By the law of nature as well as by the law of society or government, one has the right to resist force with force in the defense of himself or of others when assailed by another in a dangerous or deadly manner. Hence if a person who is without fault be pursued or assaulted by another in such a manner as to induce in him a well-grounded belief that he is actually in danger of losing his life or of suffering great bodily harm when acting under the influence of such apprehension, he will be justified in defending himself, whether the danger was real or only apparent - even to the taking of the life of his assailant.64

Under the doctrine of self-defense a person may take human life intentionally, and not commit any crime.65

A person thus assaulted or pursued may act upon appearances. The danger confronting him need not be real, but it must appear imminent, urgent and pressing to justify the killing of the assailant. A mere belief of danger is not sufficient.66

62 Dilger vs. Com., 88 Ky.,* 550;

Reg. vs. Porter, 12 Cox., 444;

Rolen vs. State, 31 Fla., 514. 63 Reg. vs. Caton, 12 Cox, C. C, 624;

People vs. Munn, 65 Cal., 211. 64 Campbell vs. People, 16 111., 17;

Steiner vs. People, 187 111., 245. 65 Smith vs. People, 142 111., 117, 123. 66 Price vs. People, 131 111., 234;

Hughes. Cr. Law, Sec. 2443.

The danger or apparent danger must be such as would justify an ordinarily prudent person under like circumstances in taking the life of his assailant to save his own.67

The accused is not bound to show that the killing was absolutely necessary, but only apparent.68 And one in the exercise of the right of self-defense is not required to wait until his assailant gets the advantage over him; he may act promptly, especially if he has been repeatedly threatened by a lawless enemey.69

But the accused must be wholly free from fault in bringing on the difficulty. He has no right to provoke a quarrel and take advantage of it and then justify the killing on the ground of self-defense.70

But if it appears that a person, though originally in the wrong in bringing on the difficulty, in good faith had abandoned the conflict and declined any further struggle he then would have the right to act in self-defense.71

Whether the accused in good faith acted upon well-grounded or reasonable belief of danger at the time of giving the mortal blow is generally a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances of the particular case. The reasonableness of the apprehension must be judged from the standpoint of the accused at the time and not from that of the jury.72

67 State vs. Warren, 1 Warr. (Del.), 487. 68 Enright vs. People, 155 111., 35. 69 State vs. Matthews, 148 Mo., 185;

Bohannon vs. Com., 8 Bush.

(Ky.), 481 70 Hughes vs. People, 116 111., 335;

Weld vs. State, 124 Ala., 41;

Henney vs. People, 108 111., 527; State vs. Vaughan, 141

Mo., 514; Swammer vs. State (Tex. Cr.), 58 S. W., 72; Roberson vs. State, 53 Ark., 516; Crawford vs. State, 112 Ala., 1. 71 Young vs. Com., 19 Ky L. R., 929; People vs. Newcomer, 118 Cal., 263; State vs. Higgerson, 157 Mo., 395; 3 Greenl. Ev., Sec. 116; 4 Blackstone Com., 184. 72 1 McClain Cr. Law, Sec. 306.