Gould, J., was of the same opinion with Nares, J., that this action was well maintainable. The whole difficulty lies in the form of the action and not in the substance of the remedy. The line is very nice between case and trespass upon these occasions; I am persuaded there are many instances wherein both or either will lie. I agree with brother Nares, that wherever a man does an unlawful act, he is answerable for all the consequences; and trespass will lie against it, if the consequence be in nature of trespass. But, exclusive of this, I think the defendant may be considered in the same view as if he himself had personally thrown the squib in the plaintiff's face. The terror impressed upon Willis and Ryal excited self-defence, and deprived them of the power of recollection. What they did was therefore the inevitable consequence of the defendant's unlawful act. Had the squib been thrown into a coach full of company, the person throwing it out again would not have been answerable for the consequences. What Willis and Ryal did was by necessity, and the defendant imposed that necessity upon them. As to the case of the football, I think that if all the people assembled act in concert, they are all trespassers; 1, from the general mischievous intent; 2, from the obvious and natural consequences of such an act; which reasoning will equally apply to the case before us. And that actions of trespass will lie for the mischievous consequences of another's act, whether lawful or unlawful, appears from their being maintained for acts done in the plaintiff's own land; Hardr., 60; Courtney and Collet, 1 Lord Rayn, 272. I shall not go over again the ground which brother Nares has relied on and explained, but concur in his opinion, that this action is supported by the evidence.

DeGray, C. J., - This case is one of those wherein the line drawn by the law between actions on the case and action of trespass is very nice and delicate. Trespass is an injury accompanied with force, for which an action of trespass vi et armis lies against the person from whom it is received. The question here is, whether the injury received by the plaintiff arises from the force of the original act of the defendant or from a new force by a third person. I agree with my brother Blackstone as to the principles he has laid down, but not in his application of those principles to the present case. The real question certainly does not turn upon the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the original act; for actions of trespass will lie for legal acts when they become trespasses by accident; as in the cases cited of cutting thorns, lopping of a tree, shooting at a mark, defending oneself by a stick which strikes another behind, etc. - They may also lie for the consequences even of unlawful acts, as that of casting a log in the highway, etc. But the true question is, whether the injury is the direct or immediate act of the defendant; and I am of opinion that in this case it is. The throwing the squib was an act unlawful, and tending to affright the bystander. So far mischief was originally intended; not any particular mischief, but mischief . indiscriminate and wanton. Whatever mischief therefore follows he is the author of it - Egerditur personam, as the phrase is in criminal cases. And though criminal cases are no rule for civil ones, yet in trespass I think there is an analogy. Every one who does an unlawful act is considered as the doer of all that follows; if done with a deliberate intent, the consequence may amount to murder; if incautiously, to manslaughter; Fost, 261. So, too, in 1 Ventr., 295, a person breaking a horse in Lincoln's Inn Fields hurt a man; held that trespass lay; and 2 Lev., 172, that it need not be laid scienter. I look upon all that was done subsequent to the original throwing as a continuation of the first force and first act, which will continue till the squib was spent by bursting. And I think that any innocent person removing the danger from himself to another is justifiable; the blame lights upon the first thrower. The new direction and new force flow out of the first force, and are not a new trespass. The writ in the Register, 95, a, for trespass in maliciously cutting down a head of water, which thereupon flowed down to and overwhelmed another's pond, shows that the immediate act need not be instantaneous, but that a chain of effects connected together will be sufficient. It has been argued that the intervention of a free agent will make a difference; but I do not consider Willis and Ryal as free-agents in the present case, but acting under a compulsive necessity for their own safety and self preservation. On these reasons I concur with brothers Gould and Nares, that the present action is maintainable."