The following Official Report, on which was granted a Decree of Incorporation to the St. Louis Theosophical Society, is an important document, as putting on record the view taken of the Theosophical Society-after a careful examination of witnesses on oath-by an American Court of Law.

1. The petitioner is not a religious body. I report this negative finding for the reason that the word Theosophical contained in petitioners' name conveys a possible religious implication. The statutory phrase "society formed for religious purposes" applies, I suppose, only to an organization formed in part for worship, worship being an individual act involving adoration and perhaps emotional power, both being of necessity individual acts, or else to an organization formed for a propagation of a religious faith. Merely to teach a religion as one may teach algebra, is not, I think, a religious work, as the word religious is used in the Statute and the Constitution. A man may occupy a collegiate chair of Professor of Religions and as such teach the tenets of many religions. These different religions being variant and antagonistic, the Professor could not by any possibility worship under all. Nay, he might even be irreligious. Hence, merely teaching religions is not a religious work in the statutory sense. It will be noted that in article two of this society's constitution, the word religion is used in the plural. To teach religions is educational, not religious. "To promote the study of religions" is in part to promote the study of the history of man. I add the subordinate finding that the society has no religious creed and practices no worship.

2. The petitioner proposes to promote the study of literature and sciences. These objects are expressly within the terms of the Statute.

3. Cognate with the last objects is that of investigating "unexplained laws of nature and psychical powers latent in man." These two phrases, taken in their apparent meaning, are unobjectionable. But there is reason to believe that they form a meaning other than the apparent one.

The court will take notice of the commonly accepted meaning of the word Theosophy. Though I am ignorant of Theosophy, I think it is supposed to include among other things manifestations and phenomena, physical and psychical, that are violations of the laws now known by physicists and metaphysicians, and perhaps not explained or claimed to be explained or understood even by Theosophists themselves. In this group may be included Spiritualism, mesmerism, clairvoyance, mind-healing, mind-reading and the like. I took testimony on this question, and found that while a belief in any one of these sorts of manifestations and phenomena is not required, while each member of the society is at liberty to hold his own opinion, yet such questions form topics of inquiry and discussion, and the members as a mass probably believers individually in phenomena that are abnormal and in powers that are superhuman as far as science now knows. It is undoubtedly the right of any citizen to hold whatever opinions he pleases on these subjects, and to endeavor at his pleasure to investigate the unexplained and to display the latent. But the question here is: Shall the Court grant a franchise in aid of such endeavor? Voodooism is a word applied to the practices of guileful men among the ignorant and superstitious who inflict impostures upon guileless men among the ignorant and superstitious. No Court would grant a franchise in furtherance of such practices. The Court then will stop to inquire into the practices and perhaps the reputation of the enterprise which seeks judicial aid. I am not meaning to make a comparison between voodooism and this group of phenomena which for convenience (though I know not whether accurately) I will call occultism. I only take voodooism as a strong case to show the Court ought to inquire. If we now inquire into occultism we shall find that it has been occasionally used, as is reported, for the purposes of imposture. But this goes for nothing against its essential character. Always and everywhere bad men will make a bad use of anything for selfish ends. The object of this society, whether attainable or not, is undeniably laudable, assuming that there are physical and psychical phenomena unexplained, and that Theosophy seeks to explain them. Assuming that there are human powers yet latent, it seeks to discover them. It may be that absurdities and impostures are in fact incident to the nascent stage of its development. As to an understanding like that of occultism, which asserts powers commonly thought superhuman, and phenomena commonly thought supernatural, it seemed to me that the Court, though not assuming to determine judicially the question of their verity, would, before granting to occultism a franchise, inquire whether at least it had gained the position of being reputable or whether its adherents were merely men of narrow intelligence, mean intellect, and omnivorous credulity. I accordingly took testimony on that point, and find that a number of gentlemen in different countries of Europe, and also in this country, eminent in science, are believers in occultism. Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, a writer of large and varied learning, and of solid intellect, is asserted to have been an occultist, an assertion countenanced by at least two of his books. The late President Wayland, of Brown University, writing of abnormal mental operations as shown in clairvoyance, says:

The subject seems to me well worthy of the most searching and candid examination. It is by no means deserving of ridicule, but demands the attention of the most philosophical inquiry.

Sir William Hamilton, probably the most acute and, undeniably, the most learned of English metaphysicians that ever lived, said at least thirty years ago:

However astonishing, it is now proved beyond all rational doubt that in certain abnormal states of the nervous organism perceptions are possible through other than the ordinary channels of the senses.

By such testimony Theosophy is at least placed on the footing of respectability. Whether by further labor it can make partial truths complete truths, whether it can eliminate extravagances and purge itself of impurities, if there are any, are probably questions upon which the Court will not feel called upon to pass. I perceive no other feature of the petitioners' constitution that is obnoxious to legal objection, and accordingly I have the honor to report that I show no cause why the prayer of the petitioners should not be granted.

- August W. Alexander, Amicus Curiae.