58. Gibson v. Holden, 115 111. 199, 56 Am. Rep. 133, 3 N. E. 272; Mcchesney v. Davis, 86 111. App. 380; Bloch v. Isham, 28 Ind. 37. See Mickel v. York, 175 111. 62, 51 N. E. 848; Tomblin v. Fish,

18 111. App. 439. Pillsbury v. Morris, 54 Minn. 492, 56 N. W. 170. And Professor Aigler's discussion, 10 Mich. Law Rev. at p. 195.

59. Gibson v. Holden, 115 111. 199, 56 Am. Rep. 133, 3 N. E. 272. See Rugg v. Lemley, 78 Ark. 65, 115 Am. St. Rep. 17, 93 S. W. 570; Platt v. Eggleston, 20 Ohio St. 414.

60. Jebeles etc. Confectionery Co. v. Brown, 147 Ala. 593, 11 Ann. Cas. 525, 41 So. 626; Adams v. Noble, 120 Mich. 545, 79 N. W. 810; Loyal Mystic Legion v. Jones, 73 Neb. 342, 102 N. W. 621.

61. Southworth v. Perring, 71 Kan. 755, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87, 114 Am. St. Rep. 527, 81 Pac.

Even though the benefit of the covenant would otherwise pass, the party building the wall may, it has been held, upon the grant of his parcel, reserve the right to compensation on account of the use which may be subsequently made of the wall by the adjoining proprietor.63

Occasionally the benefit of the stipulation for payment of part of the cost of the wall has been regarded as passing to a grantee of the builder of the wall, not on the theory that it is a covenant running with the land, but because the instrument by which the land was conveyed also transferred in terms the benefit of the stipulation,64 or on the theory, apparently, that a transfer in terms of the land is to be construed as also intended to transfer the benefit of the stipulation, as if it were so stated.65

In one or two cases the grantee of the builder appears to be regarded as entitled to recover part of the cost of the wall on the theory, not of contract, but rather of quasi contract, that is, that the person making use of another's wall is under an implied assumpsit to make compensation to the owner of the wall.66

481, 82 Pac. 785; King v. Wight, 155 Mass. 444, 29 N. E. 644; Hoffman v. Dickson, 47 Wash. 431, 125 Am. St. Rep. 907, 15 Ann. Cas. 173, 92 Pac. 272, 93 Pac. 523. Sandberg v. Rowland, 51 Wash. 7, 97 Pac. 1087. See Loyal .Mystic Legion v. Jones, 73 Neb. 342, 102 N. W. 621; Weyman v. Ringold, 1 Bradf. (N. Y. Surr.) 40.

62. Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166, 26 N. E. 198; Behrens v. Hoxie, 26 111. App. 417. See Mott v. Oppenhiemer, 135 N. Y. 312, 17 L. R. A. 409, 31 N. E. 1097.

63. Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166, 26 N. E. 198; Pillsbury v. Morris, 54 Minn. 432, 56 N. W. 170.

64. Keating v. Korfhage, 88 Mo. 524; Parsons v. Baltimore Bldg. & L. Ass'n, 44 W. Va. 335, 29 S. E. 999, 67 Am. St. Rep. 769; Ellinsburg Lodge No. 20 v. Collins, 68 Wash. 94, 122 Pac. 602.

65. See Roche v. Ullman, 104 111. 11; Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 Mo. 498, 57 Am. Rep. 433. Mott v. Oppenheimer, 135 N. Y. 312, 17 L. R. A. 409, 31 N. E. 1097.

The statutes in regard to party walls67 have ordinarily been construed as entitling the grantee of the builder of the wall to enforce the statutory liability for a portion of the cost of the wall.68 But the user of the wall by the adjoining lot owner matures the obligation, so that the right to compensation does not pass by a subsequent conveyance of the land.69

- Running of the burden. Agreements between owners of adjoining pieces of land that, in case of the erection by either of them of a party wall upon the division line, a part on each tract, the other will, if he subsequently uses such wall, pay his share of the cost, have usually been held to bind a subsequent transferee of either owner for a part of the cost upon his user of such wall previously erected by the owner of the other property,70 though there are states in which such liability on the part of the transferee is denied.71 The fact that the party wall agreement

66. Post, Sec. 393, note 77.

67. Ante, Sec. 365.

68. Pfrommer v. Taylor, 27 Del. 113, 86 Atl. 212; Halpine v. Barr, 21 Dist. Col. 331; Thomson v. Curtis, 28 Iowa, 229; Irwin v. Peterson, 25 La. Ann. 300; Hunt v. Ambruster, 17 N. J. Eq. 208; Knight v. Beenken, 30 Pa. 372; Vollmer's Appeal, 61 Pa. 118; Contra under an earlier Pennsylvania statute, Dannaker v. Riley, 14 Pa. 435.

69. Eberly v. Behrend, 9 Mackey (20 D. C.) 215; Lea v. Jones, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 587, 209 Pa. 22, 57 Atl. 1113.

70. Roche v. Ullman, 104 111. 11; Mackin v. Haven, 187 111. 480, 58 X. E. 448; Tomblin v. Fish, 18 111. App. 439; Gibson v. Holden,

115 111. 199, 56 Am. Rep. 146, 3 N. E. 282; Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166, 26 N. E. 198; Ferguson v. Worrall, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 219, 9 L. R. A (X. S.) 1261, 101 S. W. 966; Savage v. Mason, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 500; Standish v. Lawrence, 111 Mass. Ill; Richardson v. Tobey, 121 Mass. 457; King v. Wight, 155 Mass. 444, 29 X. E. 644; National Life Ins. Co. of Montpelier v. Lee, 75 Minn. 157, 77 N. W. 794; Burr v. Lamaster, 30 Neb. 688, 9 L. R. A. 637, 27 Am. St. Rep. 428, 46 N. W. 1015; Gar-mire v. Willy, 36 Neb. 340, 54 N. W. 562; Hall v. Geyer, 14 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 229, 7 Ohio Dec. 436.

71. Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 Mo. 498; Nalle v. Paggi, - (Tex.) -, S S. W. 205. In Nalle v. Paggi, is in terms binding on the assigns of the parties has been referred to as making the burden of the covenant run with the land72 and a statement that the covenant is to run with the land would no doubt have quite as great an effect.73

Such an agreement is, it seems, prima facie, construed as providing for reimbursement by the person alone who uses the wall for the construction of a building; and consequently the original covenantor, if he does not use the wall, is not liable on his covenant,74 nor is one to whom the land is transferred after ft has been built on by his grantor ordinarily so liable.75

81 Tex. 201, 1 L. R. A. 33, 16 S. W. 932, it was held that the non builder, party to the agreement, having contracted to pay half the value of the wall when he used it, became personally liable for half the value immediately on transferring his land to another, and thus becoming incapable of using the wall.