In the manner in which this case comes up no question arises whether an after-acquired title by James McKinney would inure to the benefit of James II. McKinney.
The judgment below is affirmed.
(4.) A Description of the Premises Sufficient to Identify Them. (a) The sufficiency of the description.
102 Michigan, 206. - 1894.
Ejectment. - Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.
Montgomery, J. - * * * 2. As the deed to Laurie McLeod was first recorded, and as defendant claims it in fact read when executed, the description of the land was as follows:
"Beginning on Market street, between the lot hereby intended to be conveyed and a lot confirmed by the Government of the United States to Ambrose R. Davenport; thence north, 62 degrees 15 minutes west, 158.96 feet; thence south, 31 degrees west, 60 feet; thence south, 62 degrees 15 minutes west, 158.96 feet, to Market street; thence along said street north, 27 degrees 55 minutes east, to the place of beginning."
Was this a sufficient description, or must the deed be treated as a nullity? The starting point is definite. The first line, to point b, is also certain, as is the line between points b and c. But if the direction of the next line is followed as given in the instrument, the terminus is at e, and the line named in the succeeding portion of the description would end at f.1 But the course given after reaching point c is not the only means of identification adopted. That line is described as terminating at Market street. If we exclude the words indicative of the direction of the line, and carry the line in the most direct course to Market street, we have not only a line answering to the other terms of the deed, but one which, with its extension, incloses something, which is, by the terms of the deed, "a lot intended to be conveyed," and which, to answer the terms of the portion of the description relating to the starting point, must lie next to "a lot confirmed by the Government of the United States to Ambrose R. Davenport." To make this clearer, the deed contains the statement that from the terminus of the third line named in the description the boundary shall extend along Market street to the place of beginning. We think the intent of the grantor is clear, and that the deed is not a nullity for want of a sufficient description. See Anderson v. Baughman, 7 Mich. 69; Cooper v. Bigly, 13 Id. 463; Dwight v. Tyler, 49 Id. 614.
1 The case in the official report is accompanied by a map. If the student will draw a rough design, he will easily identify the points, a, b, c, and will see that the courses and distances as given do not make an enclosure. - Ed.
A number of defendant's points depend upon this, and it becomes unnecessary to treat in detail some of his assignments of error. The deed being valid to convey the land, the record was notice to subsequent purchasers.
3. One of the conveyances under which plaintiff claims contained a description as follows:
"A lot 60 feet wide on Market street and 128.90 feet deep, being the north end of lot 293 in the village of Mackinac."
This is claimed to be insufficient, but we think there is no mistaking the land intended to be conveyed.
b. What will pass as appurtenant to the lands described.
62 New York, 526. - 1875.
Trespass. - Defendant pleaded title to the locus in quo in the trustees of the school district, and that defendant entered thereupon by order of one of the trustees. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Allen, J. - The effect and extent of the grant from Rufus Jennings to the school district was, by the charge of the judge at the Circuit, made to depend upon the solution of the question of fact, whether the use of the locus in quo was necessary to the district in order to a reasonable enjoyment of the granted premises for school purposes, rather than the terms of the grant and the description therein of the lands granted. The defendants prevailed at the Circuit, and had judgment, from which the present appeal is brought, upon the finding of the jury that the disputed parcel of land was a necessary adjunct of the schoolhouse as a playground for the children attending the school and essential to a reasonable enjoyment of the property conveyed. If this playground was not included within the description of the premises granted, the grant could not be enlarged by the necessities, actual or supposed, of the grantee. It is urged that if the reasonable necessity of these grounds was established, the case would be within the familiar rule, that by the grant or demise of a house or messuage, without further description, the curtilage and garden belonging to it passes with it as part and parcel of it, and as embraced within the more worthy name of the principal thing granted or demised. But only the garden, curtilage, and close, adjoining to the house and on which the house is built, passes under the general description. Other lands, although occupied with the house, will not pass except particularly described. Smith v. Martin, 2 Saund. 400, and n. 2. A devise of a house, with its appurtenances or lands appertaining thereto, may have a more extensive effect and carry other land, depending upon the intent of the testator as manifested by the entire will. Blackburn v. Edgley, 1 P. Wm. 600; Doe v. Collins, 2 T. R. 498; Buck v. Newton, 1 B. & P. 53; Bodenham v. Pritchard, 1 B. & C. 350.
In a grant or demise, the addition of the word "appurtenances' will not vary the effect of the grant or extend it so as to include other lands not parcel of the house and close mentioned. Bettis-worth's Case, 2 Coke, 516. The rule stated does not result from the necessity of a garden or curtilage to the reasonable occupation and enjoyment of the house, but from the fact that they are regarded as in fact and in law parcel of it, and as technically within the grant and the description of the thing granted. If a grant is made of a house, and there is no garden, curtilage or close annexed to and a part of it, the grantee cannot claim, as incident to the grant, a garden and curtilage such as twelve men may say is reasonably necessary to the proper occupation and enjoyment of the house as a dwelling. Whether a garden is or is not necessary to a dwelling is wholly immaterial in interpreting and giving effect to a grant of the messuage and determining what lands pass by the conveyance. So here, whether any or what extent of playground was convenient or necessary in connection with a schoolhouse, was entirely immaterial in construing and determining the boundaries of the grant.