The right of a common carrier to limit his liability by special contract is much broader. The only limitation upon such right is that the limitation shall not be illegal or unreasonable and that no unfair advantage be taken of the shipper. In the United States the courts have held, in the great majority of cases, that when a shipper accepts a bill of lading containing provisions for a limitation of the common law liability of the carrier, such provision is binding upon him.15 A common carrier cannot exempt himself from liability for losses caused by his own negligence. Such a contract is clearly against public policy. This question was discussed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Liverpool Steam Co. vs. Phenix Ins. Co.,16 in the following words: "The employment of a common carrier is a public one, charging him with the duty of accommodating the public in the line of his employment. A common carrier is such by virtue of his occupation, not by virtue of the responsibilities under which he rests. Even if the extent of these responsibilities is restricted by law or by contract, the nature of his occupation makes him a common carrier still. A common carrier may become a private carrier, or a bailee for hire, when, as a matter of accommodation or special engagement, he undertakes to carry something which it is not his business to carry. But when a carrier has a regularly established business for carrying all or certain articles, and especially if that carrier is a corporation created for the purpose of the carrying trade, and the carriage of the articles is embraced within the scope of its chartered powers, it is a common carrier, and a special contract about its responsibility does not divest it of that character.

14 American and Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. V, p. 289; Southern Express Co. vs. Newby, 36 Ga., 635.

15 Michigan Cent. R. Co. vs. Mineral Springs Mfg. Co., 16 Wall. (U. S.), 329; Levering vs. Union Transp., etc., Co., 42 Mo., 88, 97 Am. Dec, 320.

"The fundamental principle, upon which the law of common carriers was established, was to secure the utmost care and diligence in the performance of their duties. That end was effected in regard to goods, by charging the common carrier as an insurer, and in regard to passengers by exacting the highest degree of carefulness and diligence. A carrier who stipulates not to be bound to the exercise of care and diligence, seeks to put off the essential duties of his employment.

16 129 U. S., 397.

"Special contracts between the carrier or the customer, the terms of which are just and reasonable and not contrary to public policy, are upheld; such as those exempting the carrier from responsibility for losses happening from accident, or from dangers of navigation that no human skill or diligence can guard against; or for money or other valuable articles, liable to be stolen or damaged - unless informed of their character and value; or for perishable articles or live animals, when injured without default or negligence of the carrier. But the law does not allow a public carrier to abandon altogether his obligations to the public, and to stipulate for exemptions which are unreasonable and improper, amounting to an abnegation of the essential duties of his employment.

"It being against the policy of the law to allow stipulations which will relieve the railroad company from the exercise of care and diligence, or which in other words, will excuse it for negligence in the performance of its duty the company remains liable for such negligence.

"This analysis of the opinion in Railroad Co. vs. Lockwood shows that it affirms and rests upon the doctrine that an express stipulation by any common carrier for hire, in a contract of carriage, that he shall be exempt from liability for losses caused by the negligence of himself or his servants is unreasonable and contrary to the public policy, and consequently void. And such has always been the understanding of this court, expressed in several later cases. Express Co. vs. Caldwell, 21 Wall, 264, 268 (210); Railroad Co. vs. Pratt, 22 Wall., 123, 134; Bank of Kentucky vs. Adams Express Co., 93 U. S., 174, 183; Railway Co. vs. Stevens, 95 U. S., 655; Hart vs. Pennsylvania Railroad, 112 U. S., 331, 338; Phoenix Ins. Co. vs. Erie Transportation Co., 117 U. S., 312, 322; Inman vs. South Carolina Railway, ante (129 U. S.), 128." Section 15. Liability of Connecting Carriers. "By joint arrangement between carriers operating connecting lines, a partnership relation may arise by which each is liable for breach of the duty of carrier by any one of them in the course of the transportation, and suit may be brought against any one for the loss. But mere joint traffic arrangements, and an agreement, for division of freight, will not in themselves constitute such a partnership.17 The joint arrangement between the connecting lines may be such as to make each the agent for the other in undertaking the continuous transportation of goods.18 On the other hand, where the initial carrier undertakes the entire transportation, the connecting carriers through whose hands the goods pass in the performance of the contract are agents of the initial carrier in the performance of its contract, and a suit for breach of the contract should be brought against the carrier with whom the contract is made." 19