This section is from the book "The Law Of Real Property and Other Interests In Land", by Herbert Thorn Dike Tiffany. Also available from Amazon: A Treatise on the Modern Law of Real Property and Other Interests in Land .
It is well recognized that a dedication of land does not involve any necessity of a particular grantee or beneficiary.19 The purpose and effect of a common-law dedi15. Elyton Land Co. v. South & North Alabama Co., 95 Ala. 631, 10 So. 270; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Warrum, 42 Ind. App. 179, 82 N. E. 934, 84 N. E. 356 (dictum); Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Stephens, 96 Ky. 401, 49 Am. St. Rep. 303, 28 S. W. 14; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Whitham, 155 111. 514, 28 L. R. A. 612, 46 Am. St. Rep. 355, 40 N. E. 1014; Todd v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co., 19 Ohio St. 514; Watson v. Chicago M & St. P. R. Co., 46 Minn. 321, 48 N. W. 1129.
But by force of statute land may be dedicated for railway purposes. Morgan v. Railroad Co., 96 U. S. 716, 24 L. Ed. 743; Kansas City & N. Connecting R. Co. v. Baker, 183 Mo. 312, 82 S. W. 85; Iowa Cent. R. Co. v. Homan, 151 Iowa, 404, 131 N. W. 878.
16. Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch U. S. 292, 3 L. Ed. 735.
17. See editorial note 16 Harv. Law Rev. 128.
18. Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 566, 7 L. Ed. 521.
19. Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. 566, 7 L. Ed. 521; Doe v. Jones, 11 Ala. 63; Warren v. Jacksonville, 15 111. 236, 58 Am. Dec.
Cation is to create a right of user in the public, or at least in some particular class of the public, and not in some particular person or persons, natural or legal. And for this reason, not only is a particular grantee or beneficiary unnecessary, but there is, it seems, no dedication when there is a particular grantee or beneficiary.
As there cannot be a dedication in favor of a particular person, so there cannot be a dedication in favor of a limited number of persons..20 It must be in favor of the public, and not of a part of the public. Consequently an attempted dedication in favor of a municipality, or the inhabitants of a municipality, has no legal validity, unless construed as a dedication in favor of the whole public,21 and this although the municipality may represent the public for the purpose of acg10; Maywood Co. v. Village of Maywood, 118 111. 61, 6 N. E. 866; San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal. 170, 13 Pac. 405; State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9; Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119; Bryant's Lessee v. Mccandless, 7 Ohio Pt. 2, 135; Atkinson v. Bell, 18 Tex. 874; Meeker v. Puyallup, 5 Wash. 759, 32 Pac. 727.
20. Hill v. Wing, 193 Ala. 312. 69 So. 445; Hlinois Ins. Co. v. Littlefield, 67 111. 368; City of Chicago v. Borden, 190 111. 430, 60 N. E. 915; Thomas v. Ford, 63 Md. 346, 52 Am. Rep. 513; Witter v. Harvey, 1 Mccord L. 67, 10 Am. Dec. 650; Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 36 Utah, 257, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 86, 102 Pac. 740; Talbott v. Richmond & D. R. R. Co., 31 Gratt. (Va.) 685; Tupper v. Huson, 46 Wis. 646, 1 N. W. 332.
21. Poole v. Huskinson, 11 M. & W. 827; Miller v. City of
Indianapolis, 123 Ind. 196, 24 N. 228; Atty Gen. v. Tarr, 148 Mass. 309, 2 L. R. A. 87, 19 N. E. 358; Trerice v. Barteau, 54 Wis. 99. 11 X. W. 244.
In connection with the statement that it is immaterial to the validity of a dedication that there is no municipal corporation existent at the time to assume control of the land dedicated on behalf of the public, it is occasionally suggsested that the lack in this respect is remedied by the subsequent creation of such a corporation. Riverside v. Mac-lain, 210 I11. 308, 66 L. R. A. 288, 102 Am. St. Rep. 164, 71 N. E. 408; Buffalo L. & U. Ry. C Hover. 214 X. V. 236, 108 N. E 155; Kuiss v. Duquesne Borough, Pa. 117. 100 Atl. 132; Gillian v. Frost. 25 Tex Civ,app . 371 61. S. W. 345. This is. it is conceived, misleading. The dedica tion is valid regardless of whether cepting the dedication,22 and controlling the user of the land dedicated. .
The case of a gift of land to a municipal corporation, effected by a written conveyance to the corporation, for a purpose involving a use of the land by or for the benefit of the inhabitants, is occasionally referred to as a dedication,23 but it is not properly such. In such a case the municipality is in the position of a grantee, while in the case of a dedication there is, as above stated, no grantee. And conceding that a valid dedication may be made in favor of a religious association by an oral declaration of an intention to that effect,24 a view which, as before suggested, is difficult to harmonize with the requirement that dedication be in favor of the public and not of part of the public, the term dedication is not properly applicable when there is a valid conveyance in writing to such association or in trust therefor. In such case the title passes, not by dedication, but by grant.