The security of individuals against defamation calculated to injure them in their property rights, or in their feelings or their reputation, is a proper matter for consideration by the law; and it is therefore generally regarded as criminal to publish any matter calculated to bring individuals into contempt, or subject them to ridicule, or to destroy their good reputation. Such a wrong is regarded as a public injury in the same sense as wrongful appropriation or destruction of the property of individuals; and while the individual concerned may be alone directly damaged, it is for the protection of the public in general against similar injuries that such acts are treated as crimes. Moreover, the publication with reference to individuals of defamatory matter is calculated to cause disorder and is in that sense a public wrong.

It is evident that the publication of defamatory matter may be objectionable from the point of view of the public tranquillity and security, although it is in fact true; and therefore in prosecutions for libel as a crime, the truth of the defamatory matter published is not necessarily any defence. But there, may well be just occasion for publishing defamatory matter which is true, as, where it relates to the conduct of a public officer or the character of one who is a candidate for office; and it is usually provided in state constitutions in some form of language that in criminal prosecutions for libel the truth of the defamatory matter may be shown and will constitute a defence if it appears that the publication was with good motives and for justifiable ends.

In many state constitutions it is also provided that in criminal prosecutions for libel, the jury shall be judges of the law as well as of the facts. This modification of the ordinary rule as to jury trials, that the court determines questions of law and leaves only the facts to be determined by the jury, is due to a peculiarity of the English law, in accordance with which judges were in the habit of instructing juries that the fact of publication of the alleged defamatory matter was alone to be determined, it being for the court to say whether the publication was in fact defamatory, or whether it was privileged. There seems to be no substantial difference, however, under such a constitutional provision, between a prosecution for libel and a prosecution for any other crime; the judge directs the jury as to the law, and the jury determines whether the facts are such as to constitute a crime as defined by the court.

A person may be directly damaged in his property rights or in his feelings or reputation by defamatory publications made concerning him; and for such damage he is entitled to recover compensation in a civil action brought against the person wrongfully causing injury to him. In such action the truth of the defamatory matter may be shown by way of defence, for here, as in the case of slander referred to in a preceding section, the policy of the law is not to recognize as a civil injury the detriment suffered from the publication of the truth.