Following the general rule that suretyship contracts are to be strictly construed, and that the liability of the surety shall rest on the express language used, and that the liability shall not be increased by implication, it follows that where the language used is ambiguous in part, it is the rule that the courts will endeavor to so construe the contract and to give it an interpretation as to prevent a forfeiture of the instrument if possible. There is no apparent way, however, to reconcile the decisions of the courts on this point. One line of decisions hold that the surety who is responsible for the use of ambiguous words, which mislead or tend to mislead the other party, uses such words at his peril, and the words so used will be construed most strongly against the surety. This line of decisions gives the obligee the right to adopt his construction of the contract, provided it is reasonable and provided he acts on it and it is employed by the surety in the contract.10 The other line of decisions follows the rule laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Russel vs. Clark in which he says: "It is the duty of the individual who contracts with one man on the credit of another not to trust to ambiguous phrases and strained constructions, but to require an explicit and plain declaration of the obligation he is about to assume." 11

7 McMillan vs. Parkell, 64 Mo., 286.

8 Spring vs. Bank of Mount Pleasant, 10 Peters, 257.

9 Cordle vs. Burch, 10 Gratt (Va.), 480.

Many decisions, on the question involved, have followed the rule enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall, giving a construction tending to the opposite of the other line of decisions.12

10 Taussig vs. Reid et al., 145 I11., 488; Rindge vs. Judson, 24 N. Y., 64.

11 7 Cranch, 90

12 Cutler vs. Ballou, 136 Mass., 337; Morgan vs. Boyer, 30 Ohio State, 324.