There must always be a misrepresentation of material fact as the first element in an action for deceit. This misrepresentation, however, need not always consist of express words. There may be a misrepresentation either by (a) express words, (b) actions, or (c) concealment.

(a) Misrepresentation by express words. This is the clearest type of misrepresentation. Where misrepresentations are thus made, with the intention of having them acted upon, it is very evident that there is a basis for an action of deceit.2

The misrepresentations may have been as to any matter having a natural bearing on the transaction, but they must not be merely expressions of opinion. For example, where defendant, a corporation, by its president, wrote to the owner of certain land to be used in the sale of mortgage bonds, stating, inter alia, that "we have in our possession the original documents printed in the advertisements of your bonds secured by mortgage to this company as trustee upon the tract in this city. We indorse the estimates of value contained therein, made by," certain persons, names, "all of whom are known as men of integrity and sound judgment touching local estimate value." We are of the opinion that" it "is adequate security for the amount of your proposed loan." It was held that such statements purport to be mere opinions, and, though false, actions for deceit will not he in favor of persons to whom they were made for the purpose of inducing them to invest in bonds secured by the mortgage therein referred to.

2 Stevens vs. Lee, 2 C. L. R., 251; Gerhard vs. Bates, 1. C. L. R., 868; 2E.& B., 476; Hubbard vs. Weave, 79 Iowa, 687; 44 N. W., 915; Dickinson vs. Atkins, 100 111. App., 401.

Such letter, however, also stated: "That we consider the title good in you will appear from the fact that we have engaged to issue our policies of title insurance to the several holders of your mortgage bonds to the aggregate amount of $150,000, fully protecting such holders against loss or damage arising from any defect in said title or prior incumbrance thereon." It was held that such representation purports to be a statement of fact, which was intended to produce the belief among purchasers of bonds, to whom it was shown, that the title was perfect, and, if false, renders defendant liable to, such purchasers as bought relying thereon.3

In actions for deceit by purchaser of such bonds on account of such representation it appeared that there was a prior mortgage of $30,000 on the land; that it had been arranged by the owner that defendant should reserve in its hands bonds to the amount of $40,000 as a protection against such mortgage; and that defendant's president probably regarded policies of title insurance to be issued by it as a perfect protection to the bondholders. It was held, that the representation was false, since a bond secured by a second mortgage with a policy of title insurance is not the same as a bond secured by a first mortgage.4

In a recent New York case it was held that an action for deceit would lie against one who induced the plaintiff to marry a woman by representing that she was virtuous, when she was at the time pregnant by the defendant.5

3 Nash vs. Minnesota Title Ins., etc., Co., 159 Mass., 437; 34 N. E., 625.

4 Id.

Some cases have held that the action of deceit will not he for a false claim by the vendor that the title is in him, when the purchaser has taken possession of the premises under a conveyance with express covenants.6 The weight of opinion, however, is the other way even on this point,7 and all cases agree that such action will he for collateral misrepresentation affecting the title.8

A person is liable, in an action of this character, who makes a false and fraudulent representation of fact as to the credit or standing of another, by which a third person is damaged. Thus it was held by the Supreme Court of Georgia that: "An action on the case for a false representation, lies against one who gives a letter of recommendation of character and credit to an individual, on the strength of which he gets credit, it being shown that the representations were false, and that the defendant knew them to be false."9

The illustrations already given will serve to show the various kinds of misrepresentations which be the basis for an action for deceit. A complete enumeration of all the possible forms of deceit would be an impossibility.

(b) Misrepresentations may also arise from the acts or conduct of the party. This is clearly set out in the decision in Leonard vs. Springer.10 "Counsel further contends there is no allegation that the defendant ever knew the plaintiff or ever made any representations of any sort to her. It is true, the representations were not by means of conversations between the parties, but the rule is as stated in the Law of Frauds, by Bigelow (p. 467), that a representation is anything short of a warranty, 'proceding from the action or conduct of the party charged, which is sufficient to create upon the mind a distinct impression of fact, conducive of action. The most usual and obvious example is an oral, written or printed statement. But statement is by no means necessary. Any conduct capable of being turned into a statement of fact is a representation. There is no distinction between misrepresentations effected by words and misrepresentations effected by other acts. It is sufficient that there were acts such as to mislead a reasonably cautious or prudent man in regard to the existence of a fact forming a basis of or contributing an inducement to some change of position by him.' In this case, the recitals in the deeds and trust deed, stating a consideration which inferred that the property was of great value whereas the interest of the defendant therein was of no value whatever; the memorandum on the notes that they were secured, 'by a trust deed to Chicago Title and Trust Company, trustee, of even date herewith, on seven-story and basement building, No. 188 East Monroe Street, City of Chicago,' implying that the trust deed conveyed the fee simple title; the recital in the trust company's certificate that these notes were a part of a series of notes amounting to $75,000, 'secured by trust deed,' and likewise the statement that 'in consideration of the interest being paid in full the time is extended to May 1, 1899,' signed by Miller, are in law representations calculated to deceive and mislead any third person dealing with those notes. Especially is the statement by Miller misleading and deceptive. It amounted to a statement that the notes were originally given to him as a part, only, of the purchase price for the property; and that statement, taken with the recitals of consideration, $100,000, naturally leads to the inference that he received $25,000 of the purchase price in money and $75,000 in said notes. Accepting as true the allegations of the declaration, as we must on this general demurrer, the scheme was an artful one, calculated to lead an innocent third party to believe that the property was ample security for a much larger sum of money than that invested by the plaintiff. Moreover, if appellee concocted a scheme for placing ' fraudulent and worthless securities upon the market, he cannot be heard to say that parties induced to buy them shall suffer for their failure or neglect to discover his fraud. The rule is, that a party guilty of fraudulent conduct, whereby he induces another to act, will not be allowed to impute negligence to the latter as against his own deliberate fraud."