9 N. E. 413; Bunker v. Barron, 79 Me. 62!, 1 Am. St. Rep. 282, 8 Atl. 253; Lovell v. Williams, 125 Mass. 442; Pinney v. Kimpton, 46 Vt. 80.

6. Ford v. Burks, 37 Ark. 91; Flower v. Elwood, 66 111. 438; Burdett v. Clay, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 287; Moore v. Thompson, 100 Ky. 231, 37 S. W. 1042; Wright v. Wooters, 46 Tex. 380.

7. Buck v. Wood, 85 Me. 204, 27 Atl. 103.

8. Whittaker v. Dick, 5 How. (Miss.) 296, 35 Am. Dec. 436.

9. Davis v. Maynard, 9 Mass. 242.

10. Maryland etc., N. Y. Coal & Iron Co. v. Wingert, 8 Gill (Md.) 170.

11. Cover v. Black, 1 Pa. 493. 11a. McGuire v. Van Pelt, 55

Ala. 344; Bond v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co., 106 111. 654; Foster v. Paine, 63 Iowa, 85, 18 N. W. 699; Commercial Bank v.

Suggestions are occasionally to be found that the surrender or cancellation of the original note or bond tends to show an intention that the giving of the subsequent note or bond shall operate as a payment of the debt secured so as to extinguish the mortgage lien.16

Cunningham, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 270, 35 Am. Dec. 322; New Hampshire Bank v. Willard, 10 N. H. 210. But see Sharp v. Collins, 74 Mo. 266; Hadlock v. Bulfinch, 31 Me. 246, as to the presumption in such case.

12. Moody v. Stubbs, 94 Kan. 250, 146 Pac. 346; Burdett v. Clay, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 287; Watkins v. Hill, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 522; Cullum v. Branch Bank, 23 Ala. 797; Mc-Guire v. Van Pelt, 55 Ala. 344; Flower v. Elwood, 66 I11. 438. Compare Tucker v. Alger, 30 Mich. 67. So in the case of a renewal note given to the husband of the person to whom the original note and mortgage securing it were given. Pomroy v. Rice, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 22.

13. Franklin v. Cannon, 1 Root (Conn.) 500; Bray v. First Avenue Coal Min. Co., 148 Ind.

599, 47 N. E. 1073; Chase v. Abbott, 20 Iowa, 154; Maryland, etc., Coal, etc., Co. v. Wingert, 8 Gill (Md.) 170; Gleason v. Wright, 53 Miss. 247; Lippold v. Held, 58 Mo. 213; Davis v. Thomas, 66 Neb. 26, 92 N. W. 187; Kaphan v. Ryan, 16 S. C. 352; Seymour v. Darrow, 31 Vt. 122.

14. Port v. Robbins, 35 Iowa, 208; Boxheimer v. Gunn, 24 Mich. 372; Bourne v. Littlefield, 29 Me. 302; Joyner v. Stancill, 108 N. C. 153, 12 S. E. 912; Seymour v. Darrow, 31 Vt. 122, 130.

15. Brinckerhoff v. Lansing, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 65, 8 Am. Dec. 538; De Cottes v. Jeffers, 7 Fla. 284.

16. Wilkes v. Miller, 156 N. C. 428, 72 S. E. 482 (surrender necessary for discharge); Davis v. Thomas, 66 Neb. 26, 92 N. W.

3 R. P.-23

The propriety of such an inference of intention would appear, however, to be open to question.17 And opposed to such a view are occasional decisions that the fact that the original note is surrendered to the maker at the time of the delivery of the substituted note, and is afterwards shown by him to an intending; purchaser of the mortgaged property, does not justify the latter in assuming that the mortgage has been extinguished by the discharge of the debt secured.18

That the new note is itself secured by a new mortgage upon the same,19 or upon different,20 property does not necessarily show an intention that it should operate as a discharge of the original debt or of the mortgage securing it.

As the mere taking of a new note does not affect the mortgage when the debt was originally evidenced by another note, so the taking of a note as evidence of a debt, already secured by mortgage, but not previously evidenced by a note, will not affect the mortgage security.21

187 (surrender strong evidence); Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Dayton, 116 111. 257, 4 N. W. 492 (cancellation without surrender immaterial); Bonestell v. Bowie, 128 Cal. 511, 61 Pac. 78 (surrender and cancellation not conclusive).

17. See Cook v. Gilchrist, 82 Iowa, 277, 48 N. W. 84, to the effect apparently, that the cancellation and surrender of the former bond is no evidence of intention. ,

18. Bolles v. Chauncy, 8 Conn. 389; Boxheimer v. Gunn, 24 Mich. 372. See Heively v. Matteson, 54 Iowa, 505, 6 N. W. 732.

19. Higman v. Humes, 127 Ala. 404, 30 So. 733; White v. Stevenson, 144 Cal. 104, 77 Pac. 828, (but see Williamson v.

Strong, 136 Cal. XX, 68 Pac. 486); Walters v. Walters, 73 Ind. 425; Pouder v. Ritzinger, 102 Ind. 571, 1 N. E. 44; Watson v. Bowman, 142 Iowa, 528, 119 N. W. 623; Ladd v. Wiggin, 35 N. H. 421, 69 Am. Dec. 551; Hinton v. Ferre-bee, 107 N. C. 154, 12 S. E. 235; New England Loan & Trust Co. v. Stephens, 16 Utah 385, 52 Pac. 624 (partial mortgages substituted). And see post, 641. But see Dryden v. Stephens, 19 W. Va. 1, where it is held that the giving of a note and mortgage by a purchaser of the property discharges the prior mortgage.

20. Jenkins v. Daniel, 125 N. C. 161, 74 Am. St. Rep. 632, 34 S. E. 239.

21. Gravlee v. Lamkin, 120 Ala.

That subsequently to the execution and delivery of the mortgage instrument, it is agreed thai the mortgage debt shall be paid in a medium oilier than was originally specified, as, for instance, in gold or cotton, has been held not to affect the existence of the mortgage lien as security for the debt.22

In the case of a mortgage given to secure indorsers or sureties on a note or draft against loss by reason of the contract of indorsement or suretyship, the conditional indebtedness secured by the mortgage is ordinarily regarded as still existent in spite of the substitution of another or other notes or drafts, on which the persons secured by the mortgage again appear as endorsers or sureties.23 And the fact that the other endorsers are different,24 or even that the signer or signers of the notes are different,25 has been regarded as not affecting the mortgage security, provided only the indebtedness still existing can be regarded as the same as that in connection with which the original contract of indorsement or suretyship was entered into. And the mortgage has been regarded as continuing although the new notes or drafts are for amounts and periods different from the amounts and periods specified in the notes originally given, provided they do not exceed the sum for which the security was originally given.26

210, 24 So. 756; Shipman v. Lord, 60 N. J. Eq. 484, 46 Atl. 1101. So the fact that a note is given for accrued interest does not take such interest out of the operation of the mortgage. Frink v. Branch, 16 Conn. 260; Dean v. Ridgeway, 82 Iowa, 757, 48 N. W. 923.

22. Lehman v. Marshall, 47 Ala. 362; Belloc v. Davis, 38 Cal. 242.

23. Greist v. Gowdy, 81 Conn. 351, 71 Atl. 555; De Cottes v. Jef-fers, 7 Fla. 284; Simmons Hardware Co. v. Thomas, 147 Ind 313,

46 N. E. 645; Markell v. Eichel-berger, 12 Md. 78; Boxheimer v. Gunn, 24 Mich. 372; Stavers v. Philbrick, 68 N. H. 379, 36 Atl. 16; Newburgh Nat. Bank v. Bis-ler, 83 N. Y. 51; Patterson v. John-son, 7 Ohio, 225; Choteau v. Thompson, 3 Ohio St. 424; Alston V. Alston, 2 Rich. Law (S. C.) 428. But Bell v. Murphy, 2 La. Ann. 765, is apparently contra.

24. Pond v. Clarke, 14 Conn. 334.

25. Moore v. Thompson, 100 Ky. 231, 37 S. W. 1042.

In the case of a mortgage on the land of one person securing the debt of another, the former is, as regards the land, in the position of a surety, and consequently an extension of the debt in favor of the principal debtor, by taking a renewal note or otherwise, will operate to relieve the land from the burden of the mortgage.27