In order that the statute of limitations may bar one of his right to recover land it is necessary, not only that the land be in possession of another, but that such possession be "adverse" or "hostile" to the true owner. It is somewhat surprising, in view of the frequency with which the courts have recognized this requirement, that they have so seldom ventured to explain what they mean by an adverse or hostile possession as distinguished from one which is not adverse or hostile. A possession, it

39. Lightwood, Possession of Land, 14; Pollock & Wright, Possession 21.

40. 2 Blackst. Comm. 180, 191.

41. Woodruff v. Roysden, 105 Tenn. 491, 80 Am. St. Rep. 905, 58 S. W. 1066.

42. Hutchinson v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 41 Wis. 541; Beedy v. Dine, 31 Pa. 13; Ward v. Ward. L. R. 6 Ch. 789.

43. Bendorff v. Uihlein, 132 Tenn. 193, 177 S. W. 481;.

44. Randall v. Sanderson, 111 Mass. 114; Barker v. Publishers' Paper Co. - N. H - 97 Atl. 749; Sowles v. Butler, 71 Vt. 271, 44 Atl. 355.

45. Webber v. Clark, 74 Cal. 11, 15 Pac. 431; Cady v. Fitz-simmons, 50 Conn. 209; Rupley v. Fraser, 132 Minn. 311, 156 N. W. 350; Woodruff v. Paddock, 130 N. Y. 618, 29 N. E. 1021; Cocke v. Texas etc. R. Co.. 46 Tex. Civ. App. 363, 103 S. W. 407.

Appears, is adverse to the true owner when it is unaccompanied by any recognition, express or inferrible from circumstances, of the right in the latter. It does not involve the necessity of an express denial of the title of the true owner, and, it is evident, in the majority of cases there is no such denial.

The requirement that the possession be adverse has its logical justification in the consideration that the recognition by the person in possession of the title of the true owner is calculated to lull the latter into a false sense of security and so to induce him to refrain from asserting his right by entry or action. And in accord with this consideration are the decisions,46 very considerable in number, that if the possession was originally not adverse to the true owner, the statute cannot be set in motion against him until the possessor has changed the character of the possession by a denial of the title of such owner, and such change has been brought to the knowledge of the latter.

46. Trufant v. White, 99 Ala. 536; Cotton v. White, 131 Ark. 273, 199 S. W. 116; Kerns v. Dean, 77 Cal. 555; Millett v. Lagomarsino, 107 Cal. 102, 38 Pac. 308: Harrall v. Leverty, 50 Conn. 46, 47 Am. Rep. 608; Trask v. Success Mining Co., 28 Idaho. 483, 155 Pac. 288; Thompson v. Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. 271 111. 11, 110 N. E. 901; Kirby v. Kirby, 236 111. 255, 86 N. E. 259; Mc-clenahan v. Stevenson, 118 Iowa. 106, 91 N. W. 925; Frazier v. Morris, 161 Ky. 72, 170 S. W. 496; Lancey v. Parks, 102 Me. 135. 66 Atl. 311; Hall v. Stevens, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 418; Compau v. Lafferty, 50 Mich. 114, 15 N. W. 40; Collins v. Colleran, 86 Minn. 199, 90 N. W. 3o4; Stevenson v. Black, 168 Mo. 549, 68 S. W. 909; M'pune v. Goodwillie, 204 Mo.

306, 102 S. W. 997; Smith v. Hitchcock, 38 Neb. 104, 56 N. W. 791; Lewis v. New York & 11. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 202, 56 N. E. 540; Acton v. Culbertson, 38 Okla. 280, 132 Pac. 812; Coquille Mill & Mercantile Co. v. Johnson, 52 Ore. 547, 132 Am. St. Rep. 716, 98 Pac. 132; Bannon v. Brandon, 34 Pa. St 263, 75 Am. Dec. 655; Johns v. Johns, 244 Pa. 48. 90 Atl. 535; Mccutchen v. Mc Cutchen, 77 B. C. 129, 12 L.. R. A. (X. S.) 1140, 57 S. E. 678; Duke v. Harper, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 280, 27 Am. Dec. 162; Hulvey v. Ilulvey, 92 Va 192,23 S. E. Graydon v. Hurd, 56 Fed. 724, 5 C. C. A. 258. But it lias been decided that, if one purchases land in the possession of one other than his vendor, he is charged with notice that

It is sometimes said that the possession must be adverse, not only to the rightful owner, but to the whole world.47 Such a requirement corresponds, apparently, in some degree to the requirement, so frequently asserted, that the possession be under claim of title, which is the subject of discussion in the following section. The basis of the asserted requirement that possession be adverse to the whole world is not readily perceptible. If the possession is adverse to the rightful owner, it is for the latter to assert his rights, regardless of whether the person in possession mistakenly assumes that the title is in a third person.47a

- Question of fact. The question whether the possession was adverse is ordinarily a question of fact.48

That the possession was adverse may be shown by evidence that possession was taken under color of title,49 the possession, though originally subservient to the vendor's title, had become hostile. How-att v. Green, 139 Mich. 289, 102 N. W. 734.

47. Ashford v. Ashford, 136 Ala. 632, 96 Am. St. Rep. 82 34 So. 10 (dictum); Ballard v. Hansen, 33 Neb. 861, 51 N. W. 295; Bracken v. Union Pac. R. Co., 75 Fed. 347, 21 C. C. A. 387 (Nebraska); Altschul v. O'neill, 35 Ore. 202, 58 Pac. 95; Mcnaught-collins Imp. Co. v. May, 52 Wash. 632, 101 Pac. 237.

47a. That the possession need not be adverse to the whole world, see Skipwith v. Martin, 50 Ark. 141, 6 S. W. 514; Hayes v. Martin, 45 Cal. 559; Mcmanus v. O'sullivan, 48 Cal. 485; Adams v. Guerard, 29 Ga. 651, 76 Am. Dec. 624; Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 121, 17 S. W.

755; Smith v. Badura, 70 Ore. 58, 139 Pac. 107; Smith v. Jones, 103 Tex. 632, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 150, 132 S. W. 469. See note in 14 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 374, criticizing Bond v. O'gara, 177 Mass. 139, 83 Am. St. Rep. 265, 58 N. E. 189.

48. Hogan v. Kurtz, 94 U. S. 773, 24 L. Ed. 317; Snow v. Bray, Ala., 73 So. 542; Stevens, v. Velde, 138 Minn. 59, 163 N. W. 796; Page v. Gaskill, 84 N. J. L. 615, 87 Atl. 460; Ramapo Mfg. Co. v. Mapes, 216 N. Y. 362, 110 N. E. 772; Stokes v. Murray, 95 S. C. 120, 78 S. E. 741.

49. Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. (U. S.) 472, 14 L. Ed. 228; Oglesby v. Hollister, 76 Cal. 136, 9 Am. St. Rep. 177, 18 Pac. 146; Taylor v. Danbury Public Hall Co., 35 Conn. 430; Ken-drick v. Latham, 25 Fla. 819, 6