On the whole case I think the findings of fact are sustained by evidence, and that the decision of the court below should be affirmed, with costs.

Folger, J. - I think that, either from the evidence or the findings, the grantor and mortgagee placed the machinery in the building for a permanent purpose and for the better enjoyment of his estate. Walmsley v. Milne, 7 C. B. (N. S.) *115; that there did concur actual annexation of the machinery; applicability to the use to which that part of the real estate was appropriated, with which it was con-nected; and an intention of making the annexation so as to make a permanent accession to the freehold. Hoyle v. P. andM. Railroad, 54 N. V. 314, 324.

I therefore concur in the opinion of RAPPALO, J.

Allen, J. (dissenting). - The question presented by this appeal is, whether the plaintiff, as mortgagee of real property, or the defendants, as execution creditors of the mortgagor has the better legal right to hold the machinery mentioned in the pleadings as security for their respective debts. The property in controversy is in its nature personal, subject to a levy and sale upon execution, and would not ordinarily pass under a conveyance or mortgage of realty. It can only be classed with, and treated as, a part of the realty upon which it may be or in connection with which it is used by annexation thereto, either actual or constructive. It belongs to that class of property which, under some circumstances, may be annexed to real property and become what is known in the law as a fixture, so as to pass under a conveyance of the lands and as part of them, in conformity with the maxim, "Quicquid plantatur so/o, solo cedit." Whether a chattel has, by annexation, become a part of the realty depends upon circumstances, and very much upon the intent of the party by whom the annexation has been made, as such intent can be gathered from what is said and done at the time - the character of the chattel and the purposes for and the manner in. which the annexation is made. If the chattel is not a necessary accessory to the building, and is placed in position merely for the purpose of using it for manufacturing or trading purposes, and not with a view to the permanent benefit of the realty, it will not, ordinarily, become a part of the realty. Where the object of affixing the chattel to the freehold is for its more convenient use as a chattel, as shown by its nature and the use to which it is put, it will retain the character which it had before it was annexed. The law of fixtures has been the subject of much discussion in the courts and by elementary writers, and any attempt to reconcile the views of judges or commentators, or to deduce from them any fixed or certain standard or rule by which to determine whether, in any given case, a chattel has lost its character as such and become a part of the freehold, would be vain. So a discussion at any length of the general principles of the law of fixtures, or a review of the authorities, would not be profitable, in view of all that has been written upon the subject. We are relieved from the necessity of a consideration of the general rules applicable to this branch of the law by adjudications heretofore made, which have, in this State at least, become a rule of property, and cannot properly be disregarded by us, and which are decisive of the questions involved in this appeal. The chattels and machinery, the subject of the controversy in this action, were not so annexed to the building as to become a part of it, or necessary to its support, but they were susceptible of removal without material injury to themselves or the realty. The only fastenings were such as were required to keep the machinery steady while in operation. The fastenings were only for that purpose, and the only connection with the motive power and other permanent machinery was by bands and straps, by means of which it was operated. It was not a part of, or necessary to, the stationary and permanent machinery. It was not peculiarly fitted for or adapted to, the building in which it was, but was equally capable of being used in any other building having strength to support it, and motive power for its operation. It was of the same general character of machinery as was used for the same purpose elsewhere, and its value was not impaired by removal.

The mortgage under which the plaintiff claims, follows the grant by the plaintiff to the mortgagor and is of the realty described by metes and bounds without mention of the machinery. The evidence that the purchase by the mortgagor of the plaintiff was of the land together with the " machinery, tools, and fixtures " belonging to the vendor, for a sum in gross, does not tend to prove that the machinery, any more than the tools, was a part of the realty. On the contrary, the fact that both are mentioned independently and separately is some indication that it was supposed neither would be included in the sale of the lands without express mention. Aside from the evidence admitted under objection of the purpose and intent of the plaintiff to take security upon the machinery, fixtures and tools, as well as the land, which we think was incompetent, there was no evidence that the plaintiff at the time he put the machinery in the mill had any intent other than to use it for the purpose to which it was adapted so long as it should be convenient or profitable, or that he intended to connect it permanently with the realty with a view to enhance its value. In other words, there was no evidence to justify a finding that the machinery was put in the building except for use as a chattel. If the property in controversy was not described in the mortgage or covered by it as part of the property mentioned and described therein, the purpose and intent of the mortgagee could not vary the legal effect of that instrument, or make it operative upon property not within its terms. The case is clearly within the principle, and cannot be distinguished from several well considered cases, in which the question has arisen between owners or mortgagees of the freehold and creditors. In Hellawell v. Eastwood, 6 Exch. W. H. & G. 294, it was adjudged, that machinery for the purpose of manufacture (i. e., mules used for spinning cotton), fixed by means of screws, some into the wooden floors of a cotton-mill and some by being sunk into the stone flooring and secured by molten lead, were distrainable for rent. Fixtures are not the subjects of a distress for rent. In Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636, machinery in a woolen factory, consisting of carding machines, picking machines, looms, etc., although used for eleven years or more, and passed from one owner of the factory to another as parts of the factory, were treated as personal property and as not belonging to the realty by commissioners in partition, and their decision and action was affirmed by the Supreme Court upon an elaborate review of all the authorities bearing upon the question. In Vander-poel v. Van Allen, 10 Barb. 157, the question was between mortgagees of the realty and judgment-creditors of the mortgagors who had levied upon the machinery in a cotton factory and other mills, being the premises mortgaged to the plaintiffs. The machinery in controversy there was the same as that in controversy here, and was placed and fastened to the building substantially in the same manner. It was held by Judge Brown, that the property was not part of the realty or within the denomination of fixtures, and that the judgment-creditors were entitled to a decree dissolving the injunction and establishing their right to the property in dispute. Murdock v. Gilford, 18 N. Y. 28, was also a controversy between mortgagees and creditors, involving the same question, and it received the same solution as in Vanderpoel v. Van Allen, supra. Cases have been since decided in this court distinguished by their circumstances from those referred to, and the circumstances which have been deemed sufficient to take them out of the principles adjudged in Murdock v. Gifford, are pointed out by the judges pronouncing judgment; but in no case that has come under my observation has the authority of the case last mentioned been questioned. Many other cases in this State, in other States and England, coincide with the rule as stated in Murdock v. Gifford. There is nothing in this case to distinguish it from that and we are not at liberty, by reason of any supposed equities in favor of either party, to unsettle the law so well established in this State by taking distinctions immaterial and without substance for the purpose of arriving at a different result. These machines were not, as said before, fitted to this building and insusceptible of use elsewhere, neither were they accessories necessary to the enjoyment and use of the building in which they were. The learned judge erred in holding that the several articles were fixtures, and the facts found by him in support of such findings, so far as they were authorized by the evidence were entirely insufficient to make them a part of the freehold.