In order that a dedication, or rather, an offer of dedication, may be effective for the purpose of imposing burdens and liabilities upon the public authorities as regards the condition and repair of the property, it is ordinarily necessary that it be accepted by the public,67 and, by numerous decisions, an acceptance is also necessary in order to render the offer of dedication irrevocable by the dedicator,68 and in order to give to the municipality rights of control as regards the property.69 In one state it has been de64. See Marsh v. Village of Fairbury, 163 111. 401, 45 N. B. 236; Ruddiman v. Taylor, 95 Midi. 547, 55 N. W. 376; Hatton v. St. Louis, 264 Mo. 634, 175 S. W. 888; Kaufman v. Butte, 48 Mont. 400, 138 Pac. 770; Pills-bury v. Alexander, 40 Neb. 242, 58 N. W. 859; Incorporated Village of Fulton's Lessee v. Mehren-feld, 8 Ohio St. 440; Kee v. Satterfield, 46 Okla. 208. 149 Pac. 243; Mccoy v. Thompson, 84 Ore. 141, 164 Pac. 589; Thorndike v. Milwaukee Auditorium Co., 143 Wis. 1, 126 N. W. 881.

65. Post, Sec. 486.

66. Winthrop Harbor v. Gur-des, 257 111. 596, 101 N. E. 199.

67. City & County of San Francisco v. Calderwood, 31 Cal. 585, 91 Am. Dec. 545; City of Denver v. Denver & S. F. Ry. Co., 17 Colo. 583, 31 Pac. 338; Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21, 43 N. E. 942; Maine v. Bradbury, 40 Me. 154; Ogle v. City of Cumberland, 90 Md. 59, 44 Atl. 1015; Downend v. Kansas City,

156 Mo. 60, 56 S. W. 902; State v. Atherton, 16 N .H. 203; Atlantic & S. R. Co. v. State Board of Assessors of New Jersey, 80 N. J. L. 83, 77 Atl. 609.

68. City of Los Angeles v. Mc-collum, 156 Cal. 148, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378, 103 Pac. 914; Riley

.v. Hammel, 38 Conn. 574; H. A. Hillmer Co. v. Behr, 264 111. 568, 106 N. E. 481; Town of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 Iowa, 337. 158 N. W. 655; Whittington v. Comm'rs of Crisfield, 121 Md. 387, 88 Atl. 232; Hayden v. Stone, 112 Mass. 346; Mighill v. Town of Rowley, 224 Mass. 586, 113 N. E. 569; Price v. Town of Brecken-ridge, 92 Mo. 378, 5 S. W. 20; Buffalo v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 190 N. Y. 84, 82 N. E. 513; Simmons v. Cornell, 1 R. I. 519; Spokane v. Security Sav. Soc, 82 Wash. 91, 143 Pac. 435; University of Our Lady of the Sacred Heart v. City of Watertown, 150 Wis. 505, 137 N. W. 754.

69. Schmidt v. Spaeth, 82 N. J. L. 83 Atl. 242; Pope v. Clarke, cided that the death of the dedicator before acceptance nullifies the dedication.70

Some of the statutes providing for a dedication by the record of a plat have been construed as not involving any necessity of an acceptance.71 And according to some decisions there is a presumption of acceptance of a dedication which is beneficial in character,72 a view which in effect dispenses with the neces sity of an acceptance in such a case. Furthermore, by the weight of authority, a dedication effected by sales with reference to a plat73 cannot be revoked even though there has been no indication of acceptance,74 a

122 Md. 1, 89 Atl. 387; Moore v. Fowler, 58 Ore. 292, 114 Pac. 472; Baltimore v. Broumel, 86 Md. 153, 37 Atl. 648; Phillips v. Stamford, 81 Conn. 408. 71 Atl. 361; Gilder v. City of Brenham, 67 Tex. 345, 3 S. W. 309.

70. People v. Johnson, 237 111. 237, 86 N. E. 676; Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 264 111. 24, 105 N. E. 702.

71. Town of Lake View v. Le Bahn, 120 111. 92, 9 N. E. 269; Osage City v. Larkin, 40 Kan. 206, 2 L. R. A. 56, 10 Am. St. Rep. 186, 19 Pac. 658; Keyes v. Excelsior, 126 Minn. 456,148 N. W. 501; Town of Otterville v. Bente, 240 Mo. 291, 144 S. W. 822; Weeping Water v. Reed, 21 Neb. 261, 31 N. W. 797; Carter v. City of Portland, 4 Ore. 339; Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah, 127, 104 Pac. 1ll; Meachem v. City of Seattle, 45 Wash. 380, 88 Pac. 628.

72. Archer v. Salinas City, 93 Cal. 43, 16 L. R. A. 145, 28 Pac. 839; Guthrie v. Town of New Haven, 31 Conn. 308: Poole v. Commissioners of Rehobolh, 9

Del. Ch. 192, 80 Atl. 683; Abbott v. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521, 58 Am. Rep. 143, 10 N. E. 325; Harrington v. Manchester, 76 N. H. 347, 82 Atl. 716. See Phillips v. Stamford, 81 Conn. 408, 71 Atl. 361.

Such a presumption cannot, it has been suggested exist in the case of a highway, there being liabilities to repair in connection therewith. Abbott v. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521, 58 Am. Rep. 143, 10 N. E. 325; Wayne County v. Miller, 31 Mich. 447. But it might, it would seem, even then exist for purposes other than of Imposing a liability upon the public. See Henderson v. Yea-man, 169 Ky. 503, 184 S. W. 878; Harrington v. Manchester, 76 N. H. 347, 82 Atl. 716.

73. Ante, Sec. 482, note 56.

74. Rulolph v. Birmingham 188 Ala. 620, 66 So. 1006; Brook-field v. Block, 123 Ark 153, 184 S. W. 449; Davidow v. Griswold, 23 Cal. App. 188, 137 Pac. 619; Boise City v. Hon. 14 Idaho, 272,

Ville v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 147 Ky. 141, 738, 143 S. W. 782, 145 S. W. 389; Bartlett v. Bangor, 67 Me. 460; Baltimore v. Frick, 82 Md. 77, 33 Atl. 435; Harrison County Supervisors v. Seal, 66 Miss. 129, 3 L. R. A. 659, 14 Am. St. Rep. 545, 5 So. 622; Shearer v. City of Reno, 36 Nev. 443, 136 Pac. 705; Darling v. Jersey City, 73 N. J. Eq. 318, 67 Atl. 709; Revard v. Hunt, 29 Okla. 835, 119 Pac. 589; Baker City Mut. Irr. Co. v. Baker City, 58 Ore. 306, 110 Pac. 392, 113 Pac. 9; City of Pitts-burg v. Epping Carpenter Co., 194 Pa. 318, 45 Atl. 129; Martinez v. City of Dallas, 102 Tex. 54, 109 S. W. 287, 113 S. W. 1167. Contra, Gathright v. State, 129 Ark. 339, 195 S. W. 1069; Prescott v. Edwards, 117 Cal. 298, 59 Am. St. Rep. 186, 49 Pac. 178; Eltinge v. Santos, 171 Cal. 278, 152 Pac. 915; Kimball v. Chicago, 253 111. 105,

94 Pac. 167; Russell v. Lincoln, 200 111. 511, 65 N.e. 1088; Louisview which is ordinarily asserted without any attempt to state a reason for such an exception to the ordinary requirement of acceptance, but which is occasionally based on the somewhat unsatisfactory theory that the individual purchasers, by making the purchases, accept in behalf of the public the dedication made by the sales to them.75 It would rather seem that it is because of the creation of rights in the individual purchasers, which rights are not subject to subsequent control by the vendor, and of the association which apparently exists between the creation of such individual rights and the asserted dedication in favor of the pub-lic,75a that the vendor has been regarded as unable to revoke the dedication thus made.