3. Stone v. Missouri Guarantee, etc., Ass'n, 58 111. App. 78; Benton v. Wood, 17 Ind. 260; Hughes v Riggs, 84 Md. 502, 36 Atl. 269; Parkhurst v. Cory, 3 N. J. Eq. 233; Kane v. Jonasen, 55 Neb. 757, 76 N. W. 441; Barnwell v. Marion, 60 S. C. 314, 38 S. E. 593.

4. Field v. Brokaw, 159 111. 560, 42 N. E. 877; Shannon v. Hay, 106 Ind. 589, 7 N. E. 376; Street v. Beal, 16 Iowa, 68, 85 Am. Dec. 504; Clark v. Birge, 100 Neb. 769, 161 N. W. 427; Griswold v. Fowler, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 135; Thomas v. Thomas, 44 Mont. 102, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 616, 119 Pac. 283.

5. Meux v. Trezevant, 132 Cal. 487, 64 Pac. 848; Craig v. Stevenson, 15 Neb. 362, 18 N. W. 510; Clarke v. Birge, 100 Neb. 769, 161 N W. 427; Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Jenkins, 40 N. J. Eq. 451, 2 Atl. 13; McLaughlin v. Teasdale, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 23; Thompson v. Browne, 10 S. D. 344, 73 N. W. 194; Elgutter v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,

86 Fed. 500, 30 C. C. A. 218.

6. Kelley v. Canary, 129 Ind. 460, 29 N. E. 11; Thomas v. Fews-ter, 95 Md. 446, 52 Atl. 750; Parkhurst v. Cory, 11 N. J. Eq. 233.

7. Blazey v. Delius, 74 111. 299; James v. Fisk, 9 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 144, 47 Am. Rep. 211; American Life, etc., Ins. Co. v. Ryer-son, 6 N. J. Eq. 9; Hiles v. Brooks, 105 Wis. 256, 81 N. W. 422 (statute); Black v. Reno, 59 Fed. 917. See ante, this section, note 93.

8. Bernhard v. Hovey, 9 Kan. App. 25, 57 Pac. 245; Stone v. Missouri Guarantee Sav., etc., Ass'n, 58 111. App. 78; Parkhurst v. Cory, 11 N. J. Eq. 233; McFad-den v. May's Landing & E. H. C. R. Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 176, 22 Atl. 932.

9. See e. g.. Haynes v. Cox, 118 Ind. 184, 20 N. E. 758; Mclntyre v. Wyckoff, 119 Mich. 557, 78 N. W. 654; Hiles v. Brooks, 105 Wis. 256, 81 N. W. 422.

10. Ante, Sec. 625.

Effect of sale. The sale is, in most jurisdictions, not valid for the purpose of vesting title in the purchaser until it has been confirmed by the court.14 In a few states, however, confirmation of the sale, although usual, appears not to be absolutely necessary.15

The completed sale vests in the purchaser whatever title the mortgagor had when he executed the mort11. Monarch Coal & Mining Co. v. Hand, 197 111. 288, 64 N. E. 381; Thomaston Sav. Bank v. Hurley, 117 Me. 211, 103 Atl. 234; Bradfield v. Sewall, 58 Neb. 637, 79 N. W. 615; Sternberger v. Han-na, 42 Ohio St. 305.

12. Raun v. Reynolds, 11 Cal. 14; Chicago & G. W. Railroad Land Co. v. Peck, 112 111. 408; Millsaps v. Bond, 64 Miss. 453, 1 So. 506; Craig v. Miller, 41 S. C. 37, 19 S. B. 192. Ante, Sec. 647.

13. Livingston v. Mildrum, 19 N. Y. 440; Dobbs v. Niebuhr, 15 Daly (N. Y.) 52.

14. See Williamson v. Berry, S How. (U. S.) 495, 12 L. Ed.

1170; Lathrop v. Nelson. 4 Dill. 184, Fed. Cas. No. 8,111; De Yam-part v. Manley, 127 Ark. 153, 19 S W. 905; Hart v. Burch, 130 III. 425, 6 L. R. A. 371, 22 N. E. 831; Allen v. Poole, 54 Miss. 323; State v. Campbell, 5 S. D. 636, 60 N. W. 32; State v. Holden, 96 Wash. 35, 164 Pac. 595; Woehler v. End-ter, 46 Wis. 301, 1 N. W. 329, 50 N. W. 1099.

15. Brown v. Marzyck, 19 Fla. 840; Fuller v. Van Geesen, 4 Hill. (N. Y.) 171; Ward v. Ward, 131 Fed. 946 (New York); Hochgraef v. Hendrie. 66 Mich. 556, 34 N. W. 15; State v. Evans, 176 Mc 310, 75 S. W. 914.

Gage,16 and thus cuts oft the interests of any subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers, who were made parties to the proceeding, and deprives them of all right of redemption.17 Persons whose interests and claims were prior to the mortgage are not affected by the sale, and the purchaser acquires, as against them, no better title than the mortgagor had at the time of making the mortgage.18 If, however, a prior mortgagee is made a party to the proceeding, and the bill contains sufficient allegations, he is barred by the decree, the bill in such case being one both to foreclose the second mortgage and to redeem from the first mortgage.19

Any surplus proceeds of sale remaining after the payment of the debt secured by the mortgage are paid to the mortgagor or, if there are subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers, such surplus proceeds belong to them, in the order of priority in which their rights against the land could have been asserted.20 In other words,

16. Davis v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 84 111. 508; Poweshiek County v. Dennison, 36 Iowa. 244, 14 Am. Rep. 521; Allis v. Foley, 126 Minn. 14, 147 N. W. 670; Champion v. Hinkle, 45 N. J. Eq. 162, 16 Atl. 701; Christ Protestant Episcopal Church v. Mack, 94 N. Y. 488, 45 Am. Rep. 260; King v. McCully, 38 Pa. St. 76.

17. McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365, 70 Am. Dec. 655; Shaw v. Heisey, 48 Iowa, 468; Gamble v. Horr, 40 Mich. 561; McMurray v. McMurray, 258 Mo. 405, 167 S. W. 513; Christ Protestant Episcopal Church v. Mack, 93 N. Y. 488; Frische v. Kramer's Lessee, 16 Ohio, 125, 47 Am. Dec. 368.

18. Hefner v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 123 U. S. 747, 31 L. Ed. 309; McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365, 70 Am. Dec. 655; San

Francisco v. Lawton. 18 Cal. 465; Bozarth v. Landers, 113 111. 181; Summers v. Bromley, 23 Mich. 125; Bannings v. Bradford. 21 Minn. 308 18 Am. Rep. 398; Emigrant Industrial Sav. Bank v. Goldman, 75 N. Y. 127; Lewis v. Smith, 9 N. Y. 502. 61 Am. Dec. 706; Iowa County Sup'rs v. Mineral Point R. Co., 24 Wis. 93, 121. And see 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Sec. 1927.

19. Hefner v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 123 U. S. 747, 31 L. Ed. 309; Hagan v. Walker, 14 How. (U. S.) 29, 37, 14 L. Ed. 312; Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734, 24 L. Ed. 136; Haines v. Beach, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 459; Hudnit v. Nash, 16 N. J. Eq. 550; Cronin v. Hazeltine, 3 Allen (Mass.) 324.

20. See 2 Jones, Mortgages, Sec.Sec. the proceeds of sale are substituted for the land itself, and become subject to outstanding liens and claims to the same extent and in the same order as the land itself was subject thereto.

In a very considerable proportion of the states, the statute gives to the mortgagor and other persons interested in the property, or certain classes of such persons, a right to redeem for a named period after the sale, such period varying in different states from two months to two years. This right is purely the creation of statute, and is to be carefully distinguished from the right of redemption in equity before foreclosure. The equitable right is a right to redeem from the mortgage, by paying the debt secured by the mortgage, while the statutory right is a right to redeem from the sale, by paying the amount of the purchase money with interest thereon regardless of whether this is more or less than the amount of the debt.21-22 These statutory provisions for redemption quite usually apply in terms to sales under execution, and to judicial sales generally, as well as to sales under foreclosure of mortgages, and differ greatly in different states. No discussion thereof will be here, attempted. Apart from such a statutory right of redemption, there is no right to redeem after the sale,23 except when such a right is created by an agreement to that effect.24

1684-1698; Wiltsie, Mortgage Foreclosure, cc. 3.2, 33.

21-22. See First Nat. Bank of Anniston v. Elliott, 125 Ala. 646, 47 L. R. A. 742, 82 Am. St. Rep. 268, 27 So. 7; Wood v. Holland, 57 Ark. 198, 21 S. W. 223: Hooker v. Burr, 137 Cal. 663, 99 Am. St. Rep. 17, 70 Pac. 778; Tuttle v. Dewey, 44 Iowa, 306; Dickerson v. Hayes, 26 Minn. 100, 1 N. W. 834; Schroeder v. Richardson,101 Wis. 529, 78 N. W. 178.

23. Weiner v. Heintz, 17 111.

259; Leary v. New, 90 Ind. 502; Mayer v. Farmers' Bank, 44 Iowa, 212; Butler v. Seward, 10 Allen (Mass.) 466; White v. Smith, 174 Mo. 186, 73 N. W. 610; Parker v. Dacres, 130 U. S. 43, 32 L. Ed. 848; Powers v. Andrews, 84 Ala. 289, 4 So. 263.

24. See Swain v. Jacks, 125 Cal. 215, 57 Pac. 989; Traeger v. Mutual Building & Loan Ass'n, 192 III. 166, 61 N. E. 424; Heald v. Jardine, - (N. J. Ch.) -, 21 Atl. 586; Agate v. Agate, 11 N.

The purchaser is, usually, if not, invariably, entitled to a conveyance from the officer making the sale. In jurisdictions, however, in which a right of redemption after sale is given by the statute, the purchaser is not ordinarily entitled to a conveyance! until the period allowed for redemption has expired, he having in the meantime merely a certificate showing his purchase of the property.

In case the foreclosure sale is for some reason invalid, the purchaser paying the purchase price is subrogated to the rights of the mortgage creditor under the mortgage,25 and if he takes possession he is regarded as in the position of a mortgagee in possession,26 for the purpose of the doctrine, asserted in a number of states, that the mortgagor, although otherwise entitled to the possession as having the legal title, cannot recover the possession from the mortgagee who has acquired possession under circumstances indicative of the mortgagor's consent thereto.27