It is a well settled rule of law, that the owner of land has a right to have the soil of his premises sustained by the lateral support of the natural soil of the adjoining land, but this right is limited to the soil in its natural state, and does not extend to the support of any additional weight which the owner of the soil may place upon it, such as a building or other superstructure, near his boundary line.

7 Dillon on Mun. Corp.; Story vs. N. Y. Elev. R. Co., 90 N.Y., 122.

8 Heineck vs. Grosse, 99 III. App., 441.

The owner may use his land in such reasonable way as his judgment shall dictate, either by making excavations or superstructures thereon, subject, however, to the implied condition that he shall not thereby interfere with his neighbor in the enjoyment of the same right in respect to his adjacent land. Each is entitled to have his soil in its natural state sustained, when necessary, by the lateral support of the adjacent soil of the other, but neither has the right to burden the land of the other with the support of any additional weight, as that would be to make the land of the one servient to that of the other.9

In the case of Thurston vs. Hancock, 12 Mass., 229, the facts were these: In 1802, the plaintiff purchased a lot upon Beacon Hill, in the city of Boston, and in 1804 built a valuable house on it within two feet of his line; in 1811 the defendant became the owner of the adjoining lot and began to dig down the hill, and had dug within five or six feet of the plaintiff's lot, when the earth gave way and exposed the foundations of the plaintiff's house, and he had to take it down. The court held that the plaintiff was without remedy for the injury to his house, saying: "A man, in digging upon his own land, is to have regard to the position of his neighbor's land, and the probable consequences to his neighbor. If he digs too near his line, and if he disturbs the natural state of the soil, he shall answer in damages; but he is answerable only for the natural and necessary consequence of his act, and not for the value of a house put upon, or near, the line by his neighbor. For in so placing the house, the neighbor was in fault, and ought to have taken better care of his interests. ... He built at his peril, for it was not possible for him, merely by building upon his own ground, to deprive the other party of such use of his as he would deem most advantageous. . . . For the loss of or injury to the soil merely, his action may be maintained. The defendants should have anticipated the consequences of digging so near the line, and they are answerable for the direct consequential damage to the plaintiff, although not for the adventitious damages arising from putting his house in a dangerous position."

9 City of Quincy vs. Jones, 76 III., 231.

Gas and Water Pipes.- A municipal corporation may allow the use of its streets for the purpose of laying down gas pipes and water pipes. Where a charter in terms gives a city the power to supply, or authorize its inhabitants to be supplied with water, the city council may use, or as an incidental power may permit a contractor to use, the streets for that purpose. The use of streets for the purpose of laying water pipes being necessary to the construction of water works, the power to contract for their construction includes, as a necessary incident, the power to contract for the use of the streets for that purpose.10

Projections. - Municipal corporations quite generally enact ordinances permitting the owners of lots abutting on streets to construct and extend balconies, awnings, bay-windows and signs for a certain distance over the line of the street.

10 State vs. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 Ohio St., 262; Quincy vs. Bull, 106 III., 337.

It is held that in such cases the adjoining property owners who suffer some inconvenience thereby cannot recover damages.11

However, in the case of John Anicfield Co. vs. Edward B. Grossman & Co., 98 III. App., 180, the court held, in substance, that a municipal corporation holds and controls its streets and sidewalks in trust for the general public, without the power of converting or appropriating them to private use, and where an ordinance by its terms proposes to impair the public right and use of a part of a street or sidewalk for the sole purpose of enabling a private person or corporation to occupy a part of the street or sidewalk by a permanent structure appurtenant to his or its building abutting upon such street or sidewalk, such ordinance is void.

Railroads in Streets. - In the absence of constitutional restrictions, the legislature may authorize the use of the public streets by railroads, and may delegate such power to municipal corporations. "The power of municipalities to authorize railroads to use their streets may be derived either from express grant or by necessary implication. It is a question of some doubt whether the general authority over the streets which is usually given to them empowers them to grant to street railway companies the right to use their streets; but the better rule seems to be that it does. It is believed, however, that the ordinary powers of municipal corporations to regulate and improve their streets and to prevent their obstruction are not in themselves sufficient to enable municipalities to grant the right to use their streets to ordinary commercial railroads, although it has been held that a city may grant such a right when it is given sole and exclusive control of its streets.

11 Livingston vs. Wolf, 136 Pa. St., 519; Garrett vs. Janes, 65 Md., 260.

"It is clear that it cannot grant such a right when a railroad is for the mere private use of an individual." 12

It is held, that a grant of power to construct a railroad along a street does not exist in a municipal corporation unless plainly given by the legislature.13

"The usual and ordinary powers of municipal corporations to regulate streets and keep them free from obstructions are not sufficient, it is believed, to empower them to authorize the use thereof for the purpose of constructing and operating thereon a steam railway, as these powers are not to be enlarged by construction, and were not conferred for this purpose." 14

Street Railways. - The consent of the municipality is now required in most of the states for the operation of street railways. A contract between the municipal corporation and the railway company is the modern mode of granting the privilege of operating street railways, and this contract may exist in the form of written documents signed by the authorities of the municipality and the company, or it may exist in the form of an ordinance passed by the city and accepted by the company.

The business and property of a street railway company are impressed with a public interest, and it may be subjected to municipal regulations, and a city cannot, by an ordinance granting a street railway franchise, deprive itself of the power nor relieve itself of the duty of enacting and enforcing ordinances necessary for the preservation of the health, safety and comfort of the public; nor can the company, by any contractual terms of the ordinance, exempt itself from control of the city in such respect.

12 Elliot, Mun. Corp., Par 106;

Elliot on Railroads, Vol. III, Par. 1077. 13 Merrill vs. Monticello, 138 U. S., 673.

14 Dillon, Mun. Corp., Vol. II (3d Ed.), Par. 705; Railroad Co. vs. Shiels, 33 Ga., 601.