which may be a fixture becomes a part of the realty by annexing it depends, as a general proposition, upon the intention with which it was done."