40. State v. Green, 41 Iowa, 693; Stickley v. Sodus Tp. 131 Mich. 510, 515, 59 L. R. A. 287, 91 N. W. 745; Wills v. Reid, 86 Miss. 446, 38 So. 793; Hill v. Mcginnis, 64 Neb. 187, 89 N. W. 783; People v. Osborn, 84 Hun. 441, 32 N. Y. Supp. 358; Stewart v. Frink, 94 N. Car. 487; Blute v. Scribner, 23 Wis. 357; Marsh-field Land & Lumber Co. v. John Week Lumber Co., 108 Wis. 268, 84 N. W. 434; Parrott v. Stewart, 65 Ore. 254, 132 Pac. 523; Board of Com'rs Sheridan County v. Patrick, 18 Wyo. 130, 104 Pac-. 531, 107 Pac. 748.

Suggested above, that user under claim of right means merely adverse user,41 and that user is ordinarily to be presumed to be adverse in the absence of evidence to the contrary,42 it does not seem that recognition by the municipal authorities should be regarded as essential, though the fact of such recognition throughout the prescriptive period is the strongest sort of evidence that the user is not permissive merely.43

- (g) Width of highway. Ordinarily the width of a highway based upon prescription is determined by the extent of the user during the prescriptive period.44 Other considerations, however, are frequently effective to extend the exterior limits of the highway beyond the line of actual travel.45 If the user is based upon invalid proceedings for the location of a highway, the width named in such invalid location will ordinarily control46 and enclosures, such as fences or buildings, along the

41. Ante, Sec. 533(d), note 20.

42. Ante, Sec. 504.

43. Smith v. Nofsinger, 86 Neb. 834, 126 N. W. 659; Wecker v. Dommer, 97 Neb. 728, 151 N. W. 157; O'connell v. Chicago Terminal Transfer R. Co., 184 111. 308, 56 N. E. 355; Parrott v. Stewart, 65 Ore. 254, 132 Pac. 523; Sharp v. Mynatt, 1 Lea. (Tenn.) 375.

44. District of Columbia v. Robinson, 180 U. S. 92, 45 L. Ed. 440; Goerke v. Town of Manitou, 25 Colo. App. 482, 139 Pac. 1049; Evans v. Bowman, 183 Ind. 264, 108 N. E. 956; Anderson v. City of Huntington, 40 Ind. App. 130, 81 N. E. 223; Meade v. City of Topeka, 75 Kan. 61, 88 Pac. 574; Scheimer v. Price, 65 Mich. 638, 32 N. W. 873; Wayne County Sav. Bank v. Stockwell, 84 Mich. 586, 22 Am. St. Rep. 708, 48 N. W. 174; Arndt v. Thomas, 93

Minn. 1, 100 Am. St. Rep. 378, 106 Am. St. Rep. 418; State v. Auchard, 22 Mont. 14,' 55 Pac. 361; Talmage v. Hunting, 29 N. Y 447; Silverton v. Brown, 63 Ore. 418, 128 Pac. 45; Morse v. Ranno, 32 Vt. 600; Prince William County v. Manuel, 118 Va. 716, 88 S. E. 54; Upper v. Lowell, 7 Wash. 460, 35 Pac. 363.

45. See Bayard v. Standard Oil Co., 38 Ore. 438, 63 Pac. 614.

46. Pillsbury v. Brown, 82 Me. 450, 19 At. 858, 9 L. R. A. 44; Marchand v. Maple Grove, 48 Minn. 271, 51 N. W. 606; State v. Auchard, 22 Mont. 14, 55 Pac. 361; Bayard v. Standard Oil Co., 38 Ore. 438, 63 Pac. 614; Upper v. Lowell, 7 Wash. 460, 35 Pac. 363; Konkel v. Pella, 122 Wis. 143, 99 N. W. 453. But the width named in the invalid location will not control as against line of the highway, maintained by the owners of the land, will be given very great weight in determining the limits of the highway.47 Even where the width is regarded as measured by the user, it is not necessarily to be confined to the beaten track or thread of actual travel, it being essential that those using the road have sufficient room to pass and repass,48 and occasionally a greater width being required for the purpose of properly improving the road.49 The question of width is usually regarded as one of fact for the jury,50 and statutory provisions as to the width of highways are not ordinarily regarded as controlling.51 Occasionally it has been said that the public user is to be regarded as evidence one whose fences blocked part of such width. Samuel v. Sherman, 170 111. 265, 48 N. E. 576.

47. Middletown v. Glenn, 278 111. 149, 115 N. E. 847; Evans v. Bowman, 1S3 Ind. 264, 108 N. E. 956; Tilton v. Wenham, 172 Mass. 407, 52 N. E. 514; Washington Borough v. Steiner, 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 392; Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah. 341, 57 Am. St. Rep. 740, 44 Pac. 1032. See Watz v. Sunderland, 147 Mich. 96, 110 N. W. 507; Kendall Smith Co. v. Lancaster Co., 84 Neb. 654, 121 N. W. 960.

48. Davis v. City of Clinton, 58 Iowa, 389, 10 N. W. 768; Tilton v. Wenham, 172 Mass. 407, 52 N. E. 514; Arndt v. Thomas, 93 Minn. 1, 106 Am. St. Rep. 418, 100 N. W. 378; State v. Morse, 50 N. H. 9; Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah, 341, 57 Am. St. Rep. 740, 44 Pac. 1032; Bart-lett v. Beardmore, 77 Wis. 356, 46 N. W. 494.

49. Marchand v. Town of Maple Grove, 48 Minn. 271, 51 N. W. 606; Whitesides v. Green,

Of a right in the public to use the land to the usual width of a highway, by widening the travelled path, or otherwise, as the exigencies of the public may require.52

13 Utah, 341, 57 Am. St. Rep. 740, 44 Pac. 1032.

50. Meservey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho, 133, 93 Pac. 780; Davis v. City of Clinton, 58 Iowa, 389, 10 N. W. 768; Lawrence v. Mt. Vernon, 35 Me. 100; Arndt v. Thomas, 93 Minn. 1, 106 Am. St Rep. 418, 100 N. W. 378; State v. Morse, 50 N. H. 9; Bayard v. Standard Oil Co., 38 Ore. 438, 63 Pac. 614; Burrows v. Guest, 5 Utah, 91, 12 Pac. 847; White-sides v. Green, 13 Utah, 341, 57 Am. St. Rep. 740, 44 Pac. 1032; Hamp v. Pend Oreille County, 102 Wash. 184, 172 Pac. 869.

51. Goerke v. Town of Mani-tou, 25 Colo. App. 482, 139 Pac. 1049; Davis v. City of Clinton, 58 Iowa, 389, 10 N. W. 768. Compare Yakima County v. Conrad 26 Wash. 155, 66 Pac. 411. Such a statutory provision could not extend the width as against an owner of land adjoining the line of travel, whose land was fenced. Watz v. Sunderland, 147 Mich. 96, 110 N. W. 507.

52. Sprague v. Wait, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 309; Coffin v. Plymouth, 49 N. H. 173; Kendall Smith Co. v. Lancaster Co., 84 Neb. 654, 121 N. W. 960; Bartlett v. Beardmore, 77 Wis. 356, 46 N. W.

494. See Meservey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho, 133, 93 Pac. 78; Arndt v. Thomas, 93 Minn. 1, 100 N. W. 378, 106 Am. St. Rep. 418; City of Olympia v. Lemon, - Wash. - , 161 Pac. 363.