The doctrine of contributory negligence is, that one cannot recover compensation for an injury from any negligence, into which negligence of his own has to a greater or less degree entered cause, contributing as a proximate to the complained result.26

Negligence, to be actionable, must be the proximate cause of the injury, and similarly contributory negligence, in order to be a defense must also be a proximate cause of the injury sued on.27 The application of the doctrine of contributory negligence is well set out in the decision in the case of The Bernina.28

"The cases which give rise to actions for negligence are primarily reducible to three classes as follows: 1. A, without fault of his own, is injured by the negligence of B; then B is liable to A. 2. A, by his own fault, is injured by B, without fault on his part, then B is not liable to A. 3. A is injured by B by the fault, more or less, of both combined; then the following further distinctions have to be made: (a) If notwithstanding B's negligence, A, with reasonable care, could have avoided the injury, he cannot sue B; (b) if, notwithstanding A's negligence, B, with reasonable care, could have avoided injuring A, A can sue B; (c) if there has been as much want of reasonable care on A's part as on B's, or, in other words, if the proximate cause of the injury is the want of reasonable care on both sides, A cannot sue B. In such a case A cannot, with truth say, that he has been injured by B's negligence. He can only with truth say, that he has been injured by his own carelessness with N's negligence, and the two combined give no cause of action at common law."

24 Ford vs. London, etc., R. Co., 2 F. & F., 730; Planter's Warehouse, etc., Co. vs. Taylor, 64 Ark., 307; Illinois Central R. Co. vs. Anderson, 184 111., 294; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cush. (Mass.), 292.

25 American and English Ency. of Law, Vol. XXI, p. 463; Hay-man vs. Hewitt, Peake Add. Cases, 170; Morris vs. Platt, 32 Conn., 75; Central R., etc.

Co. vs. Roach, 64 Ga., 635;

Duvall vs. Baltimore, etc., R.

Co., 73 Md., 516; Bolton vs.

Calkins, 102 Mich., 69. 26 Bishop on Non-Contract Law,

Sec. 459. 27 Doggett vs. Richmond, etc., R.,

78 N. C, 305; Pendleton

Street R. vs. Stallman, 22 Ohio

St., 1. 28 12 P. D., 58.

In Pennsylvania R. Co. vs. Aspell,29 the defendant company negligently carried the plaintiff, a passenger, beyond his destination. The speed of the train was slackened somewhat at the switches, but after passing these the speed became greater. The conductor warned the plaintiff not to attempt to get off while the cars were moving, and told him that he would back the train to the station. The plaintiff, however, leaped from the car and was hurt. It was held that he was guilty of contributory negligence, which was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, and could not recover.

The case of Flagg vs. Hudson,30 will serve as an illustration of the class of cases, which do not amount to contributory negligence. In this case, the plaintiff, driving along a highway on a dark night, pulled his horse to the left to avoid going down an embankment on the right of the road, which had negligently been left without a railing. By so going down he was brought into collision with another vehicle which came from the opposite direction. It was held that the failure of the town authorities properly to safeguard the road was the proximate cause of the damage, and that the plaintiff was not chargeable with contributory negligence in being on the wrong side of the road.

29 23 Pa. St., 147.

30 142 Mass., 289.