At common law, rent is not regarded as accruing from day to day, like interest, but it is only upon the day fixed for payment that any part of it becomes due.89 The result of this principle is that, ordinarily, the person who is on that day the owner of the reversion is entitled to the entire installment of rent due on that day, though he may have been the owner of the reversion or rent but a part of the time which has elapsed since the last

88. See Post, Sec. 410.

88a. Piatt v. Johnson, 168 Pa. 47, 47 Am. St. Rep. 877, 31 Atl. 935.

88b. Goodwin v. Sharkey, 80 Pa. St. 149.

88c. Johns v. Winters, 251 Pa. 169, 96 Atl. 130; Hart v. Wynne, - (Tex. Civ.) - , 40 S. W. 848.

88d. See Wald's Pollock, Contracts (Williston's Ed.) p. 355 et seq

88e. Bradbury v. Higgenson,

162 Cal. 602, 123 Pac. 797; Minneapolis Baseball Co. v. City Bank, 74 Minn. 98, 76 N. W. 1024; Brown v. Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 159 Pac. 89.

89. Clun's Case, 10 Coke 126b; Dexter v. Phillips, 121 Mass. 178. 23 Am. Rep. 261; Anderson v. Robbins, 82 Me. 422, 9 L. R. A. 568, 19 Atl. 910; Marshall v. Mose-ley, 21 N. Y. 280; Bank of Pennsylvania y Wise, 3 Watts (Pa.) 394.

Applications of this rule occur as follows: If a tenant in fee simple, having made a lease, dies between two rent days, the entire installment of rent falling due belongs to his heir or devisee, as being the owner of the reversion at the time the installment falls due, and the executor or administrator can assert a claim to no portion thereof.90 And when the landlord makes a conveyance of the reversion, the grantee is entitled, in the absence of a contrary stipulation, to all the rent which falls due at the next rent day, and the grantor can claim no part thereof.91 So in case the tenant is evicted by title paramount between rent days, the landlord cannot claim any portion of the installment next falling due,92 and this is a fortiori the case if the landlord himself evicts the tenant. The case is the same if the landlord terminates the tenancy, either by force of an express option so to do,93-94 or in accordance with the nature of the tenancy, as being one at

90. Chin's Case, 10 Coke, 127a; Duppa v. Mayo, 1 Wms. Saund. 287; Anderson v. Robbins, 82 Me. 422, 8 L. R. A. 588, 19 Atl. 910. Eloodworth v. Stevens, 51 Miss. 475; Dorsett v. Gray, 98 Ind. 237; Allen v. Van Houton, 19 N. J. Law (4 Harr.) 47.

91. English v. Key, 39 Ala. 113; Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368, 61 Am. Dec. 364; Hull v. Stevenson, 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 135, note. Bank of Pennsylvania v. Wise, 3 Watts (Pa.) 394; Hearne v. Lewis, 78 Tex. 276, 14 S. W. 572.

92. English v. Key, 39 Ala. 113; Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368, 61 Am. Dec. 364; Adams v. Bige-low, 128 Mass. 365; Russell v. Fabyan, 28 N. H. 543, 61 Am. Dec. 629.

93-94. Zule v. Zule, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 76, 35 Am. Dec. 600; Nicholson v. Munigle, 6 Allen (88 Mass.) 215. But see dictum in Perry v. Aldrich, 13 N. H. 343, 38 Am. Dec. 493, to the effect that a lease providing for the termination on a contingency should be construed as providing for apportionment.

The rule forbidding the apportionment of rent, so far as concerns a rent reserved on a lease by a tenant for his own life, was changed in England, by Stat. II Geo. 2, c. 19, Sec. 15, providing that if any tenant for life should die before the day for the payment of rent reserved on a lease which terminated on such death, his executors or administrators might recover from the under tenant a proper proportion of the rent, according to the length of time between the last rent day and the death of the tenant for life. And a similar statute has been enacted in a number of states. By later legislation in England the right of apportionment has been greatly extended, and in a few states there is legislation of a like tendency.98