For mere voluntary or gratuitous services there can be no recovery. No person can have a liability forced upon him in this way without any consent on his part.10 There is one well established exception to this rule. Where a person is under a moral and legal obligation to do an act, and another does it for him in such circumstances of urgent necessity that humanity and decency admit of no time for delay, the law will imply a promise to pay without the proof of the actual promise.11 Cases of this character furnish good illustrations of true quasi contracts. In Ambrose vs.

* See Section 105.

* See Section 106.

6 See Section 107.

7 See Section 108.

8 See Section 109.

9 See Section 110.

10 Utica, etc., R. Go. vs. United States, 22 Ct. Ci., 265; Fox vs.

Sloo, 10 La. Am., 11; Boston Ice Co. vs. Potter, 123 Mass., 28, 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. XV, p. 1080; Force vs. Harnes. 17N.J.L.,389; Gould vs. Monla-han, 53 N. J. Eq., 341; Patterson vs. Patterson, 59 N. Y., 582; 17 Am. Rep., 384.

Kerrison,12 the Court in applying this rule held that where a husband and wife were separated, and a distant relative, not knowing where the husband was, on the death of the wife defrayed her burial expenses, he was entitled to recover from the husband the amount so expended.

Where a person renders services for another at his request without any agreement as to compensation,13 or where a person accepts the services of another under such circumstances as would show that such services were not intended to be gratuitous,14 the law will presume a promise to pay the reasonable value of such services. These, however, are illustrations of implied contracts, rather than quasi contracts.

In cases where the plaintiff has wilfully abandoned the contract before completion, some courts have held that there can be no recovery on a quantum meruit;15 while other courts have allowed the plaintiff to recover the value of his services less damages resulting from the breach.16 The first view is taken by the Court in Badgley vs. Heald.17 "By the contract between the parties, Heald was to work for Badgley six months at eight dollars per month, with the right to either party to terminate at the end of the first month. This was an entire contract, as much so as if the agreement had been to work the six months for forty-eight dollars, with the privilege to either party to put an end to the contract at the end of the first month, when Heald should receive eight dollars. As the agreement was not terminated at the end of the first month, it was then the same as if it had never contained such a provision. The evidence clearly shows, that Heald abandoned the service of Badgley before the completion of the contract and without the consent of Badgley, or any justifiable cause. Nor can it be said that Badgley subsequently consented to the rescinding of the contract by the payment of the eight dollars, even were that admissible; for although Badgley did pay Heald eight dollars, yet he did it under a protestation that he was not bound to pay it, for he said 'he would not pay him, plaintiff, any more unless he was compelled to pay it by law.' It is manifest from this, that what he paid at that time he intended as a gratuity, or did it to buy his peace, under a protest against further liability. It clearly appeared that this work was done under an entire contract which the plaintiff below refused, without any excuse, to fulfill; and the law, as laid down by this and various other courts, determines that he is entitled to no compensation.

12 10 C. B., 776; 70 E. C. L., 776. 13 Spearman vs. Texarkana, 58

Ark,. 348; Linn vs. Linderath,

40 El. App., 320; Blaisdell vs.

Gladwin, 4 Cush., 373. 14 Shelton vs. Johnson, 40 Iowa, 84;

Viley vs. Pettit, 96 Ky., 576;

Hienanz vs. Goerger, 51 Mo.

App., 586. 15 Eldridge vs. Rowe, 7 I11., 93; 43

Am. Dec., 41; Miller vs. God-dard, 34 Me., 102; Faxon vs. Mansfield, 2 Mass., 147; Mason vs. Heyward, 3 Minn., 182.

15 Wheatly vs. Miscal, 5 Ind., 142; McClay vs. Hedge, 18 Iowa, 66; Duncan vs. Bakern, 21 Kan., 99; Carroll vs, Welch, 26 Tex., 149.

17 9 I11., 64.

"The case of Lantry vs. Parks, 8 Cowen, 63, is precisely like this. There the plaintiff had agreed to work for the defendant one year, at ten dollars per month. He worked ten and a half months and then left the defendant's service, saying he would work no more until he ascertained whether he could collect his wages. It was there held that the agreement was entire, and that the plaintiff could collect nothing till he had performed his part of it. The same rule is unequivocally held in the cases of McMillan vs. Vander-lip, 12 Johns, 165, Jennings vs. Camp, 13 do., 24; Spain vs. Arnott, 2 Stark, 256; De Camp vs. Stevens,

4 Black, 24; Ripley vs. Chipman, 13 Verm., 268; Morford vs. Mastin, 6 Monroe, 609; Thayer vs. Wads-worth, 19 Pick, 349. Numerous other cases might be cited in support of this law, but it is unnecessary. Nor is there any hardship in this rule, as it might at first appear. It is reciprocal, for if the employer turn off the servant before the expiration of the time agreed upon, without any just cause, the latter may recover the full amount agreed upon, as if he had worked out his whole time. Posey vs. Grath, 7 Missouri, 64."

An illustration of the second view is found in Duncan vs. Baker,18 where it was held that where Baker hired Duncan to work for him seven months at fifteen dollars per month, and Duncan worked only fifty-nine days and then quit without any reasonable excuse therefor, Duncan might nevertheless recover from Baker for what the work which Duncan had done, was reasonably worth, less any damages that Baker had received by reason of the partial nonfulfillment of the contract.

Where the full performance of a contract becomes impossible without any fault on the part of the plaintiff, he can recover on a quantum meruit for the work he has performed.19