Thus, where the whole beneficial interest in the money in the one case, or in the land in the other, belongs to the person for whose use it is given, a court of equity will not compel the trustee to execute the trust against the wishes of the cestui que trust, but will permit him to take the money or the land, if he elect to do so before the conversion has actually been made; and this election he may make, as well by acts or declarations clearly indicating a determination to that effect, as by application to a court of equity. It is this election, and not the mere right to make it, which changes the character of the estate so as to make it real or personal, at the will of the party entitled to the beneficial interest.

If this election be not made in time to stamp the property with a character different from that which the will or other instrument gives it, the latter accompanies it, with all its legal consequences, into the hands of those entitled to it in that character. So that in case of the death of the cestui que trust, without having determined his election, the property will pass to his heirs or personal representatives, in the same manner as it would have done had the trust been executed, and the conversion actually made in his lifetime.

In the case of Kirkman v. Mills, 13 Ves., which was a devise of real estate to trustees upon trust to sell, and the moneys arising, as well as the rents and profits till the sale, to be equally divided between the testator's three daughters, A., B. and C. The estate was, upon the death of A., B. and C, considered and treated as personal property, notwithstanding the cestui que trusts, after the death of the testator, had entered upon, and occupied the land for about two years prior to their deaths; but no steps had been taken by them, or by the trustees, to sell, nor had any requisition to that effect been made by the former to the latter. The master of the rolls was of opinion, that the occupation of the land for two years was too short to presume an election. He adds, " the opinion of Lord Rosslyn, that property was to be taken as it happened to be at the death of the party from whom the representative claims, had been much doubted by Lord Eldon, who held that without some act, it must be considered as being in the state in which it ought to be; and that Lord Rosslyn's rule was new, and not according to the prior cases.

The same doctrine is laid down and maintained in the case of Edwards v. The Countess of Warwick, 2 P. Wms. 171, which was a covenant on marriage to invest Ł10,000, part of the lady's fortune, in the purchase of land in fee, to be settled on the husband for life, remainder to his first and every other son in tail male, remainder to the husband in fee. The only son of his marriage having died without issue, and intestate, and the investment of the money not having been made during his life, the chancellor decided that the money passed to the heir-at-law; that it was in the election of the son to have made this money, or to have disposed of it as such, and that, therefore, even his parol disposition of it would have been regarded; but that something to determine the election must be done.

This doctrine, so well established by the cases which have been referred to, and by many others which it is unnecessary to mention, seems to be conclusive upon the question which this court is called upon to decide, and would render any further investigation of it useless, were it not tor the case of Roper v. Radcliff, which was cited, and mainly relied upon by the counsel for the State of Virginia. [ The discussion of this case is omitted. The court disapprove of it and decide further that it is not an authority in point. ]

As to the idea that the character of the estate is affected by this right of election, whether the right be claimed or not, it appears to be as repugnant to reason, as we think it has been shown to be, to principle and authorities. Before anything can be made of the proposition, it should be shown that this right or privilege of election is so indissolubly united with the devise as to consitute a part of it, and that it may be exercised in all cases, and under all circumstances. This was, indeed, contended for with great ingenuity and abilities by the counsel for the State of Virginia, but it was not proved to the satisfaction of the court.

It certainly is not true that equity will extend this privilege in all cases to the cestui que trust. It will be refused if he be an infant.

In the case of Seeley v. Jago, 1 P. Wms. 389, where money was devised to be laid out in land in fee, to be settled on A., B. and C, and their heirs, equally to be divided: on the death of A., his infant heir, together with B. and C, filed their bill claiming to have the money, which was decreed accordingly as to B. and C.; but the share of the infant was ordered to be put out for his benefit, and the reason assigned was, that he was incapable of making an election, and that such election, if permitted, would, in case of his death, be prejudicial to his heir.

In the case of Foon v. Blount, Cowp, 467, Lord Mansfield, who is compelled to acknowledge the authority of Roper v. Radcliffe in parallel cases, combats the reasoning of Chief Justice Parker upon this doctrine of election, with irresistible force. He suggests, as the true answer to it, that though in a variety of cases this right exists, yet it was inapplicable to the case of a person who was disabled by law from taking land, and that, therefore, a court of equity would, in such a case, decree that he should take the property as money.

The case of Walker v. Denne, 2 Ves. Jr. 170, seems to apply with great force to this part of our subject. The testator directed money to be laid out in lands, tenements, and hereditaments, or on long terms, with limitations applicable to real estate. The money not having been laid out, the crown, on failure of heirs, claimed the money as land. It was decided that the crown had no equity against the next of kin to have the money laid out in real estate in order to claim it by escheat. It was added, that the devisees, on becoming absolutely entitled, have the option given by the will; and a deed of appointment by one of the cestui que trusts, though a feme covert, was held a sufficient indication of her intention that it should continue personal against her heir, claiming it as ineffectually disposed of for want of her examination. This case is peculiarly strong, from the circumstance that the election is embodied in the devise itself; but this was not enough, because the crown had no equity to force an election to be made for the purpose of producing an escheat.