So far as the agreement which is sought to be enforced against a subsequent holder of the land concerns, as is almost invariably the case, the use to be made of the land, it is a question of primary importance whether the agreement concerns the use to be made thereof by the promisor only, or the use to be made thereof by others as well. A use by a subsequent purchase cannot well be restrained if the agreement was intended to prevent the promisor only from making such use.49 What the intention was in this regard is a question of construction, but since it is ordinarily immaterial to the promisee who may make any particular use of the property, the presumption would seem to be, in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, that such a use by any person whomsoever is intended,50 and an intention to this effect would appear to be clearly indicated by the fact that the agreement in terms binds the promisor's assigns,51 or that the agreement is in an impersonal form, that the land shall not be used in a particular way.

46. T. Cyprian Williams, Esq., in 51 Solicitors' Journal at pp. 141, 155.

47. Ante, Sec. 103, note 4.

48. Lightwood, Time Limits of Actions, 80; article by Charles Sweet, 19 Juridicial Review, 67.

49. Kemp v. Bird,' 5 Ch. Div. 974; Re Fawcett v. Holmes, 42 Ch. Div. 150; Brigg v. Thornton (1904), 1 Ch. 386; Pythian Castle Ass'n of Sacramento v. Daroux, 172 Cal. 510, 157 Pac. 594.

50. See Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N.