1 See for present New York rule, § 192 R. P. Law. - Ed.

In all the cases of this kind the lessee was not at common law bound to pay at all for so much of the time since the last rent day, as had elapsed before the death of the tenant for life, but having conscientiously paid for the whole time, the person who took the estate in remainder was held by the courts of equity to have received for the use of the executor, of his life tenant, so much of the rent as accrued beyond his decease. Ex parte Smyth, supra; Paget v. Gee, 1 Ambler, 199. In these instances the rent actually paid was apportioned or divided on the principle of time; but cases of this kind have no tendency to show that such an apportionment can be made when the lease remains as before, notwithstanding a change of parties entitled to the rents takes place intermediate the rent days. The lessee on that case is bound to pay for the whole time, and the reversioner, or remainderman, takes the rent as an entire sum due to him by the terms of the contract.

The well ascertained rules of the common law are, therefore, opposed to the claim of the defendant to retain any portion of the rents received by him for the quarter during which his testator, the life tenant, died. The leases were not determined by that event, and the plaintiffs, who as remaindermen succeeded to the reversion, were entitled to the whole of those rents. It has also been observed that the courts of equity have never departed from the rule of law on this subject.

It seems hardly necessary to say now that there is no legislation of this State which the defendant can invoke in support of his claim.1 In England, one of the rules of law in regard to apportionment of rent was abrogated by an act of Parliament, passed in the reign of

1 But the latest New York statute has adopted the English rule. N. Y. Code Civ. Pro.§ 2720. - Ed.

George II. That statute, 2 Geo. II., c. 19, after noticing that by the existing rule rents were frequently lost, where a lessor having only a life estate died before or on the day when it would be payable, declared that when any tenant for life should happen so to die, his executor or administrator might recover the whole rent in arrear, in case such death took place on the day fixed for payment, or if it happened before that day then a proportion, according to time, making all just allowances, etc. That legislation, with some change in phraseology, has been followed in this State. Our statute, I R. L. 438; 1 R. S. 747, § 22, provides that when a tenant for life, who shall have demised lands, shall die before the day when any rent is to become due, his executors may recover " the proportion of rent which accrued before his death." In the case provided for, therefore, rent can be apportioned in opposition to the rule of the common law, and a recovery had, where, but for the statute, the rent would be lost. But the statute does not include the present case. The leases in question were not given by a tenant for life, but by the owner of the fee, and the disputed rent was not liable to be lost, because the plaintiffs, succeeding to the reversion, could recover the whole of it by action founded on the very leases themselves. The English statute, like ours, was enacted to remedy the apparent injustice of the rule which absolved a lessee from paying any rent, where his interest was determined between the rent days by the expiration of a life estate on which the lease depended. More recent legislation in England has gone still further. The statute of 4 W. IV., c. 22, after reciting that by law rents due at fixed periods were not apportionable, and after reciting the inconvenience of that rule, proceeds to declare that all rents made payable at such periods under any instrument executed after the passing of the act, should be apportioned so that on the termination, by death or any other means, of the estate of the person entitled to the rents, such person, or his representative, should have a portion of such rents, according to the time elapsed since the last period of payment. By a further provision, the entire rent is to be received and recovered from the tenant, by the person who would be entitled to recover it if the act had not been passed, and is to be held by him subject to apportionment, which can be enforced against him by suit at law, or in equity. It will be seen that this statute recognizes the old rule, while it declares a new one for future leases, and that it also carefully protects the tenant against more than one action for the entire rent. We have no such legislation in this State. If we should adopt the principle of that statute, in regard to apportionment, without legislative interference, we should not only change the existing law, but the change must be made without the protection to tenants which the English statutes secures. If we declare rent to be apportionable in cases like the present, it will follow, according to our rules of pleading and practice, that each party entitled to a share may sue the tenant to recover it. To illustrate, if the defendant has no interest in the rents now in question, then he cannot retain the portion in his hands. If he has an interest, then to that extent he could, under our practice, recover so much as belonged to him, by suit against the tenants if they had not paid these rents. And I think that even a notice to the tenants of his claim to a share, would take away from them their right to pay the entire sum to the persons who, as remaindermen, would be entitled to the other share. To conclude on this point, we find that the rule of law denying apportionment in a case like this, has never been shaken; and whatever may be the arguments founded in justice or expediency, in favor of a different rule, we think those arguments should be addressed to the Legislature, rather than to the courts.

The life estate and the remainder in fee, between which the apportionment is claimed, were created by the will of Mr. Coe, by whom the leases were given, and it has been insisted that we ought to construe the will favorably to his widow, and on that ground allow the apportionment to take place. But we see no room for any construction which will take the case out of the general rule of law. Of course, the life estate given was intended by the testator as a part, and perhaps the principal part, of the provision made for his widow, but it was given simply as a life estate, with remainder over to the plaintiffs; and it does not appear even to have been in lieu of dower in any other real estate which he may have owned. The widow became entitled to the rents as incident to her life estate in the reversion; but as that estate terminated between the periods for payment, the rent accruing, but not yet due, became at once annexed to the estate of those who succeeded her in such reversion. No part of it could be severed at that point of time. To make an exception in such a case, to the general rule, would be virtually to deny the existence of the rule altogether. It may be well to observe that rents are unlike annuities, and unlike the interest of money. They issue out of land, and are a part of the land. They are less capable of division, or apportionment, according to a precise measure of time, because the value of the tenant's enjoyment may be quite different at different periods of the year, and the value, moreover, may very much depend on the enjoyment for the full time specified in the lease. * * * . Judgment affirmed.1