This section is from the book "The Law Of Real Property and Other Interests In Land", by Herbert Thorn Dike Tiffany. Also available from Amazon: A Treatise on the Modern Law of Real Property and Other Interests in Land .
So he cannot, by an obstruction, cause the water to injure other land, not by overflowing it, but by percolation. Marsh v. Trul-linger, 6 Or. 356; Pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520, 91 Am. Dec. 72. Unless his obstruction of the stream occurs in the reasonable use of his own land. Cason v.
Florida Power Co - Fla. -, 76 So. 535; Moore v. Berlin Mills Co., 74 N. H. 305, 11 L. R. A. N. S. 284, 124 Am. St. Rep. 968, 13 Ann. Cas. 217, 67 Atl. 578.
77. King v. Tiffany, 9 Conn. 162; Stout v. McAdams, 3 111. 67, 33 Am. Dec. 441; Thompson v. Crocker, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 59; Michigan Paper Co. v. Kalamazoo Valley Electric Co., 141 Mich. 48, 104 N. W. 387; Mcintosh v. Rankin, 134 Mo. 340, 35 S. W. 995; Cowles v. Kidder, 24 N. H. 364. 57 Am. Dec. 287; Swain v. Penn-gewasset Power Co., 76 N. H. 498, 85 Atl. 288; Brown v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 519, 86 Am. Dec. 406; Omel-vany v. Jaggers, 2 Hill (S. C.) C34, 27 Am. Dec. 417; Hand v. Catawba Power Co., 90 S. C. 267; 73 S. E. 187; Pickens v. Coal River Boom & Timber Co., 58 W Va. 11, 6 Ann. Cas. 285, 50 S. E. 872.
78. Gould, Waters, Sec. 210; Treat v. Bates, 27 Mich. 390; Johnston v. Roane, 48 N. C. 523.
Nor so as to prevent the use of a ford by an upper proprietor. Fewell v. Catawba Power Co., 102 S. C. 452, 86 S. E. 947; Zulaback v. Kingfisher, - Okla. -, 158 Pac. 926.
79-80. Guynn v. Wabash Water & Light Co., 181 Ind. 486, 104 N. E. 849; Stimson v. Brookline, 197 Mass. 568, 16 L. R. A. N. S. 280, 125 Am. St. Rep. 382, 14 Ann. Cas. 907, 83 N. E. 893; Dorman v. Ames, 12 Minn. 451; Jones v. Hannovaa, 55 Mo. 462; Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Goodale, 46 N. H. 53; Lancaster & J. Elec. Light Co. v. Jones. 75 N. H. 172, 71 Atl. 871; Chaffin v. Fries Mfg. & Power Co., 135 N. Car. 95, 47 S. E. 224; Ripka v. Sergeant, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 9, 42 Am. Dec. 214; Graver v. Sholl. 42 Pa. 58.
81. Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Fridges, 86 Ala. 448, 11 Am. St. Rep. 58, 5 So. 864; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Ramey, 139 111. 9, 32 Am. St. Rep. 176, 28 N. E. 1087; Evans-ville, Mt. C. & N. Rwy. Co. v. Srott, - Ind. App. -, 114 N. E. 649; Washburn v. Gilman, 64 Me. 163, 18 Am. Rep. 246; Garrett v. Beers, 97 Kan. 255, 155 Pac. 2; Sprague v. City of Worcester, 13 G y (Mass.) 193; Fairbury Brick Co., v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 79 Neb. 854, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 542, 113 N. W. 535; Railroad Co. v. Carr, 38 Ohio St. 448; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Morton, - Okla. -, 157 Pac. 917-Pell v. McClintock, 9 Watts (Pa.) 219, 34 Am. Dec. 507; McCoy v. Danley, 20 Pa. St. 85; Casebeer v Mowry, 55 Pa. St. 419, 93 Am. Dec. 766; Burwell v. Hobson, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 322, 65 Am. Dec. 247. See Gray v. Harris, 107 Mass. 492, 9 Am. Rep. 61.
82. Georgia, R. & B. & Co. v. Bohller, 98 Ga. 184, 26 S. E. 739; Riddle v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 88 Kan. 248, 128 Pac. 195; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Conn 166 Ky. 327, 179 S. W. 195; Inhabitants of China v. Southwkk, 12 Me. 238; Smith v. Agawam Canal Co., 2 Allen (Mass.) 355; Ames v. Cannon River Mfg. Co., 27 Minn. 245, 6 N. W. 787; Proctor v. Jennings. 6 Nev. 83, 3 Am. Rep. 240; Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Johnson, 34 Okla. 582. 126 Pac. 567; Chicago, R. I. & P. Rwy. Co. v. McKone, 36 Okla 41, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 709, 12', Pac. 488; Eagan v. Central Vermont R. Co., 81 Vt. 161, 69 Atl. 732; Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v Meriwether, 120 Va. 55, 91 S. E 92; Radburn v. Fir Tree Lum ber Co., 83 Wash. 643, 145 Pac 632. And see cases in next pre- By railroad company. It has occasionally been judicially asserted that when a railroad is constructed under statutory authority the company is not liable in damages by reason of the obstruction of a watercourse as a result of such construction, unless this results from a lack of due care on its part.83 It is difficult to see why the fact that the construction of a railroad is authorized by law should relieve the company constructing it from the ordinary liability for damage to others. The mere fact that the corporation has legislative authority to build the railroad should not place it in any better position as regards damage to others, than that occupied by a private individual acting under his common law rights.84 That a private individual who erects a dam or other structure upon a stream so as to flood his neighbor's land cannot relieve himself by showing an absence of negligence on his part is not open to question. It has been suggested that these statements by the courts are to be explained on the theory that, if there is an absence of negligence ceding note. In Corporation of Greenock v. Caledonian Rwy. Co., L. R. (1917) App. Cas. 557, however, that the damage occurred by reason of an unprecedented rainfall was not regarded as a defense.
83. St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Morris, 35 Ark. 622; St. Louis I. M. & S. Rwy. Co. v. Walker, 89 Ark. 556, 117 S. W. 534; Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Bohler, 98 Ga. 184, 26 S. E. 739; Cleveland etc. R. Co. v. Wisehart, 161 Ind. 208, 67 N. E. 993; Vyse v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 126 Iowa, 90, 101 N. W. 736; Illinois Cent, R. Co. v. Wil-bourn, 74 Miss. 284, 21 So. 1; Bellinger v. New York Cent. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 42; Moyer v. New proprietor further up the stream who appropriates or pollutes the water so as to affect injuriously the former's enjoyment of the use of the water,92 that, in other words, he has the same right as has a riparian proprietor to complain of an unreasonable use of the water by an upper proprietor.
Judicial decision, is perhaps the more satisfactory from the standpoint of principle.
On the part of the railroad company in the construction of the work which causes the obstruction, that is, if such obstruction is a necessary result of the construction of the railroad, the damage to neighboring land caused thereby involves a taking of property within the constitutional provision for compensation, in which case damages must be recovered, once for all, as compensation for the taking, while if the obstruction is the-result of negligence in the mode of construction, there is no taking of property, but it is merely the ordinary case of the flooding of land for which successive actions may be brought from time to time.85 Furthermore, it is to be observed, if the land flooded is that of one from whom right of way was purchased, the damage to his land by reason of the construction of the road in a reasonably careful manner may frequently be regarded as included in the price paid, or in the damages assessed in condemnation proceedings.