This section is from the book "The Law Of Real Property and Other Interests In Land", by Herbert Thorn Dike Tiffany. Also available from Amazon: A Treatise on the Modern Law of Real Property and Other Interests in Land .
The statutes usually contain explicit provisions as to the constitution of the tribunals which are to decide the amount of compensation to be paid for the property taken. Such a tribunal may, in the absence of any constitutional requirement to the contrary, be composed of a jury of less than twelve men, or of a board of commissioners.
The petition for the condemnation should allow the public character of the use, and the necessity of taking the particular land, and this latter must be accurately described. Notice to the owner is necessary before the compensation is assessed, but constructive notice by publication is usually regarded as sufficient. The action of the tribunal in fixing the amount of the compensation is frequently subject to review by appeal or certiorari, but is not so in the absence of a statutory provision. In the case of an attempted taking of private property under color of the right of eminent domain, which is, however, unauthorized, on account either of the private nature of the use, the lack of necessity for the appropriation, or lack of legislative authority, the owner may usually obtain an injunction against the wrongful entry on the land, or may sue in ejectment or trespass, and sometimes other remedies are available.
States, 153 Fed. 876, 83 C. C. A. 58, to the same effect.
7. Ante, Sec. 417.
The constitutions of some states provide that compensation shall be made before the land is taken, but in others, where there is no such provision, the legislature sometimes authorizes a taking of property, and leaves the onus upon the landowner of instituting proceedings to ascertain the compensation to be paid, and to enforce its payment. Such legislation has usually been supported in the case of a taking by the state or a municipal corporation, but in a number of states it has been held that, in the case of the actual occupation of land by a private corporation, the payment of the compensation must be in some way secured to the owner of the land before he can thus be deprived of his property. When the taking of property does not involve the direct occupation of the land of the person claiming compensation, but merely consequential injuries thereto, the actual payment of the compensation is naturally subsequent to the acts which constitute the taking, since the proper amount thereof was not previously ascertainable.8