98. Bouvier-iaeger Coal Land Co. v. Sypher, 186 Fed. 644.

99. Equitable Mtge. Co. v. Brown, 105 Ga. 474, 30 S. E. 687; Mccune v. Goodwillie, 204 Mo. 306, 102 S. W. 997; Hathaway v. Cook, 258 111. 92, 101 N. E. 227.

1. Gould v. Day, 94 U. S. 405, 24 L. Ed. 232; In re Jackson Brick & Tile Co., 189 Fed. 636; Cribbs v. Walker, 74 Ark. 104, 85 S. W. 244; Bruner v. Hart, 59 Fla. 171, 51 So. 593; Rode-meier v. Brown, 1C9 111. 347, 61 Am. St. Rep. 176, 48 N. E. 468; Bunnell v. Bunnell, 111 Ky. 566, 64 S. W. 420, 65 S. W. 607; Patrick v. Howard. 47 Mich. 40,

10 N. W. 71

2. See Corley v. Corley, 2 Poldw. (Tenn.) 520; Donahue v. Sweeny, 171 Cal. 388, 153 Pac. 708; Tweedale v. Barnett, 172 Cal. 271, 156 Pac. 483; Tupper v. Foulkes, 9 C. B. N. S. 797. That the grantor treats the land as his own, after having signed a conveyance thereof, has been regarded as tending to show thai the conveyance was not delivered. Little v. Eaton, 267 111. 623, 108 N. E. 727.

3. Post, Sec. 463.

3a. Souverbye v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 240.

4. Ante, this section, note 43.

5. See Wallace v. Berdell, 97 N. Y. 13; Bryan v. Wash, 7 111. 557; 1 Perry, Trusts, Sec. 103.

6. Miller v. Meers, 155 111. . 284, 40 N. E. 577; Ls timer v. Latimer, 174 111. 418, 51 N. E. 548; Abhott v. Abbott, 189 111. 488, 82 Am. St. Rep 472; Baker v Hall, 214 111. 364, 73 N. E. 351; Colee v. Colee, 122 Ind 109, 17 Am. St. Rep. 345, 23 N. E. 687; Crowder v. Searcy. 103 Mo. 97, 15 S. W. 346; Schooler v. Schooler 258 Mo. 83, 167 S. W. 444.

7. Bryan v. Wash, 7 111. 557; Winterbottom v. Pattison, 152 111. 334, 38 N. E. 1050; Abbott v. Abbott, 189 111. 488, 82 Am. St. Rep. 472. But in Hawes v. Hawes, 177 111. 409, 53 N. E. 78, the necessity of a showing of delivery even in the case of a voluntary settlement is clearly recognized.

8. Bryan v. Wash, 7 111. 557.

Of delivery, the reasons suggested for dispensing with the ordinary proof thereof in this particular case appear somewhat inadequate. Indeed the fact that the settlement is voluntary, a gift merely, might well be regarded as requiring the strictest proof of delivery.9

- Date of delivery. Since an instrument of conveyance operates to transfer the title to the property only upon delivery, the ascertainment of the date of delivery is frequently a matter of importance. There is a rebuttable presumption that the instrument was delivered on the day on which it is dated,10 provided, at least, it is not acknowledged, or is not acknowledged on a different date. When the date of the instrument differs from the date of acknowledgment, the delivery is by some courts presumed to have taken place on the former date,11 and by some on the

9. See Jamison v. Craven, 4 Del. Ch. 311; Hooper v. Van-strum, 92 Minn. 406, 100 N. W. 229.

10. Williams v. Armstrong, 130 Ala. 389, 30 So. 553; Gordon v. City of San Diego, 108 Cal. 264, 41 Pac. 301 (statute); Kimball v. Chicago, 253 111. 105, 97 N. E. 257; Sweetser v. Lowell, 33 Me. 446; Schweigel v. L. A. Shakman Co., 78 Minn. 142, 80 N. W. 871, 81 N. W. 529; Blair State Bank v. Bunn, 61 Neb. 464, 85 N. W. 527; Crossen v. Oliver, 37 Ore. 514, 61 Pac. 885; State v. Dana, 59 Wash. 30, 109 Pac. 191; Douthat v. Roberts, 73 W. Va. 358, 80 S. E. 819; Wheeler v. Single, 62 Wis. 380, 22 N. W. 569.

11. Smith v. Scarbrough, 61 Ark. 104, 32 S. W. 382; Smiley v. Fries, 104 111. 416; Lake Erie etc. R. Co. v Whitham, 155 111. 514, 46 Am. St. Rep. 355, 28

L. R. A. 612; Scobey v. Walker, 114 Ind.. 254, 15 N. E. 674; Crabtree v. Crabtree, 136 Iowa. 630, 113 N. W. 923, 15 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 149: Mcconnell v. Brown, 6 Litt. (Ky.) 459; Ford v. Gregory, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 175; Smith v. Porter, 10 Gray. (Mass.) 66; Conley v. Finn, 171 Mass. 70, 68 Am. St. Rep. :?99. But see Mlghill v. Town of Rowley, 224 Mass. 586, 113 N. E. 569; People v. Snyder, 41 N. Y. 397; Harriman Land Co. v. Hilton, 121 Tenn. 308, 120 S. W. 162; Kirby v. Cartwright, 48 Tex.. Civ. App. 8, 106 S. W 742; Beall v. Chatham, (Tex. Civ App.), 117 S. W. 492; liar man v. Oberdorfer, 33 Gratt (Va.) 497. In Calligan v. Cal-ligan, 259 111. 52, 102 N. E 247 it is decided that the deed presumed to have been delivered on the day of its date though not acknowledged till a later latter.12 This difference of view as to whether the date of acknowledgment should control, in the absence of other evidence, appears to be the result, to a very considerable extent, at least, of a difference of view as to the probability of delivery before acknowledgment,12a and the usage of different communities in this regard might well differ.