40. Mcclung v. Ross, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 116; Wheat v. Wheat, 190 Ala. 461. 67 So. 417; Ashley v. Rector, 20 Ark. 375; Oglesby v. Hollister, 76 Cal. 136, 9 Am. St. Rep. 177, 18 Pac. 146; Russell v. Stickney, 62 Fla. 569, 56 So. 691; Blackaby v. Blackaby, 185 111. 94, 56 N. E. 1053: Stowell v. Lynch, 269 111. 437, 110 N. E. 51; Pedin v. Cavins, 134 Ind. 494, 39 Am. St. Rep. 276, 34 N. E. 7; Bader v. Dyer, 106 Iowa, 715. 68 Am. St. Rep. 332, 77 N. W. 469; Johnof the rents and profits, is not of itself sufficient to start the running of the statute in favor of A. B has a right to assume that A holds possession, or otherwise utilizes the property, with a full recognition of the right of B to do the same if he so chooses, and B is guilty of no laches in failing to assert his rights. But though the exclusive possession of one cotenant, or his exclusive receipt of the profits, does not of itself serve to show that his possession is adverse to the other or, as it is frequently expressed, that there is an ouster by him of such other, it has been quite occasionally asserted that the sole and uninterrupted possession and receipt of profits by one cotenant, continued for a long series of years, without any interruption or claim on the part of the cotenant, will justify a jury in inferring an actual ouster and adverse pos-session.42 The distinction appears to be in effect, that son v. Myer, 168 Ky. 430. 182 S. W. 190; Mansfield v. Mcginnis, 86 Me. 118, 41 Am. St. Rep. 532, 29 Atl. 956; Donohue v. Vosper, 189 Mich. 78, 155 N. W. 407; Also-brook v. Eggleston, 69 Miss. 833, 13 So. 850; Warfield v. Lindell, 30 Mo. 272, 77 Am. Dec. 614; Collier v. Gault, 234 Mo. 457, 137 S. W. 884; Carson v. Broady, 56 Neb. 648, 71 Am. St. Rep. 691, 77 N. W. 80: Jackson v. Tibbitts, 9 Cow, (N. Y.) 241; Youngs v. Heffner, 36 Ohio St. 232; Tulloch v. Worrall, 49 Pa. St. 133; Odom v. Weathersbee. 26 S. C. 244, 1 S. E. 890; Hubbard v. Wood's Lessee 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 279 Gilkey v. Peeler, 22 Tex. 663; Holley v. Hawley, 39 Vt. 525; Clark v. Eeard. 59 W. Va. 669, 53 S. E. 597: Lagorio v. Dozier, 91 Va. 492, 22 S. E. 239.

41. Mckneely v. Terry, 61 Ark. 527, 33 S. W. 953; Hill v. Cherokee Const. Co.. 99 Ark. 84, 137 S. W. 553; Morgan v. Mitchell. 104 Ga. 596, 30 S. E. 792; Todd v. Todd, 117 111. 92, 7 N. E. 583; Hudson v. Coe, 79 Me. 83, 1 Am. St. Rep. 288, 8 Atl. 249; Warfield v. Lindell, 30 Mo. 272, 77 Am. Dec. 121 (dictum); Rodney v. Mclaughlin, 97 Mo. 426, 9 S. W. 726; Velott v. Lewis, 102 Pa. St. 327.

42. Johnson v. Toulmin, 18 Ala. 50; Kidd v. Borum, 181 Ala. 144, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1226, 61 So. 100; Oglesby v. Hollister, 76 Cal. 136, 9 Am. St. Rep. 177, 18 Pac. 146; Burns v. Byrne, 45 Iowa, 287; Chambers v. Pleak. 6 Dana (Ky.) 432; Harrington v. Williams, 173 Ky. 575, 191 S. W. 273 (semble): Parker v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals on Merrimack River, 3 Mete (Mass.) 91, 37 Am Dec. 121: Lefavour v. Homan, 3 Allen ( Mass.) 354; Joyce v. Dyer, while the exclusive possession of one cotenant does not involve an ouster of the other, so as to start the running of the statute, the fact that one cotenant is in sole possession for twenty, thirty, or forty years, without any claim being made by the other, justifies a finding that an ouster had taken place, "because men do not ordinarily sleep on their rights for so long a period, and a strong presumption arises that actual proof of the original ouster has become lost by lapse of time."43 While the sole possession of one cotenant is prima facie not adverse to the other, it may, as has been above indicated, become adverse to him, and whether it has so become adverse is ordinarily a question of fact.44 The cotenant in possession may deny the right of the other either by express statement,45 or by im189 Mass. 64, 109 Am. St. Rep. 603, 75 N. E. 81; Warfleld v. Lin-dell, 38 Mo. 561, 90 Am. Dec. 443; Lund v. Nelson, 89 Neb. 449, 131 N. W. 919; Jackson v. Whitbeck, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 632, 16 Am. Dec. 454; Dobbins v. Dobbins, 141 N. Car. 210, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185, 115 Am. St. Rep. 682, 53 S. E. 870; Bolton v. Hamilton, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 294, 37 Am. Dec. 509; Rider v. Maul, 46 Pa. St. 376 (semUe); Rohrbacb v. Sanders, 212 Pa. 636, 62 Atl. 27; Hubbard v. Wood, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 279; Drewery v. Nelms, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S. W. 946; Baber v. Baber, 121 Va. 740, 94 S. E. 209; Doe v. Prosser, Cowp. 217; See Sagen & Nelson v. Gudmanson, 164 Iowa, 440, 145 N. W. 954.

43. Lefavour v. Homan, 3 Allen (Mass.) 354.

44. Carpentier v. Mendenball, 28 Cal. 484, 87 Am. Dec. 135; Oglesby v. Hollister, 76 Cal. 136, 9 Am. St. Rep. 177, 18 Pac. 146; Gill v. Fauntleroy, 8 B. Mon.

(Ky.) 177; La Fountain v. Dee, 110 Mich. 347, 68 N. W. 220; Harmon v. James, 7 Sm. & M. (Miss.) Ill, 45 Am. Dec. 296; Warfleld v. Lindell, 38 Mo. 581, 90 Am. Dec. 443; Golden v. Tyer, 180 Mo. 196, 79 S. W. 143; Beall v. Mcmenemy, 63 Neb. 70, 93 Am. St. Rep. 427, 88 N. W. 134; Clark v. Crego, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 599; Bolton v. Hamilton, 2 Walls & S. (Pa.) 294, 37 Am. Dec. 509; Keyser v. Evans, 30 Pa. St. 509; Workman v. Guthrie, 29 Pa. St. 495, 72 Am. Dec. 654; Purcell v. Wilson, 4 Gratt. (Va.) 16.

45. Brady v. Huff, 75 Ala. 80; Ashley v. Rector, 20 Ark. 359; Oglesby v. Hollister, 76 Cal. 136, 9 Am. St. Rep. 177, 18 Pac. 146; Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853, 7 So. 391; King v. Carmichael, 136 Ind. 20, 43 Am. St. Rep. 303, 35 N. E. 509; Gill v. Fauntleroy, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 177; Fenton v. Miller, 108 Mich. 246, 65 N. W. 966. Thornton v. York Bank, 45 Me. 158. Phillips v. Gregg, 10 plication, as, for instance, by his actual exclusion of the other,46 or by utilizing all or part of the property in such a way as to show an intention to make a permanent appropriation thereof to his own use.47 But the statute does not begin to run in his favor unless the other acquires actual notice of the adverse character of his possession, or unless his assertion of an exclusive claim, however made, is so open and notorious that the other, exercising reasonable diligence, would necessarily learn thereof.48