The principal authorities upon which the law of emblements depends are Littleton, section 68, and Coke's Commentary on that passage. The former is as follows: " If the lessee soweth the land, and the lessor, after it is sowne and before the corne is ripe, put him out, yet the lessee shall have the corne, and shall have free entry, egresse and regresse to cut and carrie away the corne, because he knew not at what time the lessor would enter upon him." Lord Coke, Co. Litt. 55, a, says, "the reason of this is, for that the estate of the lessee is uncertaine, and, therefore, lest the ground should be unmanured, which should be hurtful to the commonwealth, he shall reap the crop which he sowed in peace, albeit the lessor doth determine his will before it be ripe. And so it is if he set roots or sow hempe or flax, or any other annual profit, if after the same be planted, the lessor oust the lessee; or if the lessee dieth, yet he or his executors shall have that year's crop. But if he plant young fruit trees, or young oaks, ashes, elms, etc., or sow the ground with acornes, etc., there the lessor may put him out notwithstanding, because they will yield no present annual profit." These authorities are strongly in favor of the rule contended for by the defendant's counsel; they confine the right to things yielding present annual profits, and to that year's crop, which is growing when the interest determines. The case of hops, which grow from ancient roots, and which yet may be emblements, though at first sight an exception, really falls within this rule. In Latham v. Atwood, Cro. Car. 515, they were held to be " like emblements," because they were " such things as grow by the manurance and industry of the owner, by the making of hills, and setting poles; " that labor and expense, without which they would not grow at all, seems to have been deemed equivalent to the sowing and planting of other vegetables. Mr. Cruise in his Digest, I., no, Ed, 3, says that this determination was probably on account of the great expense of cultivating the ancient roots. It may be observed, that the case decides that hops, so far as relates to their annual product only, are emblements; it by no means proves that the person who planted the young hops would have been entitled to the first crop whenever produced.

On the other hand, no authority was cited to show that things which take more than a year to arrive at maturity are capable of being emblements, except the case of Kingsbury v. Collins, 4 Bing. 202, in which teazles were held by the Court of Common Pleas to be so. But this point was not argued, and the court does not appear to have been made acquainted with the nature of that crop or its mode of cultivation, or it may be, that in the year when the -plant is fit to gather, so much labor and expense is incurred as to put it on the same footing as hops. We do not, therefore, consider this case as an authority upon the point in question.

The note of Sergeant Hill, in 9 Vin. Abr. 368, in Lincoln's Inn Library, which Mr. Gambier quoted, is precisely in point in the present case, and proves that, in the opinion of that eminent lawyer, the crop of clover in question does not belong to the plaintiffs. It is stronger, because there the estate of the tenant is supposed to determine after harvest, whereas here it determined before.

The weight of authority, therefore, is in favor of the rule insisted upon by the defendant. There are, besides some inconveniences, doubts, and disputes, which were pointed out in the argument, which would arise if the other rule were to prevail. Is the tenant to have the feeding in Autumn, besides the crop in the following year? If so, he gets something more than one crop. Is he to have the possession of the land for the purpose? Or is the reversioner to have the feeding; and, in that case, is the reversioner to be liable to an action if he omits to feed off the clover, and thereby spoils the succeeding crop? These inconveniences do not arise if the defendant's rule is adopted. It also prevents the reversioner from being kept out of the full enjoyment of his land for a longer time than a year at most; whereas, upon the other supposition, that period may be extended to two or more years, according to the nature of the crop.

We are, therefore, of opinion that the rule regulating emblements is that which the defendant has contended for, and that for this reason also he is entitled to our judgment.

Judgment for the defendant.

Whitmarsh V. Cutting

10 Johnson (N. Y.), 360. - 1813

Trespass quare clausum /regit for entering plaintiff's close and carrying away a quantity of wheat and rye. One Hilton had a lease of the premises in question and sowed the grain during his term. After the expiration of his term plaintiff leased the premises and gathered the grain. Defendant justifies the trespass under an execution against Hilton. Verdict for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

Per Curiam. - The verdict was clearly against law. The crop sown did not belong to Hilton, but to his successor. This lease was for a year certain, and then renewed for the next year; and it was his folly to sow when he knew that his term would expire before he could reap. The doctrine of emblements is founded entirely on the uncertainty of the termination of the tenant's estate, where that is certain there exists no title to emblements. Without touching any other points, we are of opinion that the verdict was against law and evidence, and that the judgment below must be reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Clark V. Harvey

54 Pennsylvania State, 142. - 1867.

Thompson, J. - By the custom, or as it has been called, the common law of Pennsylvania, the tenant of a farm under a lease from year to year for agricultural purposes, is entitled to the way-going crop. This is the law, in view of which, such letting must be presumed to have been made, if nothing to the contrary be said. In the case before us this implication was attempted to be rebutted by proof of bad husbandry, and a manifest trespass justified by an alleged breach of contract. If there were bad husbandry in the case, the redress for that was by suit, and not by confiscation of the tenant's rights. The one thing was no defense to the other, and the learned judge was entirely within the law in charging as he did. The case of Lewis v. Jones, 5 Harris, 262, referred to by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error, was upon a different subject from that involved in this case, and is no authority for the ground assumed in the case. The jury have found that the plaintiffs left a fall crop in the ground when they left the premises, and have estimated its value in the damages given. There being a crop in the ground, therefore, whether good or bad, the plaintiffs had a right to it and to take it away when it ripened, and this being found by the verdict, and that the defendants destroyed it, there was an end of the matter.